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This thesis is structured as three papers and aims to explore three main alliance factors 
that relate to firm performance, with a sample of China and Taiwan companies from 
the printed circuit board industry and plastic rubber industry. Firm performance 
depends on firm strategy and how resources are configured. A critical alliance factor 
is alliance strategy, which can determine how firms form and operate their alliances. 
Alliance strategy can be either a standalone strategy or a portfolio strategy. I attempt 
to determine (1) if managerial characteristics and compensation package relate to the 
choice of alliance strategy; (2) if alliance strategy impacts on alliance diversities and 
firm performance relationships; (3) if alliance capabilities impact on the alliance 
strategy and firm performance relationship. 
 
Paper 1 builds on upper echelon theory and agency theory. I theorise that managerial 
characteristics and compensation package are the key determinants to understand why 
executives adopt different alliance strategies. The results show that tenure, executives’ 
educational background, functional background and variable pay are important to 
predict the choice of an alliance strategy. 
 
Paper 2 builds on the resource-based view. I explore the alliance strategy as a 
moderating influence between alliance diversities (partner, functional and governance) 
and firm performance. The results show that alliance strategy impacts on partner 
diversity and firm performance. However, it does not impact on the functional 
diversity-firm performance and governance diversity-firm performance relationships. 
Governance diversity is related to firm performance only when partner diversity is 
also considered. 
 
Paper 3 builds on the resource-based view. I suggest that alliance capabilities are a 
mediating influence between alliance strategy and firm performance. The results 
demonstrate that individual alliance capabilities complement standalone alliance 
strategy, and portfolio alliance capabilities and individual alliance capabilities both 
complement portfolio alliance strategy. 
 
Theoretical contributions, possible future research and managerial implications are 
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Strategic alliance has been extensively studied in the field of strategic 
management, international business, knowledge management, organisational theory 
and economics (Singh and Mitchell, 2005). Gulati (1998) defines strategic alliances 
as voluntary arrangements between firms involving exchange, sharing or co-
development of products, technologies or services. The aim of this cooperative 
arrangement between firms is to improve their competitive position and performance 
by sharing resources (Hitt et al., 2000, Jarillo, 1988). Over the past few decades, 
researchers have tried to explain how firms can create successful strategic alliances 
and contribute to firm performance (Parkhe, 1993, Gulati, 1995a, Gulati, 1995b, Doz, 
1996, Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996, Simonin, 1997, Gulati, 1998, Gulati and 
Singh, 1998, Anand and Khanna, 2000, Baum et al., 2000, Chung et al., 2000, 
Dussauge et al., 2000, Hitt et al., 2000, Stuart, 2000, Ahuja, 2000a, Ahuja, 2000b). 
Scholars have shown that strategic alliances provide many benefits to the firms such 
as access to critical resources and capabilities, gaining legitimacy, facilitating 
innovations and accelerating international market entry (Baum et al., 2000, Brouthers 
et al., 2014, Powell et al., 1996, Nakos et al., 2014, Pisano, 1990, Shan et al., 1994, 
Teece, 1992). Despite this, strategic alliances have high failure rate, with studies 
showing that 50% of alliances fail (Greve et al., 2010, Park and Ungson, 2001). In 
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addition, the variation in performance outcomes for firms engaging strategic alliances 
is high (Ireland et al., 2002). 
In today’s business landscape, firms are commonly engaged in multiple 
alliances, not just single alliances. They face challenges in managing multiple strategic 
alliances simultaneously (Anand and Khanna, 2000, Doz and Hamel, 1998, Gulati, 
1998, Hoffmann, 2005, Hoffmann, 2007, Lavie, 2006, Lavie, 2007, Lavie and Miller, 
2008, Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009, Parise and Casher, 2003). Scholars have used 
different theoretical orientations to study the phenomenon of multiple strategic 
alliances such as the resource-based view (e.g. Ahuja, 2000a, Ahuja, 2000b, Lavie, 
2006), transaction cost economics (Goerzen and Beamish, 2005, Goerzen, 2007), 
learning and knowledge (e.g. Anand and Khanna, 2000, Deeds and Hill, 1996, Hoang 
and Rothaermel, 2005, Kale et al., 2002), social network theory (e.g. Baum et al., 2000, 
Capaldo, 2007, Goerzen and Beamish, 2005, Goerzen, 2007), dynamic capabilities 
(Kale et al., 2002), agency theory (Reuer and Ragozzino, 2006) and resource 
dependency theory (Bae and Gargiulo, 2004, Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009). This body 
of work suggests that there are two kinds of alliance strategies: standalone strategy, 
whereby firms manage each of their alliances independently from each other, and 
portfolio strategy, whereby firms manage all their alliances together as a portfolio. 
Despite the distinction between the two kinds of alliance strategies, scholars have not 
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explored why top managers choose one strategy over another. From a strategic 
decision-making perspective, the factors that lead to a standalone or portfolio strategy 
remain unclear.  
Furthermore, firms engaging in multiple alliances are likely to have a diverse 
set of alliances. Diversity can be diversity in partners, diversity in functions and/or 
diversity in governance structure (Jiang et al., 2010). Scholars have been interested in 
whether alliance diversity brings better or worse firm performance (e.g. Duysters and 
Lokshin, 2011, Goerzen and Beamish, 2005, De Leeuw et al., 2014, Hoehn-Weiss and 
Karim, 2014, Koka and Prescott, 2008, van Beers and Zand, 2014). The results so far 
have been mixed. Some studies show that partner diversity has a U-shaped relationship 
with firm performance (Jiang et al., 2010, Goerzen and Beamish, 2005), while others 
show that partner diversity has a positive effect on venture performance (Terjesen et 
al., 2011). Although scholars have investigated the relationship between alliance 
diversity and firm performance in the context of multiple alliances, they have not 
factored in the effect of a firm’s alliance strategy. Would a firm’s alliance strategy 
influence the relationship between diversity and performance?  
Finally, the alliance scholars highlight the existence of alliance capabilities 
either with regards to managing individual alliances (Schreiner et al., 2009) or in 
relation to managing a portfolio of alliances (Schilke and Goerzen, 2010, Sarkar et al., 
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2009). The capability of managing individual alliances is different from that of 
managing a portfolio of alliances (Wang and Rajagopalan, 2015). However, we do not 
know whether these capabilities will help firms to perform better when implementing 
a specific alliance strategy for managing multiple alliances.   
1.1. Purpose of Study 
The purpose of this research is to address the gaps in the alliance literature with 
respect to how firms manage multiple alliances. In terms of alliance strategy, we know 
very little about why firms choose one alliance strategy over another (standalone over 
portfolio or vice versa). I draw on upper echelons theory and agency theory to 
investigate whether top managers’ background and compensation packages influence 
the choice of alliance strategy. I develop and test the theory that top managers’ 
demographic characteristics may influence the choice of alliance strategy. In addition, 
I draw on agency theory to test the moderating effects of compensation package, as 
well as that of equity ownership, on the relationship between demographic 
characteristics and firm alliance strategy. 
Alliance diversity is an important topic in the alliance literature because the 
notion of diversity indicates a firm’s potential access to heterogeneous resources 
(Wassmer, 2010, Lavie and Miller, 2008). According to the resource-based view, 
resource heterogeneity is the basic condition to achieve competitive advantage 
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(Peteraf, 1993). Scholars generally agree that alliance diversity is related to a firm’s 
financial and innovation performance (Baum et al., 2000, Sampson, 2007, van Beers 
and Zand, 2014). However, a high level of diversity can also create extra managerial 
challenges and impact negatively on firm performance (Goerzen and Beamish, 2005, 
Koka and Prescott, 2008). The effect of diversity on firm performance appears to be 
inconclusive in the literature. I seek to explore whether the mixed results in the 
literature on alliance diversity and performance may be explained by a firm’s alliance 
strategy. I argue that having a standalone strategy is different from having a portfolio 
strategy when managing multiple alliances. Firms that choose one strategy or the other 
may leverage diversity differently, and this can influence the way diversity impacts 
performance. For example, a portfolio strategy encourages managers to consider how 
to integrate different resources from alliances together, whereas a standalone strategy 
may not. This implies that a portfolio strategy may strengthen the relationship between 
diversity and performance. My study seeks to find out how the choice of alliance 
strategy moderates the effect of alliance diversity on firm performance.  
Drawing on the resource-based view, scholars have highlighted the importance 
of alliance capabilities for explaining alliance success or failure (e.g. Anand and 
Khanna, 2000). Capabilities determine how well a firm uses its resources to achieve 
its objectives (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993, Makadok, 2001). In the alliance literature, 
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scholars distinguish the capabilities needed for managing single alliances from those 
needed for managing alliances as a portfolio (Wang and Rajagopalan, 2015). The 
success of strategy implementation is highly dependent on firm resources and 
capabilities (Miles and Snow, 1984). However, no studies investigate the link between 
standalone/portfolio strategy and individual alliance/portfolio alliance capability to 
study firm performance. The purpose of my research is to address this gap by studying 
alliance strategy, alliance capability and firm performance together. How does alliance 
capability help the firm to successfully implement a standalone or a portfolio strategy? 
1.2. Thesis Structure 
My thesis is formed of three papers. I propose and develop three conceptual 
models into three papers to address the research gaps and to explore how alliance 
strategy, alliance diversity and alliance capability influence firm performance. In my 
first paper, I explain the differences between a standalone strategy and a portfolio 
strategy when managing multiple alliances. I answer the question on why firms have 
a specific alliance strategy by studying the antecedents leading to the choice of either 
a standalone or a portfolio strategy. Based on upper echelons theory, managerial 
characteristics can influence the choice of alliance strategy, I investigate whether age, 
educational background, tenure and functional roles influence the choice of alliance 
strategy. For example, a portfolio strategy is considered as being less risky than a 
16 
 
standalone strategy because it takes into account the implications of potential conflicts 
among different alliances and allows the optimisation of alliance combinations. I 
hypothesise, for example, that older managers are more risk averse and may be more 
inclined to a portfolio strategy over a standalone strategy. 
In addition, agency theory suggests that managers do not always behave in the 
best interests of a firm due to the pursuit of personal gains and objectives that may be 
different from the firm’s (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Compensation package and 
equity ownership are often used as control mechanisms to align the interests of the 
principal and the agent (Fama and Jensen, 1983). This implies that compensation and 
equity ownership can influence a top manager’s strategic behaviour. Based on agency 
theory, I explore how compensation and equity ownership may lead top managers to 
deviate from the expected choice of alliance strategy. The conceptual model of paper 
1 is shown in Figure 1-1 below: 
Figure 1 - 1: Conceptual model of paper 1 
 
In the second paper, I focus on the relationship between alliance diversity and 
firm performance. Alliance diversity has been studied mainly from the perspectives of 
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the resource-based view (e.g. Cui and O'Connor, 2012, Jiang et al., 2010) and social 
network theory (e.g. Gulati et al., 2000, Lavie and Miller, 2008). Drawing on the 
resource-based view, scholars argue that a firm’s alliance diversity enables firms to 
access different resources and capabilities. However, studies on the relationship 
between alliance diversity and firm performance tend to be mixed. For example, some 
scholars find that partner diversity can lead to better firm performance (e.g. Beckman 
and Haunschild, 2002, Wuyts and Dutta, 2014), while others show that partner 
diversity can have negative effects on firm performance (e.g. Faems et al., 2010).  
Similarly, from a social network theory perspective, results are somewhat 
different, as some scholars argue that alliance diversity is helpful toward learning and 
knowledge accumulation of alliance experience (e.g. Kale and Singh, 2007, Lavie and 
Miller, 2008) and tends to positively contribute to performance (e.g. Goerzen and 
Beamish, 2005, Lee, 2007, Powell et al., 1996, Phelps, 2010), while others show that 
alliance diversity may have a negative impact on performance when there is radical 
environmental change (Koka and Prescott, 2008). 
Given the different findings regarding the impact of alliance diversity on firm 
performance in the literature, I explore the effect of alliance strategy on diversity and 
performance relationship. I draw on the resource-based view to argue that the impact 
of alliance diversity on firm performance may change depending on whether a firm 
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chooses a standalone or portfolio alliance strategy. A standalone strategy may not 
encourage managers to re-combine the resources from diverse partners, as each 
alliance is managed independently from each other. In contrast, for firms that adopt a 
portfolio strategy, diversity may be better leveraged, because a portfolio strategy 
encourages managers to evaluate all alliances based on a firm’s overall corporate 
objectives rather than on individual alliance objectives. Therefore, I theorise that a 
portfolio strategy strengthens the relationship between alliance diversity and firm 
performance, while a standalone strategy weakens this relationship. The conceptual 
model of paper 2 is shown in Figure 1-2 below: 
Figure 1 - 2: Conceptual model for paper 2 
 
My third paper seeks to extend on the literature discussing alliance capability 
and firm performance. Scholars argue that firms may have different capabilities to 
manage their alliances, which leads to different performance outcomes (Anand and 
Khanna, 2000, Gulati, 1998, Kale et al., 2002). In investigating the effects of alliance 
capability on firm performance, scholars have identified a number of alliance 
capabilities. For example, Schreiner et al. (2009) note that firms need to have the 
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capability to coordinate partner-related activity and the capability to communicate 
with the alliance partner, as well as the capability to bond with their alliance partner. 
Kandemir et al. (2006) suggest that firms need to have the capability to coordinate 
across different alliances as well as the capability to learn from previous alliances.  
In general, alliance capability studies either focus on the alliance capability to 
manage individual alliances (Simonin, 1997, Schreiner et al., 2009) or the alliance 
capability to manage a portfolio of alliances (Kandemir et al., 2006, Schilke and 
Goerzen, 2010, Sarkar et al., 2009). There are no studies that attempt to bring the two 
kinds of alliance capabilities together to study firm performance. Furthermore, the link 
between different alliance capabilities and different alliance strategies has so far not 
been explored. Although numerous studies note the relationship between alliance 
capability and performance, none of them take into account the role of alliance strategy 
in the equation. Drawing on the resource-based view, I propose that alliance capability 
may determine the outcome of alliance strategy. In other words, alliance capability can 
mediate the effect of alliance strategy on firm performance. The conceptual model for 
paper 3 is shown in Figure 1-3 below: 




1.3. Expected Contribution of Research 
The expected contributions of my research are as follows. First, previous 
literature suggests that firms may adopt two kinds of alliances strategies, such as 
portfolio strategy and standalone strategy (Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009, Hoffmann, 
2007, Parise and Casher, 2003), but does not show what drives the choice of alliance 
strategy. I contribute to the alliance literature by exploring the factors leading to the 
choice of alliance strategy. I suggest that top managers’ demographic backgrounds 
may determine the choice of alliance strategy. In addition, I propose that top executives’ 
compensation packages may change the effect of managerial characteristics on 
alliance strategy. Although managerial background influences top managers’ strategic 
choices (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), when taking compensation packages into 
account, the relationship between top executives’ characteristics and alliance strategy 
is likely to change because different compensation packages may encourage different 
strategic decision-making behaviours. For example, a higher level of variable pay may 
encourage short-termism, which may impact the relationship between managerial 
characteristics and the choice of alliance strategy. 
Second, the impact of alliance diversity on performance has been a matter of 
debate, as scholars have differing research outcomes. I contribute to the alliance 
diversity debate by providing an alternative explanation of the ‘alliance diversity–firm 
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performance’ relationship. I propose that the choice of alliance strategy can affect the 
relationship between alliance diversity and firm performance. Specifically, a 
standalone strategy may undermine the benefits of having diversity in the alliances as 
each alliance is dealt with independently from other alliances. A portfolio strategy 
enables a firm to leverage its alliance diversity because all alliances are managed 
collectively and top managers ensure that the mix of alliances is suitable for the 
portfolio. The different underlying nature of these alliance strategies means that 
choosing one strategy or the other may influence the way diversity impacts firm 
performance. 
Third, I contribute to the alliance capability literature by highlighting that a firm 
needs appropriate alliance capability to better implement its alliance strategy. Previous 
literature discussing alliance capability notes that alliance capability has effects on 
alliance success and outcomes (Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007, Hoang and Rothaermel, 
2005, Sarkar et al., 2009, Schilke and Goerzen, 2010). However, we know little about 
the effects of different types of alliance capability on different alliance strategies and 
firm performance. Although scholars note that the capability to manage alliances as 
independent entities is different from the capability to manage a portfolio of alliances 
(Wang and Rajagopalan, 2015), we do not know how these capabilities are different 
from each other and how different capabilities may impact on firm performance 
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differently. Therefore, I distinguish individual alliance capability from portfolio 
alliance capability and suggest that a standalone strategy will require individual 
alliance capability and a portfolio strategy will require both individual alliance 
capability and portfolio alliance capability in order to achieve greater performance. In 
other words, individual alliance capability mediates the relationship between alliance 
strategy (both standalone and portfolio strategies) and firm performance. Portfolio 
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II. DO FIRMS REALLY HAVE ALLIANCE STRATEGIES? 
2.1. Introduction 
Strategic alliances have proliferated over the past thirty years, and in recent 
years firms have engaged in multiple strategic alliances (Gulati and Singh, 1998, Lavie, 
2007). Competition and the urgent need for product innovation have made interfirm 
collaborations a critical component of many firms’ strategy, as many rely on alliances 
to pool resources together in order to complement their innovation efforts (Deeds and 
Rothaermel, 2003, Faems et al., 2010). Research has shown that strategic alliances 
enable firms to acquire critical resources and capabilities, gain legitimacy and achieve 
a shorter innovation timespan and higher performance (Baum et al., 2000, Pisano, 
1990, Powell et al., 1996, Shan et al., 1994, Teece, 1992). Scholars have also 
demonstrated the benefits of strategic alliances in a wide range of settings, such as 
international entry modes, start-up entrepreneurial founding, relational rent generation 
and incumbent advantage from complementary assets (Brouthers et al., 2014, Dyer 
and Singh, 1998, Nakos et al., 2014, Rothaermel, 2001b, Shan et al., 1994). Despite 
this, it is also known that strategic alliances have a high failure rate, with studies 
showing that 50% of alliances fail (Greve et al., 2010, Park and Ungson, 2001).  
When a firm considers alliances as standalone occurrences, it appears to possess 
independent strategies for each alliance, thereby having a clearer goal on what it 
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intends to achieve from each collaboration. These individual collaborations are an 
important source of resources, capabilities and learning and thereby competitive 
advantage (Ireland et al., 2002). The resource-based view suggests that firm 
performance is contingent to firm resources and that differences in performance are 
related to variations in firms’ resources (Hitt et al., 2000). Therefore, firms form 
alliances to overcome resource deficiencies and build competitive advantage by 
obtaining valuable, rare and imperfectly imitable resources from these individual 
strategic alliances (Barney, 1991, Das and Teng, 2000).  
In contrast, a small number of studies suggest that firms do not consider strategic 
alliances as standalone entities. Firms take an alliance portfolio view, and managers 
make decisions by taking into account the strategic implications across a portfolio of 
alliances (Hoffmann, 2007, Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009). An alliance portfolio is a 
firm’s collection of direct alliances with partners (Bae and Gargiulo, 2004, Baum et 
al., 2000, Hoffmann, 2005, Hoffmann, 2007, Lavie, 2007, Parise and Casher, 2003). 
An alliance portfolio can consist of several partners from different stages of the value 
chain, from different industries, countries and markets, as well as from an ensemble 
of firm alliances (Goerzen and Beamish, 2005, Gulati, 1998, Jiang et al., 2010, Lavie, 
2007, Wassmer, 2010). 
The portfolio concept was first developed in finance and demonstrates 
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quantitatively how portfolio selection works to reduce the risk of investment so that 
investors can choose the optimal investment combination (Markowitz, 1952, 
Markowitz, 1991). An investment portfolio can be defined as a collection of assets 
held by an investor, which can be stocks, bonds, deposits, treasury bills and real estate. 
The purpose of a portfolio is to reduce risk through diversification. The central theme 
of the portfolio theory is that for any given expected return, rational investors will 
prefer low-risk investment combinations; for any given level of risk, rational investors 
will prefer a higher return to a lower return from the investment combination. Investors 
make decisions that reflect their risk propensity and how they view the expected 
returns of an investment. In theory, an investor will not take increased risk without 
being compensated by an adequate increase in expected returns (Markowitz, 1952, 
Markowitz, 1991).  
The portfolio perspective adopted in the strategic alliance strategy is that top 
managers make decisions about the selections of alliances in a portfolio. This reflects 
top managers’ views on the expected returns and risk level for individual alliances as 
well as the entire portfolio. The strategies to design and manage an entire alliance 
portfolio appear to be relevant to portfolio diversification and risk. Top managers need 
to decide on a firm’s direction for diversification as well as choosing alliances which 
they believe to have low risk in the firm’s overall portfolio and provide the optimal 
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combination for their portfolio. Scholars have discussed that firms use a number of 
alliances to pursue multiple goals, enabling them to spread risk, overcome uncertainty 
and obtain greater overall portfolio benefits (George et al., 2001, Hoffmann, 2007). 
Scholars have also shown the effects of alliance portfolio diversity with regard to 
innovation and productivity, and highlighted that firms’ use of the alliance portfolio 
approach can optimise their alliances combination, contributing to firm performance 
outcome (Cui and O'Connor, 2012, De Leeuw et al., 2014, Duysters et al., 2012, 
Hoffmann, 2005, Jiang et al., 2010, Parise and Casher, 2003, Sarkar et al., 2009, 
Vassolo et al., 2004).  
Furthermore, strategic alliances create synergistic effects. These effects are the 
interactions between two or more entities that produce an effect greater than the sum 
of their individual effects. These effects can be advantageous to the firm, because 
through different alliances the firm may increase its market power, spread risk, share 
resources, and gain scope of economies and learning spill-overs from its alliances. 
Although both the standalone and portfolio alliance strategies may have this effect, it 
appears to be greater with the portfolio alliance strategy as it takes into account all 
alliances within a portfolio (Parise and Casher, 2003, Vapola et al., 2010, Vassolo et 
al., 2004).  
For example, firms in the technology sector would often establish alliances to 
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meet market demands and adjust their portfolio of alliances for market uncertainty by 
terminating certain partnerships (Ozcan, 2017). Firms tend look for partners that can 
provide complementary resources because firms are unlikely to have all required 
capabilities and resources in house (Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009) but they may also 
need to terminate inefficient or low-performing partnerships (Ozcan, 2017).  
Using a portfolio alliance strategy enables managers to assess potential partners 
effectively as well as evaluating current partnerships. They aim to see how these 
partnerships together can create synergies which impact or add value to firms’ overall 
alliance portfolios (Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009, Ozcan, 2017). For example, firms 
with strong product innovation capabilities may seek partnerships with firms having 
strong market channels to distribute their products and acquire market knowledge 
from these partnerships. Essentially, executives who make decisions on the 
partnerships would consider their existing partnership base and the resource gaps they 
need to fulfil. When they can combine strong product capabilities with strong 
marketing channels with either their existing or new partnerships, they create unique 
synergies which can be used and applied to different products and markets. Another 
important advantage is that they are less likely to build redundant partnerships, and 
increase efficiency in partnership formation. 
Using either standalone or portfolio alliance strategy, firms may be able to build 
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competitive advantage and improve firm performance (Baum et al., 2014, 
Christoffersen, 2013, Christoffersen et al., 2014, Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994, 
Lin et al., 2009, Nakos et al., 2014, Shah and Swaminathan, 2008, Stuart, 2000). The 
differences are likely in the variations of performance outcomes. The question is: 
Which of the two strategies do firms tend to have? Do firms really have a portfolio 
alliance strategy before developing their alliance portfolio? Do firms simply formulate 
strategies according to each individual alliance on an ad hoc basis? Although a 
growing body of research has begun to explore the alliance portfolio perspective and 
has so far focused on the emergence, configuration and management of an alliance 
portfolio (Wassmer, 2010), to date, little empirical research has explored and 
distinguished firms’ tendency to adopt the two different strategies.  
To address this research gap, I draw on insights from the upper echelon theory 
and agency theory to investigate the alliance strategies that top executives adopt. The 
upper echelon theory and agency theory serve as appropriate guides because both 
focus on top executives. The upper echelon theory argues that a firm’s strategy is the 
reflection of the values and cognitions of its top executives (Hambrick and Mason, 
1984). Agency theory suggests that the agent is supposed to act for the benefit of the 
principal (Eisenhardt, 1989, Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Mitnick, 1973, Ross, 1973, 
Shapiro, 2005). The key insight of agency theory is that the agent will not always act 
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in the best interest of the principal, hence the principal establishes appropriate 
incentives for the agent and designs a monitoring system to ensure the agent’s 
behaviour (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
In this paper, I develop and test a theory in relation to the potential influences 
of demographic characteristics – namely the age, educational background, tenure in 
the firm and functional background of top managers – on the choice of firm alliance 
strategy, i.e. standalone or portfolio alliance strategies. I hypothesise that older 
mangers tend to choose a portfolio alliance strategy as they tend to have a more risk-
averse stance. A portfolio alliance strategy allows top managers to receive benefits 
from engaging in multiple simultaneous alliances, which enables them to spread 
potential risks and better manage uncertainties (Hoffmann, 2007). I also theorise that 
managers with a higher level of education tend to choose the portfolio alliance strategy 
because higher levels of education equip top managers with better information 
processing skills, a better knowledge base and the ability to formulate better solutions 
(Bantel and Jackson, 1989, Hambrick and Mason, 1984, Michel and Hambrick, 1992, 
Tihanyi et al., 2000, Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). This makes them more likely to see 
the benefits of the portfolio alliance strategy. Regarding tenure in the firm, my 
hypothesis is that top managers with a shorter tenure in the firm may choose the 
standalone strategy because they appear to have limited firm knowledge and possibly 
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inadequate social capital (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991). This implies that short-
tenure managers may be incapable of matching internal resources with external 
opportunities. Furthermore, I hypothesise that different functional roles will choose 
alliance strategies differently. Two types of functional roles are output and throughput 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Managers with output functional roles – marketing, 
sales and product research and development – tend to pursue new market opportunities; 
they may choose the standalone alliance strategy as they are more likely to be 
opportunity oriented. In contrast, managers with throughput functional roles – 
production, engineering and accounting – may consider a firm’s overall efficiency in 
terms of capabilities and resources available, and may choose the portfolio alliance 
strategy in order to formulate optimal combinations of alliances. 
I further explore top managers’ compensation packages and equity ownership 
in the firm as two moderating influences to see whether this correlates with top 
managers’ choice of the strategic alliance strategy. Compensation packages and equity 
ownership are often used as incentive mechanisms to influence top managers’ 
behaviour and align the interests of the principal and the agent (Fama and Jensen, 1983, 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Evidence from previous literature shows that these 
incentive mechanisms seem to have different or even opposite effects due to their 
asymmetrical risk propensities (Devers et al., 2007, Sanders, 2001, Sanders and 
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Hambrick, 2007, Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998).  
Scholars have shown that incentive pay enables firms to align the interests of 
top managers and shareholders by discouraging risk-averse and opportunistic 
behaviour (Devers et al., 2007). It also appears to be relevant to firms’ strategies 
(Balkin et al., 2000, Carpenter and Sanders, 2002, Carpenter et al., 2003, Cho and 
Shen, 2007). Top managers’ compensation often includes two parts: fixed pay – salary; 
variable pay – bonus, incentives, profit-sharing and stock options. I hypothesise that 
the relationship between top managers’ background characteristics (age, educational 
background, tenure in the firm and functional roles) and their choice of alliance 
strategy is moderated by the proportion of variable pay because a higher proportion of 
variable pay encourages managers to take riskier decisions and emphasise short-term 
gains (Guidry et al., 1999). The effect of this moderating influence is that top managers 
will tend to choose the standalone strategy rather than the portfolio strategy, and 
managers with the tendency of choosing a standalone strategy are even more likely to 
choose the standalone strategy. 
Scholars have also suggested that the agency issue occurs when top managers 
or key decision-makers have no financial interests in the outcome of their decisions 
(Boyd, 1995, Boyd, 1994, Fama, 1980, Fama and Jensen, 1983). Therefore, I 
hypothesise that the relationship between top managers’ background characteristics 
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(age, educational background, tenure in the firm and functional roles) and their choice 
of alliance strategy is moderated by the proportion of equity ownership, as a higher 
proportion of equity better aligns managers’ future financial outcomes with 
shareholders’ outcomes (Nyberg et al., 2010). This implies that a higher proportion of 
equity ownership is likely to encourage managers to make decisions based on the long-
term prospects of the firm. In addition, the portfolio strategy allows firms to spread 
risk and overcome uncertainty (Hoffmann, 2007, Wassmer, 2010). Therefore, top 
managers will tend to choose the portfolio strategy instead of the standalone strategy, 
and managers with a large proportion of equity are even more likely to choose the 
portfolio strategy. 
This research makes several contributions. Firstly, the study investigates the key 
demographic characteristics of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), which may have 
deterministic effects on their firm’s choice of strategic alliance strategy. Previously, 
scholars have identified the relationships between top managers’ demographic 
characteristics and various strategic choices such as strategic alliance formation, 
international involvement and international partnership (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 
1996, Reuber and Fischer, 1997, Sambharya, 1996). Thus far, no theoretical or 
empirical work has appeared to study the strategic choice of alliance strategy. By 
linking top managers’ background and firms’ strategic alliance strategy, this study aims 
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to provide further insights into the current literature in the field. This is important 
because strategic alliances are a common practice in firm strategy, and top managers’ 
choices and actions regarding strategy are likely to have an impact on the organisation 
(Hambrick et al., 2005). In addition, past literature on strategic alliance and alliance 
portfolio has seemed to assume that firms adopt one of the two strategies. Therefore, 
this study contributes to this important issue of managers’ intentions and tendency in 
choosing strategic alliance strategies.  
Secondly, one important aspect of agency theory is to align the interests of the 
principal and the agent. However, the financial alignment argument seems unsettled 
and inconclusive. A few meta-analyses have reported some contradictory or weak 
alignment relationships (Dalton et al., 2003, Devers et al., 2007, Tosi et al., 2000). 
Only one recent study demonstrated empirically that the financial alignment between 
shareholder return and CEO return are substantially supported (Nyberg et al., 2010). 
Developing and testing the two moderating influences – i.e. incentive pay and equity 
ownership – allows us to further advance and understand the effects of these financial 
alignment mechanisms on managers’ behaviour.  
In the following section, I discuss the theory and hypotheses underlying my 
analysis, and illustrate the theoretical model of strategic alliance strategies integrating 
upper echelon and agency theories. I then discuss the research design, followed by the 
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empirical results. A final section concludes by discussing the managerial and 
theoretical implications of this research. 
2.2. Theory and Hypotheses 
Strategic alliances have become an important strategic device for firms to access 
crucial resources, and are an essential part of firm strategy (Ireland et al., 2002, Parise 
and Casher, 2003, Wassmer, 2010). They enable firms to manage risk and uncertainties 
(Hoffmann, 2007). However, research indicates that firms still suffer from a high 
failure rate of strategic alliance – 50% of strategic alliances still fail (Greve et al., 2010, 
Park and Ungson, 2001).  
Over the past few decades, researchers have tried to explain how firms can 
create successful strategic alliances and contribute to firm performance (Ahuja, 2000a, 
Ahuja, 2000b, Anand and Khanna, 2000, Baum et al., 2000, Chung et al., 2000, Doz, 
1996, Dussauge et al., 2000, Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996, Gulati, 1995a, Gulati, 
1995b, Gulati, 1998, Gulati and Singh, 1998, Hitt et al., 2000, Parkhe, 1993, Simonin, 
1997, Stuart, 2000). However, in today’s business landscape, firms are commonly 
engaged in multiple alliances, not just single alliances. They are facing challenges in 
managing a portfolio of strategic alliances (Anand and Khanna, 2000, Doz and Hamel, 
1998, Gulati, 1998, Hoffmann, 2005, Hoffmann, 2007, Lavie, 2006, Lavie, 2007, 
Lavie and Miller, 2008, Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009, Parise and Casher, 2003). 
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Researchers have started to explore the benefits and cost of viewing a firm’s alliances 
as a portfolio. They have suggested that adopting a portfolio alliance strategy may be 
more beneficial as it allows the firm to create value through recombining resource-
based advantages from different alliances and to better utilise synergistic effects from 
different alliances (Doz and Hamel, 1998, Hoffmann, 2005, Hoffmann, 2007, Kale et 
al., 2002, Parise and Casher, 2003, Powell et al., 1996, Vassolo et al., 2004). 
Most studies that examine strategic alliances and alliance portfolios have 
investigated these two strategies independently (Hoffmann, 2007, Parise and Casher, 
2003, Wassmer, 2010) and concentrated on the cost and benefits of either standalone 
alliance strategy or alliance portfolio strategy. A few scholars highlight that firms’ top 
managers and top management teams affect the formation of alliances, the assessment 
of technological alliance opportunities and the creation of high-performing alliance 
portfolios (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996, Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009, Tyler and 
Steensma, 1998). Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) report that top management 
team members’ previous work experiences and the level of their previous jobs affect 
the rate of alliance formation. Their results show that firms with top management team 
members who had previously worked for many semiconductor firms and have had 
higher levels of management positions have significantly higher rates of alliance 
formation. Tyler and Steensma (1998) note that top executives’ experiences and 
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perceptions affect their assessment of potential technological alliances. Their studies 
showed that age, technical education, technical work experience and past successful 
collaboration experience were all directly related to top executives’ assessment of 
potential technological alliances.  
Moreover, Ozcan and Eisenhardt (2009) provide two important insights that are 
related to top executives when originating their alliance portfolio. The first is that if 
executives are able to visualise their firm’s portfolio in the context of the entire 
industry, they are more likely to create a high-performing portfolio. The second is that 
executives make the strategic choice to form multiple ties simultaneously, which is 
more likely to result in a high-performing portfolio than as in executives who form a 
series of individual ties. Empirical evidence to date still does not distinguish firms’ 
tendency to choose one alliance strategy over another; rather, it appears to ignore the 
managerial characteristics that determine the choice of firm alliance strategies. There 
is a need to explore and distinguish firms’ tendency to adopt and choose certain 
alliance strategies, i.e. standalone or portfolio. Although many studies have suggested 
that strategic alliances contribute to firm performance because it enables the firm to 
access valuable resources and overcome resource constraints – e.g. technological 
know-how and capabilities, complementary assets and legitimacy (Baum et al., 2000, 
Brouthers and Nakos, 2004, Brouthers et al., 2014, Dyer and Singh, 1998, Pisano, 
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1990, Shan et al., 1994, Teece, 1992) – none have considered the factors that determine 
managers’ choice of the standalone strategy or the portfolio strategy. Instead, scholars 
have often investigated the formation, structure and performance of strategic alliances 
(Ahuja, 2000b, Anand and Khanna, 2000, Ariño, 2003, Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 
1996, Gulati, 1998, Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006, Parkhe, 1993, Stuart, 2000), and the 
emergence, configuration and management of alliance portfolios (Hoffmann, 2007, 
Wassmer, 2010) rather than managerial effects on the choice of alliance strategy. 
In addition, recent studies highlight that firms are increasingly engaged in 
multiple alliances (Hoffmann, 2005, Hoffmann, 2007, Li et al., 2012, Wassmer, 2010), 
and managing their alliances as a portfolio seems to achieve greater synergistic effects, 
contributing to better firm performance (Lavie, 2007, Lavie and Miller, 2008, Lavie 
and Singh, 2012). Both the standalone and portfolio alliance strategies seem to have 
some degree of performance effect, but the decision to choose either the standalone 
strategy or the portfolio strategy rests with firms’ top managers. The factors that 
determine managers’ choice of portfolio strategy have also not been clearly identified 
in the literature. Because of this, it is important to investigate both alliance strategies 
concurrently to gain a better understanding of top managers’ tendency to adopt one 
alliance strategy or the other. I incorporate two theoretical perspectives – the upper 
echelons theory and agency theory – in order to analyse top executives’ strategic 
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choice of alliance strategy. This is because the upper echelons theory may determine 
the choice of alliance strategy, and agency theory is likely to strengthen the upper 
echelon theory’s predictions of top managers’ alliance strategy. 
The core of the upper echelons theory suggests that executives base their 
decision-making on their personal interpretations. These personalised interpretations 
are built up from their experiences, value and perceptions (Hambrick and Mason, 1984, 
Hambrick, 2007). In order to understand a firm’s strategy, we must understand the top 
executives. Hambrick (2007 p:334) note that ‘If we want to understand why 
organizations do the things they do, or why they perform the way they do, we must 
consider the biases and dispositions of their most powerful actors – their top 
executives’. The upper echelon theory has been used in many studies to examine the 
attributes of top managers, top management teams and their influences on firms’ 
strategy and performance (Buyl et al., 2011, Carpenter et al., 2004, Carpenter and 
Fredrickson, 2001, Certo et al., 2006, Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990, Hambrick and 
Quigley, 2014, Tihanyi et al., 2000, Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). In my research, the 
alliance strategy is an important firm strategy which may influence firms’ future 
directions and long-term prospects. This theory focuses on top executives and is 




The agency theory suggests that top executives (the agent) are often motivated 
by self-interest, are rational and tend to be risk averse. Shareholders and company 
owners (the principal) may use incentive schemes to align the interests of the principal 
and agent (Eisenhardt, 1989, Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Eisenhardt (1989) suggests 
that it is appropriate to use agency theory to examine the compensation schemes of 
top executives. Moreover, agency theory focuses on the possible factors that may 
influence top executives’ behaviour. Based on this theoretical framework to investigate 
the incentive mechanisms that may influence top executives’ strategic choice of 
alliance strategy, this study provides further insights on the use of incentive 
mechanisms and how these may strengthen or weaken top executives’ choice of 
alliance strategy.  
Drawing on both the upper echelon theory (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) and 
agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), I firstly develop a theory to suggest that 
the tendency of choosing an alliance strategy is determined by top executives’ 
background characteristics. Secondly, I argue that the choice of alliance strategies can 
be influenced by top managers’ compensation package in the firm, such as variable 
pay and equity ownership – two incentive mechanisms that are commonly used to 
align the interests of top managers and shareholders (Boyd, 1994, Carpenter and 
Sanders, 2002, Chng et al., 2012, Datta and Iskandar-Datta, 2014, Devers et al., 2007, 
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Nyberg et al., 2010, Pandher and Currie, 2013, Sanders and Hambrick, 2007).   
2.2.1. Managerial Characteristics and Alliance Strategies 
In their seminal work on the upper echelons perspective, Hambrick and Mason 
(1984) argue that a firm’s outcome, such as its strategies and effectiveness, is a 
reflection of the value and cognitive bases of its top managers. They suggest that 
observable managerial characteristics such as age, tenure in the firm, educational 
background, functional background and other demographic characteristics can be used 
to predict managers’ behaviour in making strategic choices, and that these are reflected 
in strategic outcomes. A number of subsequent studies provide evidence supporting 
the upper echelons perspective and highlighted that managerial characteristics are 
indeed related to firms’ strategic choice and managers’ decision-making processes 
(Bantel and Jackson, 1989, Brouthers et al., 2000, Carpenter and Fredrickson, 2001, 
Chaganti and Sambharya, 1987, Certo et al., 2006, Herrmann and Datta, 2002, 
Herrmann and Datta, 2006, Hitt and Tyler, 1991, Pegels et al., 2000, Smith et al., 1994, 
Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). 
Research appears to suggest that managerial characteristics are important to 
predict firms’ strategic choices as well as different strategic scenarios. For example, 
Hitt and Tyler (1991) note that managers’ age, educational level, work experience and 
managerial levels influence their strategic decision formulation. Brouthers et al. (2000) 
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provide empirical support that managerial characteristics (e.g. age, experience, 
education and risk propensity) are all important predictors of strategic aggressiveness.  
Scholars have presented insights into how managers’ characteristics may impact 
firms’ strategic choices and decision-making in different strategic settings. However, 
one important strategic scenario remains undocumented – firms’ alliance strategy; in 
particular, how different managerial characteristics may affect managers’ choice on a 
firm’s alliance strategy. Top managers’ choice of firm alliance strategy is likely to 
affect the outcome of a firm’s alliance operation and its outcome. The two different 
strategies – standalone and portfolio strategies – inherently produce different 
synergistic effects and risk propensity (Parise and Casher, 2003, Wassmer, 2010). The 
two strategies are likely to require different industry knowledge and networks as well 
as top executives’ professional experience (Bae and Gargiulo, 2004, Baum et al., 2000, 
Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009). These requirements are reflected in top managers’ 
background characteristics, hence the different demographic characteristics of top 
managers may be able to predict managers’ alliance strategy and allow us to better 
understand the tendency of top managers’ choice in firms’ alliance strategy.  
In this paper, I argue that managerial characteristics influence how standalone 
and portfolio alliance strategies are perceived and adopted. In particular, I contend that 
the attributes of a top manager are likely to have a significant influence on firm alliance 
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strategy. As key decision-makers, top managers have the power and ability to make 
decisions that are likely to influence the firm’s outcomes (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 
1991, Hambrick and Mason, 1984). I incorporate the four main characteristics – 
namely age, educational background, functional background and tenure in the firm – 
to develop hypotheses that link to the two alliance strategies.  
2.2.1.1. Age 
Age has been investigated in various strategic decision-making studies and 
demonstrated as an important variable that relates to strategic choice and different 
strategic scenarios. Studies have noted that young and old managers are likely to make 
different strategic choices due to managers’ risk-taking propensities (Bantel and 
Jackson, 1989, Hambrick and Mason, 1984, Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). Hitt and 
Tyler (1991) found that age had a moderating effect between objective selection 
criteria and merger decisions. Wiersema and Bantel (1992) note the age effect on 
strategic changes is that older managers are less likely to make strategic changes 
compared to younger managers. Tyler and Steensma (1998) found that potential 
technological alliances were less attractive to older managers. Brouthers et al. (2000) 
found the relationship between entrepreneurial styles and strategic aggressiveness to 
be moderated by age, with older managers weakening the relationship. Matta and 
Beamish (2008) argue that CEOs approaching retirement are more risk averse and that 
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older managers tend to take fewer risks in the context of international acquisition.  
In a more recent study relating to CEOs’ career horizons (McClelland et al., 
2012), the authors argue that younger CEOs with relatively long career horizons are 
more likely to adopt risky strategies in order to enhance future firm performance. Chief 
Executive Officers with shorter career horizons are more risk averse and more 
concerned about career security. Their finding shows that the relationship between 
CEO age and future return on assets changes when taking CEO equity ownership into 
account. They suggest that the highest future firm performance is linked to young 
CEOs with low equity ownership.  
Scholars seem to agree that age has an impact on firm strategy, and that older 
managers tend to be more conservative and risk-averse than younger managers. In 
addition, age seems to have an impact on decision-making scenarios. According to 
Hambrick and Mason (1984), there are three main explanations for the age effect on 
executives: mental and physical stamina (Child, 1974), commitment to maintaining 
the status quo (Hambrick et al., 1993), and views and positions on the importance of 
financial and career security (Matta and Beamish, 2008). All of these explanations are 
to some degree related to managers’ risk-taking attitudes, and scholars have shown age 
and risk-taking to have a significant relationship (Vroom and Pahl, 1971). Many 
studies have also provided evidence on age and risk-taking behaviour of strategic 
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choice (Bantel and Jackson, 1989, Wiersema and Bantel, 1992).  
If older managers are likely to take a less risky stance, I argue that they are more 
likely to choose a portfolio alliance strategy, because firm alliance strategies inherently 
have different risks and uncertainties (Das and Teng, 1998, Hoffmann, 2007). 
According to Das and Teng (1998), strategic alliances are associated with relational 
and performance risks. Hoffmann (2007) highlights four dimensions of strategic 
uncertainties that are perceived by senior executives: (1) regulative uncertainty, (2) 
technological uncertainty, (3) market uncertainty, and (4) competitive uncertainty. A 
portfolio alliance strategy seems to better manage and control these risks and 
uncertainties; it allows managers to spread different risks by choosing a combination 
of suitable alliance partners to overcome these risks and uncertainties (Hoffmann, 
2007, Parise and Casher, 2003, Vassolo et al., 2004). Furthermore, a portfolio strategy 
is likely to be less risky than a standalone alliance strategy because the latter may only 
consider one specific risk or uncertainty at a time while a portfolio alliance strategy 
enables managers to consider different risk implications simultaneously.  
In contrast, younger managers tend to take more risks and are more flexible to 
change (Bantel and Jackson, 1989, Carpenter et al., 2003, Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). 
Younger managers may have a more short-term orientation, i.e. short-termism. Short-
termism is defined as ‘a preference for actions in the near term that have detrimental 
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consequences for the long term’ (Marginson and McAulay, 2008). If younger 
managers are likely to take a more short-term stance to pursue short-term performance 
results, then they will choose a standalone alliance strategy. 
I argue that younger managers are more likely to choose a standalone alliance 
strategy than older managers because this strategy may focus on a specific objective 
and is more likely to produce an outcome in a shorter time span. Furthermore, a 
standalone alliance strategy is likely to be riskier as it may consider risks associated 
with each alliance individually. A portfolio alliance strategy takes into account 
different alliances and the risk implications of the combination of different alliances. 
It tends to have longer-term implications than a standalone alliance strategy. Younger 
managers may be more willing to take riskier alliance strategies in order to have a 
quicker outcome to justify their performance without considering different types of 
risks and uncertainties associated with strategic alliances.  
Taking these arguments together, the age effect is likely to impact the choice of 
firm alliance strategy, and different age cohorts may choose alliance strategies 
differently. Hence, Hypothesis 1 states:  
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Older managers are more likely to choose a portfolio 
alliance strategy while younger managers are more likely to choose a standalone 
alliance strategy.  
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2.2.1.2. Educational background 
Educational background has been viewed as an important variable for strategic 
decision-making, and it provides an indication of executives’ knowledge and skill base 
(Brouthers et al., 2000, Hambrick and Mason, 1984, Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). 
Prior studies have shown that the educational background of top executives is related 
to decision-making (Bantel and Jackson, 1989, Tihanyi et al., 2000, Wiersema and 
Bantel, 1992). Scholars indicate the relevance of both the level of education and the 
type of education (Hitt and Tyler, 1991). In addition, top executives’ educational 
profiles – elite education (i.e. whether they attended elite educational institutions) – 
appear to be relevant to firm strategy, because attending a prestigious school denotes 
an elite membership. This membership leads to external social ties which may provide 
new opportunities and resources (Cao et al., 2012, Ozgen and Baron, 2007). 
Scholars demonstrate that the education effect occurred in different strategic 
decision scenarios, such as the adoption of innovation in banking, strategic change and 
international diversification (Bantel and Jackson, 1989, Tihanyi et al., 2000, Wiersema 
and Bantel, 1992). Bantel and Jackson (1989) found that more innovative banks were 
often managed by more educated managers. Wiersema and Bantel (1992) showed that 
firms most likely to undertake changes in corporate strategy often had more educated 
managers with academic training in sciences. Other scholars have examined the 
53 
 
relationship between elite education and executive behaviour (Palmer et al., 1993). In 
particular, Tihanyi et al. (2000) demonstrated that higher levels of international 
diversification were associated with elite educational backgrounds.  
Studies have suggested that higher levels of education are likely to influence 
strategic decision-making (Brouthers et al., 2000, Grimm and Smith, 1991, Hambrick 
and Mason, 1984). This is because higher levels of education facilitate the 
development of cognitive ability and more educated executives possess greater 
cognitive complexity (Hitt and Tyler, 1991, Wally and Baum, 1994). Also, managers 
with higher levels of education may be equipped with enhanced information-
processing and analytical skills (Papadakis et al., 1998, Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). 
Carpenter and Fredrickson (2001) show that managers with high levels of education 
tend to have more expansive global strategic posture.  
However, Hitt and Tyler (1991) found no moderating effect of education level 
between the relationship of objective criteria and the strategic evaluation of acquisition 
candidates. Brouthers et al. (2000) also found no moderating effect of education level 
between environmental factors and strategic aggressiveness. Herrmann and Datta 
(2002) found no support between educational level and entry-mode choice. The effect 
of educational level seems to have inconclusive results. This may be because senior 
managers complete their formal education many years before they reach their 
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positions, so education level may not play an important role in certain strategic 
decision-making scenarios (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996, Shenkar and Zeira, 
1992). 
Scholars have also shown that type of degree affects strategic choice (Hitt and 
Tyler, 1991, Tyler and Steensma, 1998), managerial orientation towards Research and 
Development (R&D) funding (Barker and Mueller, 2002, Tyler and Steensma, 1998) 
and a firm’s decision on environmental disclosure (Lewis et al., 2014). Hitt and Tyler 
(1991) found that the type of education is a significant moderator between objective 
criteria and the evaluation of targeting a firm on the strategic acquisition decision. 
Tyler and Steensma (1998) found that executives with a technical educational 
background (i.e. engineering and chemistry) assess potential technological alliances 
more favourably than executives with other educational backgrounds. Barker and 
Mueller (2002) demonstrate that number of science/engineering degrees achieved by 
a top executive is associated with R&D spending, but the number of business degrees 
has no association with higher R&D spending and a legal degree has a negative 
association. Lewis et al. (2014) note that CEOs with a Master of Business 
Administration (MBA) are more likely to respond to institutional pressure and disclose 
environmental information; CEOs who are lawyers are less likely to respond and 
disclose such information.  
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Furthermore, elite education may be an important indicator of top executives’ 
social capital (Cao et al., 2012, Kish-Gephart and Campbell, 2014, Ozgen and Baron, 
2007), which may influence their strategic choice. Graduating from a prestigious 
university may indicate social status and provide links to various ties and opportunities 
(Granovetter, 1973, Tiwana, 2008). These ties can be unique external resources that 
facilitate alliance formation (Gulati, 1998). 
According to Hambrick and Mason (1984) and Wiersema and Bantel (1992), 
education indicates a person’s knowledge and skill base, and reflects their cognitive 
ability. This suggests that level of education is likely to influence executives’ choice 
of alliance strategy, because a higher educational level provides top executives with a 
broad knowledge base, and better analytical and decision-making skills (Hambrick 
and Mason, 1984). This skill set enables them to consider the costs and benefits of 
different alliances in a holistic way. The holistic concept is similar to ‘the industry 
architectural view’, where top managers formulate firms’ combination of alliances in 
the context of the entire industry (Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009).  
In regards to managerial capabilities, the standalone alliance strategy requires 
top executives to possess capabilities that are important to the management of 
individual alliances. This relates to the ability to search, negotiate, manage and 
terminate an individual alliance (Kale and Singh, 2009, Schreiner et al., 2009, Wang 
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and Rajagopalan, 2015). The portfolio alliance strategy requires top executives not 
only to possess the capabilities for the standalone alliance strategy, but also for the 
portfolio alliance capabilities, e.g. portfolio coordination capabilities (Sarkar et al., 
2009, Schilke and Goerzen, 2010). In particular, the portfolio alliance strategy requires 
top executives to formulate alliances in the industrial context and evaluate synergistic 
effects created from the combination of the alliances (Hoffmann, 2007, Parise and 
Casher, 2003). These managerial capabilities can be reflected in top managers’ 
cognitive ability and complexity, which are related to their levels of education. 
Given that more highly educated managers develop better cognitive ability and 
complexity through their formal education (Brouthers et al., 2000, Hitt and Tyler, 
1991), and the portfolio alliance strategy requires more complex managerial 
capabilities and skills, it is very likely that more highly educated managers choose the 
portfolio alliance strategy because they have more developed cognitive complexity in 
order to evaluate synergies from a combination of different alliances.  
In contrast, less educated managers may not develop their cognitive complexity 
and the necessary capabilities through formal education. The standalone alliance 
strategy is simpler to manage than the portfolio alliance strategy, and it does not 
require such advanced cognitive complexity as the portfolio alliance strategy. 
Therefore, managers with a lower educational level may tend to choose the standalone 
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alliance strategy over the portfolio alliance strategy. Hypothesis 2a states: 
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): Managers with a higher educational level are more likely 
to choose a portfolio alliance strategy, while managers with a lower educational 
level are more likely to choose a standalone strategy.  
Wiersema and Bantel (1992) suggest that education specialisation shapes 
perspectives and outlooks. Executives with different types of education (i.e. subject 
areas they studied) may have different decision orientation or decision rules. Formal 
education in engineering may train managers to think using different cognitive models 
from those in business for strategic decision-making (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). 
For example, Tyler and Steensma (1998) highlight that science and engineering 
academic training provide a more complete knowledge of technology and innovation. 
Barker and Mueller (2002) argue that top executives with legal and business academic 
training may be less inclined to pursue innovation through R&D spending because of 
a lower emphasis on innovation in their training. Scholars also have found that top 
executives holding MBAs are more likely to use advanced accounting and budgeting 
techniques than executives without MBAs (Graham et al., 2005). It appears that 
business-related degrees are likely to have more training on evaluating risks and 
uncertainties. This may lead to a more conservative stance because the academic 
training teaches analytic skills which discourage risk-taking and prevent big losses 
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(Barker and Mueller, 2002).  
The two strategic alliance strategies tend to require different perspectives on 
risks and uncertainties. For the standalone strategy, managers evaluate and manage 
risks and uncertainties related to a particular alliance, one at a time. For the portfolio 
strategy, managers need to evaluate risks and uncertainties related to multiple alliances 
in the portfolio and understand how to spread risks and uncertainties (Hoffmann, 2007, 
Parise and Casher, 2003, Vassolo et al., 2004, Wassmer, 2010). 
Having specialised training in evaluating and calculating risks and uncertainties 
is likely to affect how an individual perceives and evaluates risks and uncertainties. 
Given that business-related subjects tend to teach how to avoid big risks and mistakes 
(Barker and Mueller, 2002), senior managers with formal training in business-related 
subjects are likely to take a less risky stance as they may have a better understanding 
of risk implication and be able to use the tools and knowledge gained from such 
training. This implies that they are more likely to choose the portfolio strategy as it 
allows them to better manage and spread risks and uncertainties.  
In contrast, non-business-related subjects may not include adequate training in 
calculating and evaluating risks and uncertainties. Managers without such training 
may take a riskier stance because they may be less exposed to the concept of business 
risk and uncertainties. They may not have been trained to use advanced analytical tools, 
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e.g. accounting techniques. In addition, they may not even realise that there are 
different strategies to manage firm alliances. This implies their choice of alliance 
strategy may be limited to the standalone strategy. Hence, Hypothesis 2b states: 
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): Managers with academic training in business are more 
likely to choose a portfolio alliance strategy, while managers with academic 
training in non-business are more likely to choose a standalone strategy. 
Furthermore, an elite educational background provides the basis to develop a 
person’s network, which can be the origin of executives’ social capital (Cao et al., 
2012). Executives graduating from elite schools are likely to have more diverse and 
valuable social capital than executives attending non-elite schools. Top executives 
with qualifications from elite schools may also have powerful friends. This can 
symbolise prestigious power (Finkelstein, 1992). The personal network built from 
attending an elite school enables executives to access a greater external resources and 
capabilities pool (Gulati et al., 2000). This provides more opportunities to have a 
variety of potential partners, which can be useful for alliance formulation and alliance 
portfolio planning.  
Strategic alliances enable firms to access critical resources and capabilities 
(Baum et al., 2000, Brouthers et al., 2014). The standalone strategy may enable firms 
to access critical resources from those partners in a particular alliance when managing 
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one alliance at a time or on an ad-hoc basis. The portfolio strategy allows firms to 
simultaneously access a variety of different resources and capabilities from all partners 
in a firm’s alliance portfolio (Kale and Singh, 2009, Lavie, 2006, Lavie, 2009, Parise 
and Casher, 2003). At the initial stage of alliance formation and alliance portfolio 
planning, partner selection is an important factor for the success of the alliance 
(Brouthers et al., 1998, Hitt et al., 2000). Partner diversity is likely to contribute to 
firm performance (Jiang et al., 2010).  
Elite education enables executives to build their social capital and is likely to 
provide them with more alliance formation opportunities for portfolio planning (Gulati 
and Gargiulo, 1999b). It may also allow more access to relevant industrial information 
(Gulati, 2007). This enables executives to view the different opportunities available to 
them and the benefits of configuring them into their firm’s alliance portfolio. This 
facilitates the planning and management of a firm’s alliance portfolio. Therefore, I 
suggest that managers with an elite education are more likely to choose the portfolio 
strategy due to their external social capital, which presents them with more alliance 
opportunities. They are more likely to see the benefits of combining different 
opportunities to formulate their firm’s alliance portfolio.  
In contrast, non-elite-educated executives may lack the valuable social capital 
of those with an elite education. This is likely to put executives at a disadvantage when 
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formulating alliances because of fewer opportunities available to them. This implies 
that their alliance strategies may be constrained by a less prestigious network to utilise. 
As a result, their choice of alliance strategy is limited to the standalone strategy. Hence, 
Hypothesis 2c states: 
Hypothesis 2c (H2c): Managers with an elite education are more likely to 
choose a portfolio strategy, while managers without such an education are more 
likely to choose a standalone strategy.  
2.2.1.3. Tenure 
Tenure has been associated with many firms outcomes, such as firm 
performance (Henderson et al., 2006, Luo et al., 2014, Miller, 1991), strategic choice 
(Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991), strategic changes (Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2010), 
commitment to status quo (Musteen et al., 2006), innovation (Wu et al., 2005) and risk 
taking (Simsek, 2007). Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) suggest that different phases 
of CEO tenure impact firm strategy and performance differently. They highlight that 
in the early stage of their tenures, CEOs are more open and willing to adopt risky 
decisions but that this may be constrained due to limited firm knowledge and 
inadequate social capital. Miller (1991) notes that long-tenured CEOs tend to avoid 
changing their strategies even if the environment requires such changes. Finkelstein 
and Hambrick (1990) found that top management teams with longer tenure also tend 
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to avoid strategic change. Simsek (2007) found that long-tenured CEOs tend to 
become risk averse. 
Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) found that an inverted U-shaped relationship 
exists between length of tenure and firm performance. This implies that there is an 
upward relationship between shorter tenure and firm performance followed by a 
downward relationship between longer tenure and performance. This suggests that 
short-tenured executives tend to perform better in the early stage of their tenure. Also, 
a few other studies have demonstrated that top executives’ tenure has an inverted U-
shaped relationship with profitability (Henderson et al., 2006), invention (Wu et al., 
2005), market expansion (Souder et al., 2012) and entrepreneurial orientation (Boling 
et al., 2015). The inverted U-shaped relationships are due to the changes in top 
executives’ cognitive paradigms over the course of their tenures (Hambrick and 
Fukutomi, 1991).  
Also, scholars have suggested that a propensity towards risk-taking is likely to 
change over the course of a top manager’s tenure (Simsek, 2007). This is because 
short-tenured managers may not yet have sufficient knowledge to assess strategic risks. 
Longer-tenured managers may have deeper knowledge about the firm and its 
environments and are likely to possess job-specific skills and be more capable of risk 
assessment (Wu et al., 2005, Simsek, 2007). This implies that the effects of tenure in 
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the firm are likely to affect their choice of alliance strategy.  
Furthermore, tenure in the firm may affect top executives’ legitimacy and the 
level of respect they receive from key external and internal stakeholders such as 
employees, shareholders, customers and alliance partners (Agle et al., 1999). For 
example, short-tenured managers may suffer from liability of newness. The term 
‘liabilities of newness is often used to describe the drawbacks of entrepreneurial firms’ 
(Stinchcombe and March, 1965). To a large extent, it is also applicable to top 
executives when they only have a short tenure in the firm, because, similar to those in 
entrepreneurial firms, they may lack suitable resources and skills.  
The choice of firm alliance strategy relies on top executives and their attitudes 
toward risks, job-specific skills and legitimacy, which are likely change or develop 
over the course of their tenures. The standalone alliance strategy may not be as 
superior as the portfolio strategy in the control and management of risk, because the 
portfolio strategy enables the spread of risks over different alliances (Hoffmann, 2007). 
In regard to job-specific skills for choosing firm alliance strategy, it is important that 
executives have adequate industrial knowledge so that they can establish their firm 
alliance portfolio in the context of their industry (Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009). 
Moreover, gaining legitimacy often requires time and the building of credibility with 
internal and external stakeholders (Suchman, 1995). For the standalone strategy, 
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executives may not require as much support from internal and external stakeholders. 
However, the portfolio alliance strategy needs much more support from both types of 
stakeholders because executives need to reconfigure resources and capabilities in 
order to build their alliance portfolio. 
Short-tenured managers tend to have limited firm and industrial knowledge, 
limited job-specific skills and inadequate legitimacy from different stakeholders, but 
they are willing to take risks. They are more likely to choose a standalone strategy 
because this strategy may require less firm knowledge and job-specific skills. In 
addition, short-tenured managers may not yet have gained respect and legitimacy from 
key external and internal stakeholders and may lack important social capital both 
within and outside the firm. This may be disadvantageous for adopting a portfolio 
alliance strategy, because gathering different resources to formulate an alliance 
portfolio (Cui and O'Connor, 2012) may require support from key employees and 
stakeholders (Kale et al., 2001, Sundaramurthy et al., 2014).  
In contrast, longer-tenured managers tend to have a deeper knowledge of the 
firm and its environments, and are likely to possess job-specific skills. They may be 
more capable of risk assessment and more likely to utilise different alliances to manage 
and control risks. In addition, they are also more likely to have established respect and 
legitimacy from internal and external stakeholders. This not only facilitates the 
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building of an alliance portfolio but is also beneficial at the early stage of alliance 
formation (Baum et al., 2000). Therefore, they are more likely to choose the portfolio 
alliance strategy. Hypothesis 3 states: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Managers with shorter tenure are more likely to choose a 
standalone alliance strategy and managers with longer tenure are more likely to 
choose a portfolio alliance strategy.  
2.2.1.4. Functional background 
Functional background refers to executives’ work experience within functional 
areas of firms (Waller et al., 1995). Prior studies suggest that executives’ functional 
background influences their perceptions and further influences their strategic choice 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984, Waller et al., 1995). Functional background has 
important implications for the knowledge, skills and cognitive orientation that top 
executives bring to their firms (Herrmann and Datta, 2006). Hambrick and Mason 
(1984) discuss that managers with different functional backgrounds are likely to have 
different attitudes, knowledge and perspectives when making different strategic 
choices. This is because functional background may influence how they identify 
business problems and formulate solutions (Herrmann and Datta, 2006). 
Scholars suggest that functional background is associated with firm outcomes 
and managerial behaviour as well as strategic orientation (Bantel and Jackson, 1989, 
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Bermiss and Murmann, 2014, Brouthers et al., 2000, Geletkanycz and Black, 2001, 
Thomas et al., 1991). Bermiss and Murmann (2014) demonstrate that top executives 
carrying out different functional roles have different effects on firm survival. 
Executives who manage internal firm functions are more crucial to firm viability than 
executives who manage external relationships (e.g. account managers, media 
executives and creative directors). Brouthers and his colleagues (2000) report that 
functional experience moderates the relationship between environmental factors (i.e. 
environmental turbulence, entrepreneurial style and organisational structure) and 
strategic aggressiveness. In particular, they found that managers with accounting and 
finance experience are more likely to rely on organisational structure as a determinant 
of strategic aggressiveness than managers with a general background. Bantel and 
Jackson (1989) show that the more diverse the composition of an executive team in 
terms of executives’ functional backgrounds (accounting, operation and lending), the 
more innovative the team becomes. Geletkanycz and Black (2001) document that 
executives in the functional areas of finance, marketing, law and general management 
are most strongly related to strategic commitment to the status quo (CSQ). They found 
that executives with a broader functional experience base tend to demonstrate broader 
strategic breadth. This suggests that if executives have a greater exposure to different 
functional areas, they may have more flexible strategic perspectives. 
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In terms of strategic orientation, scholars show that top executives with a 
technical background may favour technological alliances (Tyler and Steensma, 1998). 
Furthermore, CEOs’ functional specialisation may influence the choice of 
diversification strategy (Smith and White, 1987). Smith and White (1987) explain that 
CEOs with core specialisation (e.g. background in production, sales management) are 
more likely to choose the single and vertically integrated diversification strategy. 
CEOs with environmental specialisation (e.g. background related to finance and law) 
are more likely to choose an unrelated and conglomerate diversification strategy.  
Chaganti and Sambharya (1987) studied the functional backgrounds of 
executives in Prospector, Analyzer and Defender firms, using Miles (1982)’s typology. 
They found that Prospector firms tended to have a higher number of executives with 
a marketing background, whereas Analyzer and Defender firms had a similar number 
of executives with R&D, production and finance backgrounds. This suggests that 
functional background is related to strategic orientation.  
According to Hambrick and Mason (1984), functional background can be 
categorised into two main types: output and throughput functions. Output functions 
include marketing, sales and product R&D. Managers with output functional 
experience tend to focus on new opportunities for growth. Throughput functions 
include production, process engineering and accounting. Managers with throughput 
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functional experience tend to focus on efficiency strategies and aim to improve their 
firm’s processes and operation. Due to their different emphases and strategic foci, 
individuals who work in these different functions are likely to develop different 
experiences, skills and capabilities. These developments are likely to influence how 
executives make strategic choices and determine their firms’ alliance strategies.  
Strategic alliances enable firms to improve their resource endowments and 
better manage uncertainty (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996, Powell et al., 1996). 
Firms often cannot rely on a few high-profile alliances (Hoffmann, 2007). A more 
comprehensive portfolio strategy can provide access to external resources and 
opportunities with several coordinated alliances (Gomes-Casseres, 1996). Standalone 
strategy tends to be more opportunities-oriented and treats every alliance as single 
occurrences. It is likely that top managers who adopt the standalone strategy tend to 
be concerned with the opportunities rather than the overall combination of resources 
and capabilities of the firm. They tend to neglect the importance of an efficient strategy. 
In comparison, those who adopt a portfolio strategy tend to take into account the 
effects of various alliances joined together. They may focus on certain opportunities 
that not only increase a firm’s efficiency but also improve resource deficiency so that 
they can build the firm’s competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). 
Given that managers with output functional roles (i.e. marketing, sales and 
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product research and development) are likely to pursue new market opportunities, they 
may choose a standalone alliance strategy, because they tend to be concerned with 
opportunities but not the overall efficiency and benefits to the firm. In contrast, 
managers with throughput functional roles (i.e. production, engineering and 
accounting) may consider overall firm efficiency, in terms of capabilities and 
resources available, and are more likely to choose a portfolio alliance strategy than a 
standalone alliance strategy in order to formulate optimal combinations of alliances. 
Hence, Hypothesis 4 states: 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Managers with output functional backgrounds are more 
likely to choose a standalone alliance strategy, and managers with throughput 
functional backgrounds are more likely to choose a portfolio alliance strategy. 
2.2.2. Moderating Effects of Compensation and Equity Ownership 
Agency theory emphasises the problem of the separation of ownership and 
control, when senior executives act as the agent of shareholders and may pursue 
courses of actions inconsistent with the interests of owners (Eisenhardt, 1989, Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). Compensation packages are the mechanism used to align the 
interests between shareholders and top executives. A number of studies investigated 
the effectiveness of pay-to-performance and performance-to-pay models (Carpenter 
and Sanders, 2002, Hall and Liebman, 1998, Jensen and Murphy, 1990, Tosi et al., 
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2000). The results of these studies tend to be conflicting (Devers et al., 2007, Tosi et 
al., 2000), possibly because of other factors outside managers’ control, such as 
environmental factors (Brouthers et al., 2000, Hitt and Tyler, 1991) and managerial 
characteristics (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). However, it is widely recognised that 
compensation packages can mitigate managerial self-interest and may reduce agency 
costs (Himmelberg et al., 1999, Jensen and Murphy, 1990) such as minimising the 
costs of executives’ opportunistic behaviour and the misalignment of risk preference 
(Devers et al., 2007).  
The nature of the compensation can influence executive behaviour in relation to 
managerial risk perception and opportunistic tendency (Balkin et al., 2000, Carpenter 
et al., 2003, Devers et al., 2007, Devers et al., 2008, Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 1997, 
Larraza-Kintana et al., 2007). Prior studies have indicated that the individual elements 
of compensation programmes are likely to have different or even opposite effects due 
to their asymmetrical risk propensities (Devers et al., 2007, Sanders, 2001, Sanders 
and Hambrick, 2007, Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). This can exert an influence 
on executive strategic orientation (i.e. long-term vs short-term) and strategic decision-
making. For instance, variable pay such as bonuses, incentives, profit-sharing and 
stock options may encourage executives to focus on short-term results and taking on 
riskier projects. Equity ownership may lead executives to be more risk averse and 
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adopt a long-term view on decision-making (Devers et al., 2007, Sanders, 2001). The 
effects of variable pay and equity ownership appear to be opposite, based on risk 
propensity and time horizon. The interaction of managerial characteristics with either 
variable pay or equity ownership may impact the choice of strategy.  
Standalone strategy is quicker to establish than a portfolio strategy because, by 
definition, it does not require the assessment of different risks and uncertainties across 
all alliances of the firm. For example, a standalone approach can be a way to gain 
quick market access and increase revenue rapidly (Das and Teng, 1999). Therefore, 
managers seeking short-term gains may prefer to use the standalone strategy. In 
contrast, portfolio strategy requires the consideration of corporate objectives and the 
risk implications of all alliances together (Hoffmann, 2007). For example, executives 
may establish alliances in order to overcome its resource deficiency (Brouthers et al., 
2009, Brouthers et al., 2014). Addressing resource deficiency using a portfolio 
approach allows executives to reduce risk over the long term (Hoffmann, 2007).  
In the next section, I discuss variable pay and equity ownership as moderating 
influences between managerial characteristics and alliance strategy, with specific 
hypotheses. 
2.2.2.1. Variable Pay 
Variable pay is a part of the compensation package that is short-term and 
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outcome- or performance-based (Davidson III et al., 2007). It includes bonus and stock 
options. Scholars have argued that bonus compensation (also referred to as incentives 
and profit sharing) motivates executives to pursue short-term performance and forgo 
the long-term interests of their companies (Balkin et al., 2000, Hou et al., 2013). For 
example, executives may be unwilling to take on riskier projects or long-term R&D 
investment that is critical to long-term performance, in favour of current performance 
targets (Hill et al., 1992, Larraza-Kintana et al., 2007). Chief Executive Officers with 
high bonus pay may focus more on the short-term exploitation of new intellectual 
property than its long-term protection (Hou et al., 2013). Earnings-based bonuses may 
also drive managers to make discretionary accrual decisions in order to boost their 
short-term bonus (Guidry et al., 1999). 
Another popular type of variable pay is stock options. Stock options give 
executives the right to buy a share of stock at a pre-specified price with a pre-specified 
term. The pre-specified price for exercising options is often different from the actual 
market price. The higher the actual market price is from the stock option price, the 
greater the gain. This motivates executives to take actions that increase share prices as 
much as possible in order to increase their personal wealth (Hall and Murphy, 2002). 
Furthermore, while executives who hold large quantities of stock options can 
substantially improve their personal wealth when there is a sharp increase in stock 
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price, they bear no personal losses when stock prices drop following company setbacks, 
as during this time they can choose not to exercise the options. As such, scholars have 
argued that stock option remuneration tolerates myopia and risk-taking (Devers et al., 
2007, Goldman and Slezak, 2006, Thanassoulis, 2013). Managers who avoid taking 
necessary risks because they worry about losses (Amihud and Lev, 1981), personal 
reputation, future employability and the chance of dismissal (Fama, 1980) can, 
through stock options, be motivated to take big risks (Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002). 
For example, stock options have a positive effect on acquisition activity because 
executives have opportunities to benefit from gains in stock price associated with 
acquisition announcements (Sanders, 2001).  
2.2.2.2. Moderating effect of variable pay 
Drawing on upper echelons theory, we would normally expect managerial 
characteristics to influence the choice of alliance strategies between standalone and 
portfolio strategies. However, drawing on agency theory, this relationship may be 
different in the presence of variable pay. Both bonus and stock options within variable 
pay induce a more short-term and riskier strategic behaviour that allows managers to 
increase their personal wealth quickly (Devers et al., 2007). A standalone strategy is 
simpler to implement and can reap benefits more rapidly than a portfolio strategy. It is 
likely that in the presence of variable pay, the effect of managerial characteristics on 
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choosing a standalone strategy will be strengthened because this strategy can more 
quickly contribute to improving firm performance. However, the effect of managerial 
characteristics on choosing a portfolio strategy may be weakened with variable pay 
because, by contrast, a portfolio strategy is more complex, takes longer to implement 
and may not lead to immediate results. For example, with regard to age cohort and the 
choice of alliance strategy, we would normally expect older managers to choose a 
portfolio strategy due to low risk propensity and long-term consideration (H1). In the 
presence of variable pay, the effect of an older manager on choosing a portfolio 
strategy may weaken because variable pay may bring out his/her risk-taking behaviour. 
In fact, it is possible that older managers may choose a standalone strategy instead. 
Younger managers are inclined towards a standalone strategy because they have high 
risk tolerance and a more short-term orientation (H1). When receiving a high variable 
pay in their compensation package, these tendencies are reinforced, which means that 
younger managers should be even more inclined to choose a standalone strategy.  
In the same way, I hypothesise that higher education, business-related degrees, 
elite institutes, longer tenure in the firm and throughput functional role are 
characteristics that lead to a portfolio strategy (H2 to H4). When we include variable 
pay, the effects of these characteristics on portfolio strategy may be weakened and 
managers may be encouraged to switch to a standalone strategy in order to accumulate 
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more personal wealth. On the contrary, for characteristics such as lower education, 
non-business-related degrees, non-elite education, shorter tenure in the firm and output 
functional role, a standalone strategy is expected (H2 to H4). It is likely that managers 
with these characteristics may still choose a standalone strategy when they receive 
variable pay because this allows them to increase firm performance and personal 
wealth quickly. Therefore, I hypothesise that: 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Variable pay will moderate the relationship between 
managerial characteristics and firm alliance strategy. In the presence of variable 
pay, the choice of alliance strategy will tend to be a standalone strategy.  
2.2.2.3. Equity ownership 
Equity ownership includes common stock and restricted shares and is scaled by 
the total number of shares outstanding (Datta et al., 2005). When an executive’s own 
equity is in the firm they serve, it is likely that the value of their wealth changes in 
proportion to shareholder returns. Agency theory suggests that equity ownership 
motivates executives to consider long-term prospects of the company (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976, Jensen and Murphy, 1990). For example, Johnson and Greening 
(1999) show that top management team equity holdings are significantly related to 
producing quality products and services, as well as products that address 
environmental concerns. The authors argue that both product quality and 
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environmentally sound manufacturing are part of corporate social performance, which 
has a long-term, rather than a short-term objective, and it can result in long-term firm 
performance.  
However, large equity holdings tend to increase executive risk aversion (Ofek 
and Yermack, 2000, Zajac and Westphal, 1994) because an executive’s wealth will 
suffer from losses due to underperformance and will only benefit if there is growth in 
profits (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). If executives make decisions that are risky and 
prone to failure, companies’ profits and earnings may suffer, and, as a result, income 
from equity ownership will be affected. Consequently, executives would tend to avoid 
risky investments with high uncertainty (e.g. R&D projects) which may have 
implications on executives’ equity income in the long run (McConnell and Servaes, 
1990). Risk aversion can also be explained by the fact that executives tend to give 
more importance to losses than to gains (Markowitz, 1952, Sanders, 2001, Wiseman 
and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). In other words, a strategy that minimises potential losses 
may be preferred over one that may lead to potential gains.  
In addition, a key advantage of equity ownership is the potential for steady 
income streams. Executives are concerned with the downside risk of their salary 
earnings and fixed equity incentives. Downside risk refers to loss of personal income 
stream and employment when their firm underperforms or goes out of business 
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following a risk-taking decision. This may encourage risk-reducing strategy (Wright 
et al., 2007). Matta and McGuire (2008) suggest that high variation in a firm’s returns 
affects the value of executives’ equity holdings. Executives are likely to make 
conservative decisions which undercut risk exposure and generate steady returns 
(McConnell and Servaes, 1990, Wright et al., 1996).  
2.2.2.4. Moderating effect of equity ownership 
The long-term prospect of equity ownership may interact with managerial 
characteristics and influence how executives make such corporate strategic decisions. 
It is likely that in the presence of equity ownership, the effect of managerial 
characteristics on choosing a portfolio strategy versus a standalone strategy will 
change. Equity holdings encourage executives to consider the long-term prospects of 
the firm and may bring out risk-averse attitudes toward the management of personal 
financial wealth. To a large extent, equity ownership may erode the effects of 
managerial characteristics on choosing a standalone strategy. It is likely that equity 
ownership makes managers focus less on short-term gains, and, therefore, managers 
may become warier of the risk inherent in a standalone strategy. For example, we 
would normally expect less educated managers to choose a standalone strategy 
because they lack the cognitive ability to deploy a portfolio strategy and tend to focus 
on short-term gains (H2a). However, if these less educated managers have equity 
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ownership, then they may think more like a shareholder and become more keen to 
secure a long-term steady equity income based on decisions that are relatively low risk 
but highly beneficial to the long-term prospects of the company (Fama and Jensen, 
1983, Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Jensen and Murphy, 1990). This implies that the 
effect of less educated manager on choosing a standalone strategy may be weakened. 
Therefore, it is possible that the greater the equity ownership, the more likely less 
educated managers will choose a portfolio strategy instead of standalone strategy, 
because portfolio strategy tends to be less risky and more long term than standalone 
strategy.  
In the same way, I hypothesise that characteristics such as younger age group, 
non-business-related degrees, non-elite education, shorter tenure in the firm and output 
functional role, which would normally lead to a standalone strategy (H2 to H4), are 
likely to interact with equity ownership and lead managers to switch to a portfolio 
strategy instead. This is because equity ownership encourages managers to avoid risks 
that may impact on long-term firm performance and affect steady growth of equity 
income in the long run. For instance, managers who hold a large amount of equity 
would naturally prefer to benefit from a steady stream of equity income. They become 
more risk averse when making decisions and prefer a decision that results in a positive 
long-term performance. In other words, equity ownership may moderate the 
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relationship between managerial characteristics and alliance strategy choice.  
For managers with characteristics that favour a portfolio strategy, such as with 
older managers, those with business-related degrees, elite education, longer tenure in 
the firm and those with a throughput functional role, I argue that equity ownership will 
strengthen a manager’s preference for portfolio strategy. For example, in H2a I 
hypothesise that more highly educated managers will choose a portfolio strategy 
because they understand the importance of risk management and have the cognitive 
ability to use strategy that can ensure bigger returns in the long run. Equity ownership 
would most likely increase the tendency or the resolve of more highly educated 
managers to develop a portfolio strategy, as the portfolio strategy is more likely than 
a standalone strategy to provide a steady long-term personal income. In the same way, 
I hypothesise that older age group, business-related degrees, elite institutes, higher 
tenure in the firm and throughput functional role are characteristics that normally lead 
to a portfolio strategy (H1, H3 and H4). When we include equity ownership, the effects 
of these characteristics on portfolio strategy should be strengthened given the long-
term view of equity and a more conservative (risk-averse) attitude toward personal 
wealth. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 6 (H6): Equity ownership will moderate the relationships between 
managerial characteristics and firm alliance strategy. In the presence of equity 





To test my hypotheses, data were collected from companies in China and 
Taiwan, specifically in the printed circuit board (PCB) industry and plastic rubber 
industry. PCB is a plastic or fibreglass board made for connecting electronic 
components together. The plastic rubber industry includes companies in the different 
stages of the value chain to produce plastic and rubber goods. These companies can 
be firms that produce something as simple as a plastic bag, to firms that produce plastic 
injection machinery. The PCB and plastic rubber industries both consist of 
manufacturing, equipment and machinery, raw materials and chemicals, and contract 
manufacturing. Printed circuit board (PCB) is indispensable to modern electronic 
goods and equipment. Almost all household appliances and electronic devices have 
electronic components and electrical signals of PCB. Plastic and rubber are also 
important goods that are used in every household as well as many different industries. 
Industrial statistics show that that global PCB output in 2014 was US$60.15 billion 
(WECC, 2015). PlasticEurope’s published annual industrial facts data show that the 
industry turnover exceeds €350 billion for Europe only (PlasticsEurope, 2015).  
Strategic alliance is characteristic of the PCB and plastic rubber industries; 
therefore, they are suitable for my research. Companies in both industries often 
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collaborate with partners for different activities within the value chain. PCB 
manufacturers would collaborate with PCB raw material manufacturers in order to 
ensure the supply of materials (upstream alliance). A recent example from the PCB 
industry is the partnership of Hitachi Chemical Co., Ltd. with Taiwan PCB Techvest 
Co., Ltd. (Hitachi Chemical Co, 2015). PCB manufacturers may also collaborate with 
their clients, such as Personal Computer manufacturers, to develop new innovative 
products that suit the market (downstream alliance). For example, Foxconn’s 
partnership with Apple, and Pagatron’s partnership with Apple (Dou, 2013). PCB 
manufacturers may also ally with other PCB manufacturers to establish a new 
industrial standard (horizontal alliance). PCB firms in China and Taiwan are often 
members of China Printed Circuit Association (CPCA) and Taiwan Printed Circuit 
Association (TPCA). Through these associations, members often collaborate in setting 
new industry standards for product innovation and manufacturing processes. For 
example, with regard to the recent popular topic of green manufacturing, PCB firms 
are collaborating with other PCB firms to set industrial standards for green 
manufacturing processes. In addition, a specialised industrial report suggests that PCB 
firms are going for partnership and strategic alliances in order to provide unique 
solutions and to meet changing market demands and opportunities (Lucintel, 2015). 
Therefore, the PCB industry provides a large research setting to investigate the 
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managerial strategic orientation of alliance strategy. 
Similarly, firms in the plastic rubber industry are often engaged in strategic 
alliances through forward and backward integration in order to have better control and 
flexibility in raw material supplies or sales channels. For example, AD Plastiks 
(Croatia) and Henniges automotive (US) formed strategic alliances to benefit from 
each other’s specialisation in 2014. Burkool SA (Brazil) and Henniges (US) formed 
alliances to serve Brazilian and Argentinian markets in 2013 (Sweeney, 2015). 
Therefore, the plastic rubber industry also provides a suitable research setting for my 
research.  
I chose to study firms in the two industries based in China and Taiwan because 
these two industries produce high global output, and alliances are common practices 
in the two industries. For the PCB industry, these two markets (China and Taiwan) are 
ranked first and third worldwide in PCB output value. The two markets account for 
44.9% and 14% of global PCB output, respectively. Together they represent 58.9% of 
total PCB output worldwide (WECC, 2015). For the plastic rubber industry, China is 
ranked the largest producer and accounts for 26% of global of plastic materials 
(PlasticsEurope, 2015). Overall, using Chinese and Taiwanese firms in the PCB and 




Scholars suggest that it is important to examine the strategic activities of top 
managers because strategies are viewed as reflections of the values and cognitive bases 
of senior managers in the firm (Brouthers et al., 2000, Hambrick and Mason, 1984, 
Rajagopalan et al., 1993). Therefore, I am targeting top executives (i.e. the CEOs and 
vice presidents) of the companies. These executives are the main decision-makers of 
firm strategy and are responsible for setting up the strategic directions of firm alliances. 
Similar to many other strategy studies, such as Brouthers et al. (2000), 
Hambrick et al. (1993), Hitt and Tyler (1991), and Tyler and Steensma (1998), the 
data in this study were examined at the level of individual executives. Scholars suggest 
that managerial characteristics determine strategic choice (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) 
and that managers’ value and perceptions shape a firm’s strategic actions (Brouthers 
et al., 2000, Tyler and Steensma, 1998). In this study, I am interested in the extent to 
which top executives’ demographic backgrounds may influence the choice of firm 
alliance strategy, and how executives’ compensation packages and ownership stakes 
may moderate the relationship between top management characteristics and choice of 
alliance strategy. 
2.3.2. Survey 
A questionnaire was used for data collection in this study. The questionnaire 
was originally prepared in English, translated into Chinese, and then translated back 
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into English to ensure the accuracy and reliability (Brislin, 1970, Kreiser et al., 2002). 
Five senior managers of different companies from the sample industries helped to 
verify the survey contents. The survey instrument was then pilot tested with a group 
of another five senior managers within the two industries to see whether it was easy 
for them to understand and to ensure that the operational measures were appropriate 
for the study. When there were suggestions for improvement, I then incorporated and 
amended accordingly into the final survey for distribution. 
2.3.3. Data Collection 
In order to verify the appropriateness of respondents, each executive in the 
sample was contacted by phone or in person and asked if decisions regarding strategic 
alliances would be within his or her decision-making authority and if they were willing 
to participate in this study. When the executives contacted met this criterion and 
consented to participate in the survey, they would then receive the survey instrument 
via email, post, online or in person. 
A survey was distributed to each qualified respondent with a letter to introduce 
and explain the purpose of the study as well as promise confidentiality. In order to 
ensure the response rate, I sent follow-up emails or make follow-up calls to check if 
they had received the survey. I also attempted to establish a timeframe for the return 
of the survey with each respondent. 
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2.3.4. Description of the Data  
Data were collected in 2016 using a random sample of 600 companies from the 
PCB and plastic rubber industries. A sample of 380 companies was drawn from the 
directory of PCB industry in Taiwan and China (TPCA, 2015). The directory 
comprises approximately 5,200 firms. I used random sampling to select every tenth 
firm in the list and sent out an invitation to 520 firms to participate in the study via e-
mail and post. Out of the 520 firms contacted, 380 accepted to participate. I then sent 
out the questionnaire via post and email to these firms, and hand delivered 
approximately one fourth of the sample. Out of 380 firms, I received 125 responses.  
For the plastic rubber industry, the company list was based on the exhibitors list 
of Plas2016 Taipei industry exhibition. This included approximately 500 firms. During 
the Plas2016 industry exhibition, I randomly approached 220 firms out of the total 
number exhibiting firms and received 71 responses. 
The total number of responses after two waves of mailing, numerous follow-up 
calls, emails and company visits, produced 196 responses from the two industries. Of 
these responses, six were not usable as these responses had too many unanswered 
questions. A total of 190 companies participated and successfully completed the survey. 
Thus, the usable data comprised 190 firms; the number of useable surveys amounted 
to 122 for the PCB industry and 68 from the plastic rubber industry. The response rate 
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is 32% for the PCB industry and 31% for the plastic and rubber industry, and the 
overall response rate is 32%. On average, our respondents had 628 employees, and 
65% of the firms had alliance function in the company with an average 21 alliances in 
the past five years. 
2.3.5. Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in this study is the firm’s alliance strategy. In particular, 
I distinguish a standalone alliance strategy from a portfolio alliance strategy. 
Standalone alliance strategy is when all alliances are treated as standalone occurrences; 
each alliance is independent from other alliances and each alliance has its own specific 
goals. Portfolio alliance strategy is when managers take into account the strategic 
implications across all alliances and the portfolio strategy reflects an overall corporate 
strategy (Hoffmann, 2007). 
To my knowledge, there are no published scales for standalone and portfolio 
strategies, as previous studies have not measured alliance strategy based on the 
standalone versus portfolio distinction. There are two main reasons that contribute to 
the unavailability of tested scales. Firstly, alliance research has traditionally focused 
on single alliances, although some scholars have suggested a portfolio approach as an 
alternative way to manage strategic alliances (Hoffmann, 2005, Hoffmann, 2007, 
Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009). In previous studies, scholars have been mainly 
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concerned with the formation, governance, evolution and performance of single 
alliances. For alliance portfolio research, scholars are have mainly focused on 
emergence, configuration and management of an alliance portfolio (Wassmer, 2010). 
Alliance strategies (standalone and portfolio) are treated as two separate research areas, 
and scholars do not view them together. Therefore, scholars have not created scales 
that might distinguish standalone strategy from portfolio strategy. 
Secondly, scholars tend to agree on what constitutes a standalone alliance but 
have different views on what an alliance portfolio is (Wassmer, 2010). Scholars tend 
to agree that a standalone alliance is an agreement between firms in which they 
exchange resources and aim for sharing, or co-development of, products, technologies 
or services (Gulati, 1998). In contrast, scholars define alliance portfolio in a number 
of different ways. For example, some scholars define an alliance portfolio as the 
aggregate of all strategic alliances of a focal firm (Bae and Gargiulo, 2004, George et 
al., 2001, Hoffmann, 2005, Hoffmann, 2007, Lavie, 2007, Lavie and Miller, 2008). 
Other scholars define it as all direct ties with partner firms (Baum et al., 2000, Ozcan 
and Eisenhardt, 2009, Rowley et al., 2000). Another group of scholars define an 
alliance portfolio as a focal firm’s accumulated alliance experience, including both 
ongoing and past alliances (Anand and Khanna, 2000, Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005, 
Kale et al., 2002, Reuer et al., 2002). Due to the issue of having different definitions 
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for standalone alliance and a portfolio of alliances, the measurement of these two 
definitions appears to be at two different levels, i.e. alliance level and portfolio level. 
Therefore, scholars have not created a scale that combines the two levels of analysis 
and measures, or that reflects the managerial choice of a firm’s alliance strategy. In 
addition, alliance portfolio research is still burgeoning, and scholars have not 
conceptualised alliance strategy as standalone and portfolio. 
For this study, I had to create a new scale of alliance strategy. I used DeVellis 
(2012) scale development guidelines. Firstly, DeVellis (2012) suggests scholars define 
what the study wants to measure, and draw on literature to develop a suitable number 
of item scales. Therefore, as recommended by DeVellis (2012), I defined alliance 
strategy and drew on literature to develop a three-item scale. Secondly, DeVellis (2012) 
suggests seeking out industry experts for clarification and verification on the items 
developed. I therefore contacted senior managers of different companies in the target 
sample industry to carry out this task. Thirdly, DeVellis (2012) recommends that the 
scale should be reviewed by academic experts and the scale length optimised. Fourthly, 
this initial measure ought to be tested by a second set of senior executives from the 
sample industry. Finally, items should be modified based on the feedback of the test 
with the second set of senior executives, to finalise the questionnaire.    
From the literature, scholars identify the motivations and benefits of forming 
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strategic alliances such as achieving long-term strategic goals, managing risk and 
uncertainty (Ahuja, 2000b, Gulati, 2007, Hoffmann, 2007, Lavie, 2006, Ozcan and 
Eisenhardt, 2009). These are the core strategic considerations for firm alliance strategy. 
Therefore, I developed this measure based on my definitions of alliance strategies and 
taking account of the core strategic considerations suggested in the literature. The aim 
of this study is to see the extent to which managers view alliances as standalone 
occurrences or as a portfolio of alliances. Therefore, I needed respondents to be able 
to distinguish the two kinds of strategies. In doing so, it is important to highlight 
opposing characteristics of the two strategies. At the same time, scholars often present 
a portfolio perspective as a step up from the standalone perspective (Parise and Casher, 
2003). Therefore, standalone and portfolio strategies can be presented as a continuum, 
using an anchored Likert scale. The first item used generic descriptions of the 
standalone strategy and portfolio strategy. The other two items were related to core 
strategic considerations for firm alliance strategy. In total, three items were used to 
measure the firm’s tendency towards either standalone or portfolio alliance strategy. 
In item 1, I developed two descriptive statements that were based on my 
definitions of the two strategies. Scholars have found that the use of descriptive 
paragraphs is an effective means of determining a firm’s strategy (James and Hatten, 
1995). Therefore, I used descriptive statements on both ends of the continuum to 
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measure a firm’s alliance strategy. The statement for a standalone strategy was, ‘When 
we make alliance decisions, each alliance is considered as an independent entity and 
there is a specific goal for each alliance independently from other alliances’. Portfolio 
strategy is described as ‘When we make alliance decisions, we take into account the 
strategic implications of all alliances that our company is engaged in, and we consider 
the interrelationships among alliances, including the possible synergies that can be 
created through the combination of the alliances’. The respondents were asked to rate 
which statement best describes their company’s alliance strategy on a continuum, 
(ranging from 1 to 7). Firms that choose towards 1 are inclined to a standalone alliance 
strategy and firms that choose towards 7 are inclined to a portfolio-alliance strategy.  
In item 2, I developed two descriptive statements on the importance of short-
term versus long-term outcomes during alliance formation. The idea is inspired by 
Ozcan and Eisenhardt (2009). The authors suggest that managers who are able to view 
their alliances in the context of their firm’s industry are likely to develop a high-
performing alliance portfolio. I interpreted that these managers with a long-term 
perspective are more likely to take a portfolio strategy. I developed a scale of 1 to 7 
whereby 1 is ‘We mainly consider short-term outcomes during alliance formation’, 
and 7 is ‘We mainly consider long-term alliance development goal during alliance 
formation’. I asked respondents to indicate the level of prioritisation for either 
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orientation rather than importance, because respondents may feel that both short- and 
long-term outcomes are important when asked this question. By assessing how 
managers perceive the level of prioritisation, I could gauge the tendency of a firm’s 
alliance strategy: managers adopting a standalone strategy tend to be more in favour 
of short-termism, whereas managers adopting a portfolio strategy are more concerned 
with long-term viability and development. 
For item 3, I draw on literature related to alliance risk and uncertainty. Strategic 
alliances allow firms to manage risk and uncertainty (George et al., 2001, Hoffmann, 
2007). Managers tend to have a different risk propensity, and strategic choices are 
influenced by the risk preference of the decision-makers (Hoffmann, 2007). I asked 
respondents how they manage alliance risk and uncertainty by using two descriptive 
statements. On one end of the continuum, the statement reads, ‘We manage risk and 
uncertainty of individual alliances in an independent manner’. On the other end of the 
continuum, the statement reads, ‘We manage risk and uncertainty of all alliances 
together in an integrated manner’. When managers do not view managing risk and 
uncertainty in an integrated manner, they are likely to adopt a standalone strategy, 
because this strategy is less concerned with managing overall risk and uncertainty 
whereas a portfolio strategy encourages managers to consider the risk implications of 
different alliances together. Therefore, having a manager’s view on risk and 
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uncertainty can indicate the tendency of choosing an alliance strategy. 
The three-item scale reflects the strategic considerations of alliance strategy. 
Each statement indicates the tendency for strategic consideration during alliance 
decision-making. At one end of the spectrum are firms whose alliance strategy is to 
take a long-term perspective into forming alliances and managing overall risk and 
uncertainty (Hoffmann, 2007, Parise and Casher, 2003). These firms are likely to have 
a portfolio alliance strategy. At the other end of spectrum are firms whose alliance 
strategy is more short-term result oriented and more focused on risk and uncertainty 
related to individual alliance. These firms are likely to have a standalone alliance 
strategy. Therefore, the three-item scale for alliance strategy can tap into a firm’s 
alliance strategic orientation and is suitable for the measurement of alliance strategy.  
2.3.6. Independent Variables 
The questions relating to managerial characteristics are based on ‘observable 
characteristics of management’ (Hambrick and Mason, 1984).  
Age 
An executive’s age is an important variable that may influence strategic 
decision-making because it is related to risk propensity and a manager’s experience 
(Bantel and Jackson, 1989, Brouthers et al., 2000, Hambrick and Mason, 1984, 
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Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). I used the age measure of Brouthers et al. (2000), 
whereby age is a continuous two-digit number reported by each respondent.  
Level of education 
Executives’ level of education is likely to influence strategic decision-making, 
as scholars suggest that high levels of education are likely to develop better cognitive 
ability and great cognitive complexity (Brouthers et al., 2000, Hitt and Tyler, 1991, 
Wally and Baum, 1994). I followed Brouthers et al. (2000) and Bantel and Jackson 
(1989), where six categories are provided ranging from high school to doctorate (i.e. 
high school, some college, college degree, some postgraduate work, master’s degree 
and doctoral degree). The categories of educational levels were changed to reflect the 
education systems in China and Taiwan. I asked respondents to select the education 
level attained from the following categories: 1 for Junior High School Education and 
below, 2 for High School Education, 3 for Undergraduate Degree, 4 for Master’s 
Degree and 5 for Ph.D. (Doctor of Philosophy). 
Type of education 
Type of education refers to the major field of study that the executive has 
completed. A top manager’s type of education tends to influence strategic decision-
making differently (Hitt and Tyler, 1991, Tyler and Steensma, 1998). Different 
educational backgrounds (i.e. major fields of study) tend to have different decision 
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models and rules. The evaluation criteria of strategic decisions from those with 
engineering backgrounds may be different to those with business backgrounds 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984). This survey question can be open-ended or it can also 
be presented by specifying different major fields of study for respondents to choose, 
as in Bantel and Jackson (1989) and Hitt and Tyler (1991). I followed Bantel and 
Jackson (1989)’s question and asked the respondent to select his/her major field of 
study for the highest degree earned. Following telephone interviews with a few of the 
sample respondents, I discovered that senior executives in the industry tend to have 
quite a wide spread of educational specialisations and that they are more likely to have 
majored in business and engineering than in other fields. Taking into consideration the 
potentially wide spread of educational specialisation in the PCB industry, I included 
10 categories to reflect the major areas of study in China and Taiwan. These 
categorisations were chosen from Bantel and Jackson (1989), Hitt and Tyler (1991) 
and Wiersema and Bantel (1992). The respondents were requested to choose from the 
following categories: 1 for Accounting/Finance, 2 for Sociology and Social Studies, 3 
for Art and Design, 4 for Science, 5 for Law, 6 for IT and Computing, 7 for 
Business/Management/Marketing, 8 for Engineering, 9 for Language, and 10 for 
Other Fields (that respondents can specify). When coding, this variable was coded as 
1 (One) if the respondent had a degree related to business subjects, and coded as 0 
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(Zero) if the respondents had a degree non-business related.  
Elite education 
Elite education is based on the rated prestige of the universities a focal manager 
attended. Elite education is the origin of executives’ social capital (Cao et al., 2012, 
Finkelstein, 1992) and can provide opportunities to facilitate alliance formation. 
Managers with elite education may influence the choice of alliance strategy because 
they may be presented with more opportunities for alliances. Graduating from an elite 
school indicates social status and may provide unique external resources (Gulati, 1998) 
and more industry-related information (Gulati, 2007). Previous studies have tended to 
use top executives’ educational data from archival data such as the Dun and Bradstreet 
Reference Book of Corporate Managements, and compare the archived data with a list 
of elite universities used in previous studies such as Finkelstein (1992) and Tihanyi et 
al. (2000). In this study, the educational information is obtained from a survey 
questionnaire, and the research setting is different from previous studies. The sample 
group of top executives was based in China and Taiwan; therefore, I could not use the 
existing list of elite education which was compiled from the US educational institutes. 
I asked the respondent to specify the educational establishments they had attended for 
undergraduate and postgraduate studies in an open-ended question. When coding, I 
referred to the university ranking of the respondent’s country of education. (See 
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appendix A and B for China and Taiwan). If respondents were educated overseas, I 
checked the university ranking in the corresponding countries. If overseas-educated 
executives had graduated from the top 20 educational institutes in the specific 
countries, they were considered as graduating from elite universities. The decision to 
use the top 20 universities was inspired by the list of Finkelstein (1992) and Tihanyi 
et al. (2000). The variable was coded as 0 (Zero) if the respondent did not complete a 
formal degree or did not have any degree from an elite university, and coded as 1 (One) 
if the respondent had either an undergraduate degree or postgraduate degree from an 
elite university.  
Tenure 
Tenure can be categorised into three types: positional tenure, firm tenure and 
industrial tenure. For this study, I used positional tenure for the measurement. 
Positional tenure is defined as the number of years a top executive has been employed 
in his or her current position. In relation to alliance strategy, positional tenure is 
important because strategic decisions may differ according to positional tenure, as 
managers may build and obtain different firm knowledge and social capital in different 
stages of the tenure (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991). The differences in firm 
knowledge and firm social capital are likely to influence the choice of alliance strategy. 
For the survey question, I followed Bantel and Jackson (1989), and I asked 
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respondents to specify the year he/she joined his/her current position. Tenure is thus a 
continuous measure. 
Functional background  
Functional background is defined as the functional area in which an executive 
has had the most experience, i.e. the longest time spent in a particular functional 
category (Bunderson and Sutcliffe, 2002, Rajagopalan and Datta, 1996). Scholars 
suggest that executive functional background influences executives’ perceptions and 
further influences their strategic choice (Hambrick and Mason, 1984, Waller et al., 
1995). Executives with differing functional backgrounds are likely to possess different 
knowledge, skills or cognitive orientation, and may identify business problems and 
formulate solutions differently (Herrmann and Datta, 2006). I drew on Bantel and 
Jackson (1989) for the opening question, ‘The functional area in which you had the 
most experience?’. The only difference was that the original question used ‘the person’ 
and I used ‘you’. Then I followed Bunderson and Sutcliffe (2002) for the selection of 
categories, because Bunderson and Sutcliffe (2002)’s categories are more suited to my 
sampled industries (i.e. sales or marketing, manufacturing, finance or accounting, 
personnel/HR (Human Resources), distribution or warehouse, R&D, equipment 
management, administrative support, and general management). Functional 
background was coded as 1 (One) for output functional background (sales and 
98 
 
marketing) and 0 (Zero) for all other functional backgrounds (manufacturing, 
distribution or warehouse, R&D, equipment management, finance, accounting, 
personnel/HR, administrative support and general management). 
2.3.7. Moderating Variables 
The effect of variable pay and equity ownership may influence the impact of a 
manager’s demographic characteristics on the choice of alliance strategy because they 
are part of a compensation package. Studies have shown that a compensation package 
can minimise agency problems such as the opportunistic behaviour of executives and 
misalignment of risk preferences between executives and firms (Devers et al., 2007, 
Jensen and Murphy, 1990).  
Variable pay 
Variable pay encourages short-termism and is outcome based or performance 
based (Davidson III et al., 2007). It includes bonus and stock options. Variable pay 
motivates executives to pursue short-term performance and forgo the long-term 
interests of their companies (Balkin et al., 2000, Hou et al., 2013). Stock options 
motivate executives to take actions that have a positive impact on firm share prices 
because it can influence their personal wealth (Hall and Murphy, 2002). As a result, 
this variable is likely to influence a manager’s strategic choice of alliance strategy. 
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Previous studies tend to use samples of listed companies for their analysis of 
variable pay because data are available from the Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC) or other databases such as Compustat’s ExecuComp Service (Beatty and Zajac, 
1994, Carpenter and Sanders, 2002, Cho and Shen, 2007, Datta and Iskandar-Datta, 
2014, Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987, Larraza-Kintana et al., 2007, Sanders and Carpenter, 
1998, Sanders and Hambrick, 2007). From publicly available data, scholars would 
then conduct their own calculations for variable pay for bonus and stock options. Many 
studies obtain data from firms’ proxy statements which are filed with the SEC. An 
exception to collecting variable pay data can be found in Stroh et al. (1996), whereby 
two open-ended survey questions are used to ask for the actual amount of base salary 
and bonus for a particular year, respectively. Variable pay is then calculated by 
dividing the bonus amount by total yearly cash compensation (salary plus bonus). 
In my sample, there are many private firms, and they do not have a legal 
requirement to file their executives’ compensation information in their respective 
securities exchanges. Top executives in private firms, particularly Chinese firms, 
would be reluctant to provide compensation information as actual figures. This may 
also increase their reluctance to participate in the survey. Therefore, I used an open-
ended question for this variable. I asked respondents to report the percentage of their 
cash bonus to their overall compensation package, rather than asking for specific 
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figures as in Stroh et al. (1996). In addition, as I am also interested in stock options, I 
draw on Sanders and Hambrick (2007), who measure stock options as the proportion 
to total compensation paid using secondary data. For stock options, I asked two 
questions; the first is, ‘Do you receive a stock option as part of your compensation 
package?’ The answer could be Yes or No. If respondents answered Yes, I asked the 
respondents a second question to report the approximate current value of their stock 
options as a percentage of total compensation. I asked respondents two separate 
questions about their stock options because some firms may have stock options as part 
of an executive’s pay package, while others may not. Both cash bonus and stock 
options provided two percentage figures which I added together to provide the 
percentage of variable pay over the total compensation package. I used this calculated 
percentage to analyse the moderating effect, i.e. variable pay may moderate the 
relationship between managerial characteristics and the choice of alliance strategy. 
Equity ownership 
Equity ownership is defined as the percentage of equity a top executive owns 
(Brickley et al., 1999, Sanders, 2001). Equity ownership motivates executives to 
consider the long-term prospects of the company (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). When 
top executives own equity in the firm they serve, it is likely that the value of their 
wealth changes in proportion to shareholder returns. Previous studies have tended to 
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obtain equity ownership data from publicly available data, e.g. the SEC and databases. 
Sanders (2001) measures equity ownership as the value of stock owned by a top 
executive. Other scholars measure equity ownership as a percentage of the firm’s share, 
as in Brickley et al. (1999). In this study, I used the percentage of firm shares owned 
by the respondents in the company they serve. However, as I was unable to obtain 
secondary data on ownership for my sample, I asked respondents to directly report the 
percentage of firm shares they owned as an open-ended question.  
2.3.8. Control Variables 
I included a number of control variables that may potentially influence 
tendencies to choose a standalone alliance strategy or a portfolio alliance strategy. 
Particularly, I controlled for several characteristics of the focal firm and of its alliances. 
For the characteristics of the focal firm, I controlled for firm size, firm age, ownership 
type, international activity, R&D orientation, past performance, two industrial effects 
and country effect. For the characteristics of the alliances, I included alliance 
experience and alliance function.  
Firm age 
Following Brouthers et al. (2000), I included firm age as a control variable, 
because older firms are likely to have more alliance experience and the accumulated 
alliances knowledge over years may influence a firm’s alliance strategy. Scholars have 
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shown that firm age influences strategic decision-making (Anderson and Eshima, 
2013, Eisenhardt, 1989b). This may potentially influence a manager’s choice of 
alliance strategy. Firm age was measured as the age of the firm. I asked respondents 
to provide the founding year of the firm. 
Firm size 
I controlled for firm size because scholars (e.g. Brouthers et al. (2000) and Hitt 
and Tyler (1991)) have suggested that large firms and small firms are likely to make 
strategic choices differently due to the possible difference in the availability of 
resources. In my sampled industries, there were also large and small firms who were 
likely to have very different resources and capabilities. This difference may influence 
the manager’s choice of alliance strategy. Firm size was operationalised as the number 
of full-time employees (Baum and Wally, 2003, Capron and Mitchell, 2009, Schilke 
and Cook, 2013). For the survey question, I followed Schilke and Cook (2013) and 
asked, ‘How many employees does your company have?’ 
Internationalisation activity 
Previous studies in international business and strategic management suggest that 
a high level of firm internationalisation leads to higher firm performance (Michael 
Geringer et al., 1989, Tallman and Li, 1996). Strategic alliances often provide a firm 
access to resources and capabilities from international markets (Lu and Beamish, 
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2001). It is likely that a firm’s international activities may influence the firm’s alliance 
strategies because higher sales value from a particular country may lead the firm to 
develop its alliance strategy according to foreign market opportunities. For example, 
a firm that follows a portfolio strategy may consider a standalone strategy in order to 
take advantage of short-term opportunities. Similarly, it is possible for a firm to change 
from a standalone strategy to a portfolio strategy if the potential opportunity has a 
long-term prospect and requires, for example, investing in R&D or building a supply 
chain. Therefore, firms that depend to a large extent on international sales may have a 
different alliance strategy compared to those that are less dependent upon international 
sales. I borrowed the measure from international business scholars and followed 
Brouthers and Nakos (2005) to control for firms’ international activities. This measure 
consists of a firm’s ratio of foreign sales to total sales. I asked respondents to report 
the ratio of their foreign sales to total sales.  
Past performance 
Past performance may influence firm alliance strategy because a firm may take 
strategic action based on past performance in an attempt to improve performance. This 
means that past performance has a potential effect on a firm’s choice of alliance 
strategy and future performance. Previous studies control for past performance using 
different measures and time frames (Andrevski et al., 2013, Baum and Wally, 2003, 
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Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003, Santhanam and Hartono, 2003). For example, Baum 
and Wally (2003) measure past performance with two types of firm performance: 
growth and profitability. Growth is measured with two items: (1) the percentage 
change in annual sales from 1996 to 2000 and, (2) the percentage change in year-end 
employment from 1996 to 2000. Profit is measured with one item: the average annual 
‘pretax net profit percentage of assets’ for 1998, 1999 and 2000. Wiklund and 
Shepherd (2003) asked respondents directly to compare past performance with 
competitors in terms of net profit, sales growth, cash flow and growth of net worth. 
The items use a five-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 – ‘much worse than its 
competitors’ to 5 –‘much better than its competitors’. Cronbach alpha is 0.76. 
Santhanam and Hartono (2003) take into account past performance not through a 
control variable but by adjusting current performance. The authors measure financial 
performance in two categories: profit ratios and cost ratios. Profit ratios include return 
on sales, return on assets, operating income to assets, operating income to sales and 
operating income to employees. Cost ratios include cost of goods sold to sales, selling 
and general administration expenses to sales and operating expenses to sales. Data are 
collected from a secondary data source (COMPUSTAT) for current and previous years. 
Past performance is controlled through adjusting current performance and by 
regressing prior year performance on current year performance. In alliance studies, 
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Andrevski et al. (2013) control for past performance using Return On Equity (ROE), 
and data are collected from a secondary source.  
Past performance based on financial data is relatively accessible. However, 
tested scales for the measurement of past performance are relatively limited. I followed 
Schreiner et al. (2009)’s performance measure because it is used in the context of 
alliance and it asks respondents to rate their firm’s performance compared to its 
competitors over a three-year time frame. This appears to be relevant for measuring a 
firm’s past performance. Schreiner et al. (2009)’s measure is similar to Wiklund and 
Shepherd (2003)’s measure of past performance, but the items are different. Wiklund 
and Shepherd (2003) consider net profit, sales growth, cash flow and growth of net 
worth, while Schreiner et al. (2009) consider sales growth, profitability, return on 
investment, and building customer royalty. The Cronbach alpha for Schreiner et al. 
(2009) is higher at 0.93, and Wiklund and Shepherd (2003) is at 0.76. Therefore, 
following Schreiner et al. (2009), I asked respondents to rate the level of firm 
performance compared with their competitors on a seven-point Likert-type scale 
(ranging from "Far Better" to "Far Worse"). The question is: ‘During the last three 
years, how well did your company perform relative to your direct competitors in terms 





Previous studies underline the importance of R&D investments to performance 
outcomes (Eberhart et al., 2004, Zhang et al., 2007). In alliance studies, scholars have 
controlled for either R&D intensity (De Leeuw et al., 2014, Duysters and Lokshin, 
2011) or R&D orientation (Schilke and Goerzen, 2010). R&D intensity has been 
measured in two ways: R&D expenditure divided by sales revenue (Belderbos, 2003, 
Zhang et al., 2007) or number of R&D employees divided by total employment 
(Belderbos et al., 2012). Scholars suggest a higher level of R&D orientation may 
influence firm performance (Cooper, 1984, Gatignon and Xuereb, 1997). Research 
and Development (R&D) orientation has been measured as a single-item seven-point 
scale asking respondents to indicate level of agreement with the statement of ‘In our 
company, we emphasise Research and Development activities’ (Schilke and Goerzen, 
2010). R&D intensity often requires secondary data for the calculations, whereas data 
for R&D orientation can be obtained through a survey. Therefore, I followed Schilke 
and Goerzen (2010)’s R&D orientation measure as a control. Respondents were asked 
to indicate the level of agreement with the statement on a seven-point scale, ranging 
from 1 ‘strongly disagree’ to 7 ‘strongly agree’. The statement is: ‘In our company, we 




Industry effect 1&2 
Strategic alliances in certain high technology industries may be more active than 
others (Hagedoorn, 2002). Also, alliances in some industries perform better than  
others owing to differences in industry structure (Krishnan et al., 2006). Hitt and Tyler 
(1991) found that industry affects the criteria used to make acquisitions. Many scholars 
argue the importance of industry in determining the strategies employed by the firms 
(Hitt et al., 2000). Scholars also suggest that it is important to include an industry 
effect as a control variable. I used Schilke and Cook (2013)’s opening question, 
‘Which of the following is your company’s primary industry sector?’ but provide a 
selection list based on the primary industry in my sample: (1) for manufacturing, (2) 
for equipment and machinery, (3) for raw materials and chemicals, (4) for others, 
please specify. This was coded as a dummy variable, 1 (One) for Manufacturing and 
0 (Zero) for all other industries. I also included a second industrial control to 
distinguish companies from the PCB industry and companies from plastic rubber 
industry. This was also coded as dummy variables, 1 (One) for the PCB industry and 
0 (Zero) for the plastic rubber industry. 
In addition, another industry control is included to distinguish companies from 





I included a dummy variable in order to distinguish the differences between 
firms from China and firms from Taiwan. Although they are similar, managerial 
concepts and practices may be different. In addition, institutional theory suggests that 
different countries may have different institutional distance as well as psychic distance 
(Brouthers, 2013b, Brouthers et al., 2008). This is likely to have an impact on 
managerial strategic orientation; therefore, it is important to control for possible 
difference. When coding, 1 (One) for firms from Taiwan, 0 (Zero) for firms from 
China.  
Alliance Experience 
Alliance experience is concerned with the extent to which a firm has been 
involved in strategic alliances (Schilke and Goerzen, 2010). It may account for path 
dependence in the alliance formation decision (Chung et al., 2000, Gulati and Gargiulo, 
1999b) and thus potentially influence the firm’s alliance strategy. Prior research has 
measured alliance experience as the number of alliances a firm accumulated over a 
period of time (Anand and Khanna, 2000, Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005, Heimeriks 
and Duysters, 2007, Heimeriks et al., 2014). Scholars tend to use five years as a period 
of examination (Kale et al., 2002, Zollo et al., 2002, Schilke and Goerzen, 2010), 
because it is the average period in which an alliance still contributes to the experience 
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level of companies (Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007). Some scholars obtain alliance 
data from databases such as the Strategic Alliance database of the Securities Data 
Company (Anand and Khanna, 2000, Kale and Singh, 2007). Other scholars create 
their own database for a particular industry from archival data or databases (Hoang 
and Rothaermel, 2005, Lavie and Miller, 2008). A few scholars obtain alliance data 
through survey questions (Schilke and Goerzen, 2010, Heimeriks et al., 2014). 
Heimeriks et al. (2014) use a survey question to request the number of strategic 
alliances within the past five years, with a list of categorical selection (i.e. 0–5, 6–15, 
16–25, 25–40, >40 alliances). The set selection in Heimeriks et al. (2014) may be 
limited. Therefore, I chose to follow Zollo et al. (2002) and Schilke and Goerzen 
(2010), where alliance experience is measured as the number of strategic alliances 
within the past five years. Respondents were asked to indicate the number of strategic 
alliances formed by the firm within the past five years.  
Alliance function 
A dedicated alliance function may influence how a firm forms and manages its 
alliances and thus potentially influence the choice of alliance strategy. Alliance 
function is defined as ‘a position to manage or coordinate all alliance-related activity 
in the firm’ (Kale et al., 2002). I followed Kale et al. (2002)’s definition and asked 
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respondents to indicate if their company has a formal, dedicated alliance function or 
department that has responsibility for their firm’s alliances. 
2.3.9. Statistical Analysis 
Common methods variance 
 As with all self-reported data, there is a potential for common method bias 
resulting from single-respondent response (Chang et al., 2010, Podsakoff et al., 2003). 
In order to prevent common method bias, I followed the suggestions from Chang et al. 
(2010) and Podsakoff et al. (2003). Firstly, through the design of the study’s procedure, 
Chang et al. (2010) suggest using different response formats to measure different 
variables when designing the questionnaire. For dependent variables, I developed 
statements that best describe alliance strategy on a continuum, using anchored Likert-
type scale questions. For the independent variables, I used a mixture of Likert scale, 
open-ended questions and listed choices for selection. These can avoid respondents 
choosing the same response pattern, which may affect the accuracy of the data 
(Brouthers et al., 2000). Therefore, common methods variance has been minimised 
through the design of the study procedures in my study. 
Secondly, through statistical tests, the factor analysis is used, in which all items 
from each of the constructs load into an exploratory factor analysis to determine 
whether the majority of the variance between measures can be accounted for by one 
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general factor (Chang et al., 2010). The logic behind this test is that if common method 
variance is a serious issue in the data, a single factor will emerge, or one general factor 
will account for most of the covariance in the dependent and independent variables 
(Podsakoff et al., 2003). This statistical test can increase the reliability of the data for 
interpretation (Brouthers et al., 2003). The result of factor analysis is presented in the 
result section. 
Reliability and validity 
Before testing the hypotheses, I conducted statistical tests for multi-item 
constructs using coefficient alphas (α), composite reliabilities (CR) and average 
variances extracted (AVE). If all three values for each construct exceed the 
recommended thresholds, i.e. (α) ≥ 0.7, (CR) ≥ 0.7 and (AVE) ≥ 0.5, this demonstrates 
adequate convergent validity and reliability (Bagozzi and Yi, 2012, Bagozzi and Yi, 
1988). 
Hypotheses Testing 
For hypothesis H1 to H4, Ordinary Least Square regression analysis was used. 
To test for the moderating effects of variable pay and equity ownership in hypothesis 
H5 and H6, I used moderation analysis in SPSS through regression analysis on 
interaction terms. This allows examining the impact of one independent variable on 
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the relationship between another independent and dependent variable (Preacher et al., 




2.4.1. Validity and Reliability 
I first conducted analyses on multi-item constructs in this study. There are two 
multi-item constructs, which are past performance and alliance strategy. I used factor 
analysis, Cronbach’s alpha and average variance extracted (AVE) to examine construct 
reliabilities. Cronbach’s alpha and Average Variance Extracted (AVE) are indicative 
of a reliable and valid measurement of each individual construct. The AVE and 
Cronbach’s alpha for past performance are 0.76 and 0.89, respectively. For alliance 
strategy, AVE is 0.76 and Cronbach’s alpha is 0.84. (See Table 2-1). The table shows 
that all items load onto their predicated variable significantly with acceptable AVE and 
Cronbach’s alpha. 
Table 2- 1: Factor analysis and Cronbach alpha 
 
Past Performance
During the last 3 years, how well did your company perform
relative to your direct competitors in terms of?
1. Sales growth
2. Profitability
3. Return on Investment
4. Building customer loyalty
Alliance Strategy
When we make alliance decisions, each alliance is considered as
an independent entity and there is a specific goal for each alliance
independently from other alliances VERSUS When we make
alliance decisions, we take into account the strategic implications of
all alliances that our company is engaged in, and we consider the
inter-relationships among alliances, including the possible synergies
that can be created through the combination of the alliances
We mainly consider short-term outcome during alliance formation
VERSUS We mainly consider long-term alliance development goal
during alliance formation
We manage risk and uncertainty of individual alliances in an
independent manner VERSUS We manage risk and uncertainty of
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Furthermore, correlation analysis was also conducted. The inter-item 
correlations between variables were examined. The majority of the inter-item 
correlations between variables were all relatively low, generally falling between 0.0 
and 0.49. There were a few exceptions which had inter-item correlation values 
exceeding 0.5, such as educational level and elite education (r =0.517), and age and 
tenure (r = 0.537). There were a few interaction terms between variable pay and 
managerial characteristics, and between equity ownership and managerial 
characteristics, which had high inter-item correlations, with values from 0.525 to 0.699. 
These were expected because the interaction terms are the product of variable pay and 
equity ownership with each of the managerial characteristics. These interactions were 
calculated for moderation analysis, and none of the interactions exceeded the 
recommended cut-off of 0.7 (Hair, 2009). As summarised in Table 2-2, the majority of 
inter-item correlations between those variables were relatively low, at low to moderate 
levels. This is one indication that the variables are unidimensional and that there exists, 
as a result, good validity, which does not threaten discriminant validity. 
In addition, I examined the variance inflation factors (VIF) in our regression 
tests (See Table 2-3 and 2-4) and found that no VIF score was greater than 2.5, 
indicating a low probability of collinearity.
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Table 2- 2: Correlation matrix with means and standard deviations 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
Mean 14.363 26.032 627.503 44.676 6.005 0.653 21.332 18.968 0.295 0.642 0.942 0.000 0.000 0.347 0.416 0.000 0.358 0.000 0.000 0.044 0.236 0.007 0.074 -0.036 -0.004 0.068 -0.215 -0.012 -0.090 0.245 -0.059
Standard Deviation 3.247 15.748 1931.820 25.842 0.892 0.477 19.972 3.627 0.457 0.481 0.234 1.000 1.000 0.477 0.494 1.000 0.481 1.000 1.000 1.071 1.186 0.562 0.691 1.143 0.584 1.020 1.049 0.574 0.575 1.095 0.578
1 Alliance Strategy 1
2 Firm Age .065 1
3 Firm Size -.002 .337
**
1





5 RD Orientation .176
*
.137 -.034 .067 1

















































.103 .105 .069 .012 -.185
*
1













13 Educational level .078 -.086 .031 .079 -.194
**





14 Major in Business -.010 -.037 .000 .066 .126 .114 .021 .145
*
-.132 -.124 .086 -.085 .095 1









16 Tenure .130 .110 .019 -.036 .197
**







17 Ouput functional Bgd .077 -.063 -.057 .037 .026 -.193
**
-.064 .110 -.097 .122 -.003 -.264
**
.071 .078 -.028 -.223
**
1
18 Variable pay -.053 -.016 .075 .071 .177
*





19 Equtiy Ownereship -.012 -.130 -.231
**













20 Variable pay X Respondent Age .052 -.024 .100 -.170
*






.037 -.001 -.038 -.116 -.002 .068 -.060 1
21 Variable pay X Educational level -.066 .044 -.001 -.151
*









-.070 -.074 -.039 .027 .085 .016 .109 -.036 .057 .562
**
-.115 -.015 .133 1
23 Variable pay X Elite Education -.032 .089 .150
*
-.055 .095 .020 .083 .029 .002 .017 .010 -.003 .184
*







24 Variable pay X Tenure .050 .009 .103 .024 .082 .059 .010 .168
*
























26 Equity ownership X Respondent Age .087 .043 -.139 .032 -.126 .088 .059 -.022 .048 .020 -.124 -.025 -.044 -.083 .035 .161
*
-.106 -.063 -.024 .049 .005 -.024 -.050 -.012 -.062 1




-.008 -.085 .028 -.151
*
-.026 -.045 .075 .044 -.281
**
1
28 Equity ownership X Major in business .031 -.039 -.131 -.073 .092 -.111 -.140 .093 -.044 -.121 .067 -.029 -.143
*




-.067 -.024 .010 -.131 -.037 1
29 Equity ownership X Elite Education -.091 -.127 -.235
**
-.063 .052 -.092 -.173
*




.117 .007 -.083 .589
**
























-.089 -.090 -.035 .008 -.112 -.117 -.105 -.133 .117 -.048 .022 -.018 -.019 .087 -.138 .065 .584
**







Means, Standard Deviation, Correlations
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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2.4.2. Hypotheses Testing 
To test the hypotheses, I first used hierarchical regression for two regression 
models, one with the 10 control variables only – firm age, firm size, international 
activities, RD orientation, alliance function, alliance number, past performance, two 
industrial effects and country effect, with the second model adding top managers’ 
demographic characteristics as the independent variables – age, educational level, major 
in business, elite education, tenure and function background. Alliance strategy was the 
dependent variable in the two models.  
The regression results are reported in Table 2-3. Model 1 shows that firm size (p 
< 0.05), alliance function (p < 0.01), past performance (p < 0.01), industry effect 1 (p < 
0.05), and industry effect 2 (p < 0.01) were significantly related to alliance strategy. The 
control variables, Model 1, accounted for 25.8% (p < 0.01) of the variance in alliance 
strategy.  
In Table 2-3, Model 2, I added the independent variables of managerial 
characteristics. Model 2 shows that the independent variable of tenure (p < 0.05) was a 
significant predictor of alliance strategy, and control variables of firm size (p < 0.1), 
alliance function (p < 0.01), past performance (p < 0.05), industry effect 1 (p < 0.01) 
and industry effect 2 (p < 0.1) were significantly related to alliance strategy. The 
managerial characteristics as independent variables accounted for an increase of 3% of 
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the variance in alliance strategy in R2 compared to Model 1. F-statistics was significant. 
However, age (negatively related), educational level, major in business (negatively 
related), elite education (negatively related) and functional background were not 
statistically significant. Therefore, Hypotheses 1, 2a, 2b, 2c and 4 are not supported, 
whereas Hypothesis 3 is supported.  
Table 2- 3: Regression results for the effects of control variables, managerial 
characteristics on alliance strategy 
 
Dependent Variable
Control Varaibles B SE Sig B SE Sig
Firm age 0.011 0.015 0.470 .010 .015 .501
Firm size 0.000 ** 0.000 0.045 .000 * .000 .091
International sales 0.015 0.009 0.106 .014 .009 .138
RD orientation 0.206 0.270 0.445 .228 .288 .430
Alliance Function 1.315 *** 0.482 0.007 1.497 *** .499 .003
Alliance Number -0.012 0.013 0.338 -.014 .013 .276
Past performance 0.186 *** 0.064 0.004 .161 ** .066 .016
Industrial effect 1 1.447 ** 0.584 0.014 1.817 *** .609 .003
Industrial effect 2 1.507 *** 0.560 0.008 1.021 * .609 .096
Country effect 0.225 0.957 0.814 .365 .971 .707
Independent variables
Age -.356 .276 .199
Educational Level .354 .268 .189
Major in School -.291 .461 .529
Elite education -.082 .535 .878
Tenure .525 ** .264 .048
Functional Background .628 .484 .196







* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01






Model 1 Model 2
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Regression analysis was used to test Hypotheses H5 and H6 for moderating 
effects of variable pay and equity ownership between managerial characteristics and 
alliance strategy. The regression results are shown in Table 2-4. The base model (Main 
effect – Model 3) included main effects of controls, managerial characteristics and two 
moderating influences – variable pay and managers’ equity ownership. Alliance strategy 
was the dependent variable in all models. Model 3 shows that alliance function (p < 
0.01), past performance (p < 0.05), industry effect 1 (p < 0.01) and industry effect 2 (p 
< 0.1) were significantly related to alliance strategy. The independent variable of tenure 
(p < 0.1) was also significantly related to alliance strategy. Model 3 shows a small R2 
change of 0.006 compared to Model 2. F-statistics was significant. The two moderating 
influences of variable pay and equity ownership were not significant at the base model.  
Models 4 to 9 were used to test Hypothesis 5. For each of the six models, one 
interaction term (variable pay by one of the six managerial characteristics) was entered 
after the base model. This is because interaction terms may cause multicollinearity 
problems, which are likely to affect regression results. Scholars suggest that 
multicollinearity does not affect R, R2 or change in R2 (Brouthers et al., 2000, Hair, 
2009). Also, entering each interaction term after the base model singularly allows one 
to see that the changes in R2 are relevant to a particular interaction. Thus, any significant 
improvement in R2 is attributable to the interaction. In Model 4, I added the interaction 
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term of age and variable pay. The results of control variables and independent variables 
were mainly the same as model 3, except for industry effect 2, which was no longer 
significant. Also, the interaction was not significant. The R2 change was 0.001, and F-
statistic was significant. 
In Model 5, I added the interaction term of educational level and variable pay. 
The result of control variables and independent variables were the same as model 4 and 
the interaction was not significant. The R2 change was 0.001, and F-statistics was 
significant. 
In Model 6, I added the interaction term of major in business and variable pay. 
The control variables, independent variables and moderators had the same results as 
Models 4 and 5. The interactions term was significant with a negative  coefficient of 
0.884 at (p < 0.1). R2 change was 0.015, and F-value was statistically significant. 
In Model 7, I added the interaction term of elite education and variable pay. The 
result of control variables, independent variables and moderating variables were the 
same as Model 4, 5 and 6. However, the interaction was not significant. R2 change of 
0.001, and F-statistics was significant. 
In Model 8, I added the interaction term of tenure and variable pay. The 
interaction term was not significant. The result of controls, independent variables and 
moderating variables were mainly the same as Models 4, 5, 6 and 7, in which only 
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tenure was significant at (p < 0.1). Also, industry effect 2, which became significant at 
(p < 0.1). However, change in R2 was only 0.001, and F value was significant. 
In Model 9, I added the interaction term of functional background and variable 
pay. The interaction was significant at (p < 0.1) with a negative  coefficient of 0.794. 
The R2 change was 0.011 and was significant. The control variable of international 
activities became significant at (p < 0.1), and industry effect 2 was not significant 
anymore compared to Model 8 and the base model. The independent variable of tenure 
became insignificant. F value was still significant.  
In summary, Models 4 to 9 show that the interactions for two of the six managerial 
characteristics significantly improve the base model. The interaction with a major in 
business (R2 change = 0.015, p < 0.1) and output functional background (R2 = 0.011, p 
< 0.1) significantly improve the explanatory power over the main effects model. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 5 was partly supported. 
Models 10 to 15 were used to test Hypothesis 6. For each of the six models, one 
interaction term (equity ownership by one of the six managerial characteristics) was 
entered in each model separately. In Model 10, I added the interaction term of equity 
ownership and age. The interaction term was not significant. The control variables had 
the same result as the base model (Model 3), and the independent variable of tenure was 
no longer significant. R2 change was 0.001, and F value was significant.  
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In Model 11, I added the interaction term of equity ownership and educational 
level. The interaction term was not significant. The control variables had the same result 
as base model (Model 3) and independent variable of tenure was not significant as 
model 10. R2 change of 0.006, and F value was significant.  
Model 12, I added the interaction term of equity ownership and major in business. 
The interaction term was not significant. The control variable of industry effect 2 was 
not significant anymore compared to Model 11. The independent variable of tenure 
became significant at (p < 0.1), the same as the base model (Model 3). R2 change was 
0.001, and F value was significant.  
In Model 13, I added the interaction term of equity ownership and elite education. 
The interaction term was not significant. The control and independent variables had the 
same result as base model (Model 3). R2 change was 0.008, and F statistics was 
significant. 
Model 14, I added the interaction term of equity ownership and tenure. The 
interaction term was not significant. The control variable of industry effect 2 was not 
significant as Model 13 and the base model. The independent variable of tenure was not 
significant anymore compared to Model 3. R2 change was 0.003, and F statistic was 
significant.  
Model 15, I added the interaction of equity ownership and output functional 
122 
 
background. The interaction term was not significant. The control of industry effect 2 
was not significant but tenure became significant at (p < 0.1) compared to Model 3. R2 
change was 0.001, and F statistic was significant.  
In summary, Model 10 to 15 were used to test Hypothesis 6. With the same 
procedure as Models 4 to 9, in each model only one interaction term was entered after 
the base model (equity ownership by one of the six managerial characteristic). The 
regression result shows that none of the interactions terms between equity ownership 






Table 2- 4: Regression results for moderating effects of managerial characteristics, total variable pay and shareholdings on alliance strategy 
 
Dependent Variable
Control Variables B SE Sig. B SE Sig. B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig
Firm age 0.010 0.015 0.530 0.010 0.015 0.529 0.009 0.015 0.552 .009 .015 .561 .009 .016 .585 .010 .015 .536 .006 .015 .678
Firm size 0.000 0.000 0.130 0.000 0.000 0.115 0.000 0.000 0.132 .000 .000 .143 .000 .000 .120 .000 .000 .141 .000 .000 .094
International sales 0.014 0.009 0.146 0.015 0.010 0.128 0.014 0.010 0.136 .014 .009 .133 .014 .010 .129 .014 .009 .144 .016 * .009 .084
RD orientation 0.303 0.297 0.308 0.318 0.298 0.288 0.292 0.299 0.331 .322 .294 .276 .303 .297 .310 .307 .297 .303 .391 .300 .194
Alliance Function 1.504 *** 0.500 0.003 1.461 *** 0.507 0.004 1.524 *** 0.505 0.003 1.595 *** .499 .002 1.518 *** .502 .003 1.518 *** .502 .003 1.464 *** .498 .004
Alliance Number -0.014 0.013 0.278 -0.014 0.013 0.281 -0.015 0.013 0.263 -.015 .013 .270 -.015 .013 .257 -.014 .013 .286 -.015 .013 .256
Past performance 0.160 ** 0.067 0.017 0.155 ** 0.067 0.022 0.161 ** 0.067 0.017 .175 *** .067 .009 .160 ** .067 .017 .164 ** .067 .016 .150 ** .067 .025
Industry effect 1 1.737 *** 0.614 0.005 1.772 *** 0.619 0.005 1.770 *** 0.622 0.005 1.670 *** .610 .007 1.741 *** .615 .005 1.733 *** .616 .005 1.807 *** .612 .004
Industry effect 2 1.039 * 0.626 0.099 0.982 0.635 0.124 1.015 0.631 0.110 .963 .622 .124 1.008 .629 .111 1.077 * .633 .091 .957 .624 .127
Country effect 0.458 0.994 0.646 0.510 1.001 0.611 0.506 1.005 0.615 .123 1.002 .902 .500 .999 .618 .440 .997 .659 .519 .990 .601
Independent variables
Age -0.331 0.278 0.235 -0.301 0.284 0.291 -0.332 0.279 0.235 -.313 .276 .258 -.317 .280 .258 -.346 .281 .220 -.373 .278 .181
Level of education 0.426 0.275 0.123 0.435 0.276 0.117 0.422 0.276 0.128 .363 .275 .189 .427 .275 .123 .424 .276 .125 .385 .275 .163
Major in business -0.319 0.464 0.492 -0.316 0.465 0.498 -0.314 0.465 0.501 -.335 .460 .468 -.336 .466 .472 -.328 .465 .482 -.278 .462 .548
Elite education -0.034 0.538 0.950 -0.008 0.541 0.989 -0.037 0.539 0.945 .062 .536 .908 -.040 .539 .941 -.051 .540 .926 -.049 .535 .927
Tenure 0.490 * 0.272 0.073 0.494 * 0.273 0.072 0.490 * 0.273 0.074 .485 * .270 .074 .494 * .273 .072 .490 * .273 .074 .528 .272 .054
Functional background 0.623 0.485 0.201 0.642 0.487 0.190 0.653 0.494 0.187 .709 .484 .144 .667 .493 .178 .629 .487 .198 .614 .483 .205
Moderators
Variable pay % -0.261 0.229 0.257 -0.277 0.231 0.233 -0.283 0.238 0.236 .021 .271 .940 -.383 .321 .234 -.242 .233 .301 .011 .281 .969
Shareholding % 0.063 0.242 0.796 0.059 0.242 0.807 0.059 0.242 0.808 .046 .240 .850 .051 .243 .835 .069 .243 .776 .078 .241 .748
Interactions
Age X Variable pay 0.120 0.217 0.580
Educational level X Variable pay 0.071 0.197 0.719
Major in school X Variable pay -.884 * .467 .060
Elite education X Variable pay .247 .451 .584
Tenure x Variable pay -.083 .195 .669
Function x Variable pay -.794 * .480 .100
Age X Shareholdings
Educational level X Shareholdings
Major in school X Shareholdings
Elite education X Shareholdings
Tenure x Shareholdings
Function x Shareholdings
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Control Variables B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig
Firm age .009 .015 .559 .008 .015 .596 .009 .015 .557 .010 .015 .521 .008 .016 .602 .009 .016 .558
Firm size .000 .000 .181 .000 .000 .150 .000 .000 .131 .000 .000 .095 .000 .000 .165 .000 .000 .146
International sales .013 .009 .165 .014 .009 .126 .014 .009 .149 .015 .009 .122 .014 .009 .139 .013 .009 .156
RD orientation .332 .301 .271 .303 .296 .307 .296 .297 .321 .313 .296 .292 .323 .298 .280 .298 .298 .318
Alliance Function 1.484 *** .502 .004 1.516 *** .499 .003 1.543 *** .504 .003 1.474 *** .499 .004 1.501 *** .501 .003 1.521 *** .503 .003
Alliance Number -.015 .013 .257 -.016 .013 .232 -.014 .013 .286 -.015 .013 .266 -.016 .013 .246 -.015 .013 .274
Past performance .159 ** .067 .018 .154 ** .067 .022 .154 ** .067 .023 .150 ** .067 .027 .161 ** .067 .017 .158 ** .067 .020
Industry effect 1 1.695 *** .619 .007 1.723 *** .613 .006 1.735 *** .615 .005 1.719 *** .613 .006 1.690 *** .619 .007 1.729 *** .616 .006
Industry effect 2 1.041 * .627 .098 1.063 * .625 .091 1.026 .627 .104 1.118 * .627 .076 1.003 .629 .113 1.031 .627 .102
Country effect .534 1.004 .596 .657 1.005 .514 .477 .996 .633 .458 .991 .645 .514 .999 .607 .487 .999 .626
Independent variables
Age -.308 .281 .274 -.297 .279 .289 -.329 .278 .239 -.289 .279 .302 -.317 .279 .258 -.342 .280 .223
Level of education .437 .276 .115 .418 .275 .130 .429 .275 .121 .437 .274 .113 .462 .281 .101 .437 .277 .117
Major in business -.309 .465 .508 -.340 .463 .465 -.314 .465 .500 -.333 .463 .472 -.309 .465 .507 -.324 .465 .487
Elite education -.040 .539 .940 -.032 .537 .952 -.032 .538 .952 -.109 .539 .839 -.042 .539 .938 -.033 .539 .951
Tenure .452 .280 .109 .400 .281 .156 .516 * .275 .063 .459 * .272 .094 .441 .282 .119 .493 * .273 .073
Functional background .641 .487 .190 .702 .489 .153 .650 .488 .184 .675 .485 .166 .615 .486 .207 .609 .488 .214
Moderators
Variable pay % -.264 .229 .251 -.274 .229 .233 -.252 .230 .273 -.262 .228 .252 -.277 .231 .231 -.249 .231 .283
Shareholding % .071 .243 .770 .051 .241 .833 -.044 .289 .878 .280 .288 .332 .041 .244 .867 .127 .292 .664
Interactions
Age X Variable pay
Educational level X Variable pay
Major in school X Variable pay
Elite education X Variable pay
Tenure x Variable pay
Function x Variable pay
Age X Shareholdings .134 .224 .552
Educational level X Shareholdings -.269 .216 .215
Major in school X Shareholdings .311 .460 .500
Elite education X Shareholdings -.644 .467 .169
Tenure x Shareholdings .148 .217 .496
Function x Shareholdings -.187 .473 .694
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In order to understand the effect of the two significant interaction terms, I 
graphed the two significant interactions results in Figure 2-1 and 2-2. Figure 2-1 shows 
that the moderator of variable pay negatively impacts on the relationship between 
business major and alliance strategy. Figure 2-2 shows the moderating influence of 
variable pay on the relationship between output functional background and alliance 
strategy. It is also an antagonistic relationship. Therefore, an increase in variable pay 
appears to negatively impact the association between major in business and alliance 
strategy as well as the relationship between output functional background and alliance 
strategy.  













2.4.3. Robustness Tests 
2.4.3.1. Test for industry effect with sub-industry dummy variables 
 In the original regression analysis (Table 2-3 and 2-4), I used industry effect 1 
and industry effect 2 to control for industrial differences. Industry effect 1 is used to 
distinguish whether a firm is operating as a manufacturer or contract manufacturer. 
Industry effect 2 was used to identify firms from the two industries, i.e. the PCB and 
plastic industries. I found that both industry effect 1 and 2 are significantly related to 
alliance strategy at (p < 0.05) and (p < 0.01) respectively. However, different sub-
industries may also have an impact on the choices of alliance strategies. Therefore, I 
checked the robustness of my results by analysing if there are major differences with 
my findings when industry effect 1 is sub-divided into more categories and when 
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industry effect 2 is separated into two samples. 
First, I re-coded the industry effect 1 data into four sub-industrial categories (1. 
manufacture and contract manufacture, 2. equipment and machinery, 3. raw material 
and chemicals, and 4. others). Then, I created three industry dummy variables for 
equipment and machinery, raw materials and chemical, and others, with manufacture 
and contract manufacture as the reference category to see if these sub-industries would 
impact on my hypotheses. The results of this regression analysis show that control 
variables were mainly the same compared to the original regression analysis in Table 
2-3 and 2-4, except for firm size, which is significant at (p < 0.1) instead of (p < 0.05). 
The results of the re-coded control variables show that equipment & machinery (p < 
0.05), raw materials and chemicals (p < 0.05), and others (p < 0.05) were significantly 
related to alliance strategy. All significant hypotheses such as Hypothesis 3 (Model 2) 
for managerial characteristics of tenure, Hypothesis 5 (Model 6 and 9) for the two 
interaction terms (major in business and variable pay, functional background and 
variable pay) are both still significant at (p < 0.1). There is not any other significant 
hypothesis. The control variable of alliance function remains at (p < 0.01) and past 
performance at (p < 0.05). This robustness test has similar results as the original 
regression results in Table 2-3 and 2-4. The results of this robustness test are presented 
in Table 2-5 and 2-6. 
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As a second robustness test, I split the data into two samples, one for PCB firms 
only and another for plastic firms only. This is because there may be some differences 
between the two industries that can cause managers to choose different alliance 
strategies. Therefore, I conducted four further regression analyses to see if there is any 
impact on my hypotheses.  
For the PCB industry, there are 122 firms in the sample. I ran two regression 
analyses for this sample. For the first regression analysis, I used industry effect 1 
(manufacture and contract manual manufacture) as a control variable that is the same 
as the regression analysis in Table 2-3 and 2-4. For the second regression, I used the 
three sub-industrial dummy variables for equipment and machinery, raw materials and 
chemicals, and others, with the manufacture with contract manufacture as the 
reference category.  
The results of the two regression analyses are mainly the same compared to the 
initial regression results presented in Table 2-3 and 2-4. The first regression results are 
reported in Table 2-7 and 2-8. The second regression results are reported in Table 2-9 
and 2-10. The regression results of this robustness test are similar as the original 
regression results in Table 2-3 and Table 2-4. The only difference is that age became 
significant at (p < 0.05) compared to the original regression analysis in Table 2-3. 
In Table 2-8, Models 4 to 9 were used to test Hypothesis 5 for the interaction 
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terms between managerial characteristics (age, educational level, major in business, 
elite education, tenure and output functional background) and variable pay. Compared 
to the initial regression analysis in Table 2-4, I found that the interaction term for major 
in business and variable pay (Model 6) is still significant at (p < 0.05, R2 change = 
0.023). However, the interaction term for output functional background and variable 
pay (Model 9) is no longer significant.  
In Table 2-8, Models 10 to 15 were used to test Hypothesis 6 for the interaction 
terms between the managerial characteristics (age, educational level, major in business, 
elite education, tenure and output functional background) and share ownership. The 
regression results show that the control and independent variables are mainly the same 
as the base model (Model 3). None of the interaction terms between managerial 
characteristics and share ownership were statistically significant. Hypothesis 6 is not 
supported, which is the same as the original regression analysis in Table 2-4. 
In Table 2-9, Model 2 shows that age became significant, unlike the original 
regression analysis in Table 2-3. 
  In Table 2-10, compared to the initial regression analysis in Table 2-4, the result 
of the interaction term for major in business and variable pay (Model 6) has an 
improved significance level at (p < 0.05), and R2 change is improved from 0.308 to 
0.320. The interaction term for output functional background and variable pay (Model 
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9) is at the same significant level at (p < 0.1), and R2 change is improved from 0.305 
to 0.311. Hypothesis 5 is still partly supported. 
For the plastic and rubber industry (PLAS), there are only 68 firms in the sample. 
I ran two further regression analyses to the PCB industry. There was no significant 
regression result (See Table 2-11). 
2.4.3.2. Test for the dependent variable - Alliance Strategy as two-item scale 
 One of the measurement items for the dependent variable “Alliance Strategy” 
(Item 2) measures executives’ view on long-term versus short-term horizons when 
formulating their alliances. The two descriptive statements are: ‘We mainly consider 
short-term outcomes during alliance formation’ and ‘We mainly consider long-term 
alliance development goal during alliance formation’. 
In this item, we asked respondents to select their tendencies on long-term versus 
short-term perspectives during alliance formation. Scholars found that managers who 
are able to view their alliances in the context of their firm’s industry are likely to 
develop a high-performing portfolio with a long-term view (Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 
2009). This implies that executives with a long-term view are likely to choose a 
portfolio strategy. Executives with a short-term view are likely to choose a standalone 
strategy.  
However, one may question if the long-term versus the short-term perspectives 
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when forming alliances are clear, because potentially an alliance can involve short-
term projects in order to achieve a long-term objective. Standalone strategy and 
portfolio strategy may not consistently project short-term and long-term orientation 
toward alliances. For example, firms may need to form partnerships with other firms 
to design or supply some components for product testing. Product testing can be just 
the initial stage of product development to fulfill a long-term goal. These types of 
alliances can be temporary. If firms have many of these types of alliances, this may 
impact on how their executives choose their alliance strategies. In order to test if Item 
2 has any impact on my regression results and could cause misunderstanding for my 
respondents, I conducted additional regression analyses without Item 2 for the alliance 
strategy construct to see if there is any difference in my hypotheses. 
I used three sample sizes – 190 firms (all firms), 122 (PCB firms) and 68 (PLAS 
firms) for the test. In each sample size, there is different validity and reliability for the 
two-item scale. For the 190 firms (all firms) sample, the average variance extracted is 
0.82, and Cronbach’s alpha is 0.78. For the 122 firms (PCB firms) sample, the average 
variance extracted is 0.84, and Cronbach’s alpha is 0.81. For the 68 firms (PLAS firms) 
sample, the average variance extracted is 0.79, and Cronbach’s alpha is 0.70.  
The regression results of sample size 190 (all firms) show there is no difference 
in significant hypotheses from my original results in Table 2-3 and 2-4. However, the 
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control variable of international sales became significant at (p < 0.1). The robustness 
test results without Item 2 are shown in Table 2-12 and Table 2-13.  
For the sample size of 122 (PCB firms), the regression results show that age (p < 
0.05), tenure (p < 0.1) and output function (p < 0.05) were significantly related to 
alliance strategy, and only one interactions term (major in business by variable pay) 
was significant at (p < 0.05). The regression results are shown in Table 2-14 and Table 
2-15. 
For the sample size of 68 (PLAS firms), there was no significant regression result 










Control Varaibles B SE Sig B SE Sig
Firm age .011 .015 .481 .010 .015 .504
Firm size .000 * .000 .052 .000 .000 .102
International sales .014 .009 .135 .013 .009 .163
RD orientation .186 .275 .499 .218 .292 .457
Alliance Function 1.302 *** .486 .008 1.477 *** .505 .004
Alliance Number -.012 .013 .360 -.014 .013 .291
Past performance .182 *** .065 .006 .159 ** .067 .019
Equipment& Machinery -1.274 ** .635 .046 -1.673 ** .661 .012
Raw Material & Chemical -1.755 ** .797 .029 -2.062 ** .815 .012
     Others -1.582 ** .796 .048 -1.932 ** .822 .020
Industrial effect (PCB vs PLAS) 1.572 *** .573 .007 1.092 * .627 .083
Country effect .290 .966 .764 .432 .982 .661
Independent Varaibles
Age -.050 .038 .190
Educational Level .553 .416 .186
Major in School -.283 .466 .544
Elite education -.085 .539 .875
Tenure .056 * .029 .054
Functional Background .580 .493 .241







* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Alliance Strategy Alliance Strategy
0.260 0.289








Table 2- 6: Regression results for the three sub-industrial dummies variables 
 
Dependent Variable
Control Variables B SE Sig. B SE Sig. B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig
Firm age .010 .016 .536 .010 .016 .530 .009 .016 .561 .009 .015 .562 .009 .016 .583 .009 .160 .546 .006 .016 .695
Firm size .000 .000 .146 .000 .000 .127 .000 .000 .148 .000 .000 .163 .000 .000 .137 .000 .000 .160 .000 .000 .108
International sales .013 .010 .176 .014 .010 .154 .014 .010 .166 .013 .009 .167 .014 .010 .159 .013 .010 .173 .016 .010 .103
RD orientation .294 .301 .329 .316 .303 .300 .281 .305 .357 .317 .299 .290 .295 .302 .330 .296 .302 .329 .382 .304 .210
Alliance Function 1.480 *** .506 .004 1.432 *** .513 .006 1.496 *** .510 .004 1.575 *** .505 .002 1.494 *** .508 .004 1.490 *** .508 .004 1.429 *** .504 .005
Alliance Number -.014 .013 .293 -.014 .013 .297 -.015 .013 .280 -.014 .013 .286 -.015 .013 .275 -.014 .013 .302 -.015 .013 .272
Past performance .157 ** .067 .021 .150 ** .068 .029 .159 ** .068 .020 .171 ** .067 .012 .157 ** .068 .021 .161 ** .068 .019 .146 ** .067 .031
Equipment& Machinery -1.563 ** .668 .020 -1.592 ** .670 .019 -1.596 ** .677 .020 -1.477 ** .664 .027 -1.583 ** .671 .019 -1.554 ** .670 .021 -1.596 ** .664 .017
Raw Material & Chemical -2.011 ** .821 .015 -2.117 ** .839 .013 -2.006 ** .823 .016 -2.016 ** .815 .014 -1.991 ** .824 .017 -1.983 .825 .017 -2.121 *** .819 .010
     Others -1.878 ** .832 .025 -1.881 ** .834 .025 -1.941 ** .857 .025 -1.773 ** .828 .034 -1.868 ** .835 .027 -1.914 .838 .024 -2.015 ** .832 .016
PCB vs Plastic 1.121 * .646 .085 1.052 .656 .110 1.102 * .650 .092 1.044 .642 .106 1.087 * .652 .097 1.168 * .656 .077 1.059 .643 .102
Country effect .545 1.007 .589 .617 1.015 .544 .584 1.017 .566 .217 1.013 .831 .573 1.011 .572 .525 1.010 .604 .626 1.002 .533
Independent variables
Age -.046 .038 .222 -.042 .039 .283 -.046 .038 .222 -.044 .038 .243 -.045 .038 .243 -.049 .038 .206 -.053 .038 .165
Level of education .670 .427 .119 .689 .429 .110 .663 .429 .124 .574 .427 .180 .671 .428 .119 .667 .428 .121 .605 .426 .157
Major in business -.311 .469 .508 -.312 .470 .507 -.303 .471 .521 -.332 .466 .477 -.326 .471 .490 -.317 .470 .502 -.263 .467 .574
Elite education -.034 .541 .950 -.007 .544 .990 -.035 .542 .949 .060 .539 .911 -.039 .542 .943 -.049 .543 .928 -.048 .538 .929
Tenure .052 * .030 .082 .053 * .030 .080 .052 * .030 .083 .052 * .030 .083 .053 * .030 .081 .052 * .030 .084 .056 * .030 .061
Functional background .566 .495 .254 .581 .496 .243 .597 .505 .239 .646 .492 .192 .608 .504 .229 .573 .496 .250 .545 .492 .270
Moderators
Variable pay -.010 .009 .238 -.011 .009 .208 -.011 .009 .222 .000 .010 .970 -.014 .012 .244 -.010 .009 .284 .000 .011 .977
Shareholdings .217 .894 .808 .182 .898 .839 .219 .897 .807 .133 .888 .881 .182 .900 .840 .256 .901 .777 .284 .890 .750
Interactions
Age X Variable pay .141 .222 .525
Educational level X Variable pay .065 .203 .748
Major in school X Variable pay -.904 * .470 .056
Elite education X Variable pay .210 .457 .646
Tenure x Variable pay -.088 .198 .657
Output Functional Background x Variable pay -.831 * .484 .088
Age X Shareholdings
Educational level X Shareholdings
Major in school X Shareholdings
Elite education X Shareholdings
Tenure x Shareholdings
Output Functional Background x Shareholdings







* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Model 8 Model 9















3.367*** 3.611*** 3.375*** 3.374*** 3.560***
















Control Variables B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig
Firm age .009 .016 .562 .008 .016 .616 .009 .016 .558 .010 .015 .537 .008 .016 .607 .009 .016 .566
Firm size .000 .000 .201 .000 .000 .174 .000 .000 .148 .000 .000 .108 .000 .000 .185 .000 .000 .165
International sales .012 .010 .198 .014 .010 .153 .013 .010 .183 .014 .010 .145 .013 .010 .169 .013 .010 .188
RD orientation .325 .306 .290 .287 .300 .340 .291 .301 .335 .297 .300 .324 .315 .303 .300 .288 .302 .341
Alliance Function 1.462 *** .508 .005 1.481 *** .505 .004 1.526 *** .511 .003 1.437 *** .506 .005 1.478 *** .507 .004 1.497 *** .509 .004
Alliance Number -.015 .013 .271 -.016 .013 .244 -.014 .013 .302 -.014 .013 .282 -.015 .013 .260 -.014 .013 .289
Past performance .156 ** .068 .022 .150 ** .067 .027 .150 ** .068 .029 .147 ** .068 .031 .157 ** .067 .021 .155 ** .068 .024
Equipment& Machinery -1.525 ** .672 .025 -1.502 ** .668 .026 -1.564 ** .669 .021 -1.518 ** .666 .024 -1.518 ** .672 .025 -1.551 ** .670 .022
Raw Material & Chemical -1.981 ** .824 .017 -2.011 ** .819 .015 -2.052 ** .824 .014 -1.959 ** .819 .018 -1.969 ** .824 .018 -1.003 ** .823 .016
     Others -1.814 ** .841 .032 -1.968 ** .833 .019 -1.822 ** .838 .031 -1.964 ** .832 .019 -1.823 ** .838 .031 -1.880 ** .835 .026
PCB vs Plastic 1.119 * .647 .086 1.179 * .646 .070 1.098 * .648 .092 1.228 * .648 .060 1.083 * .649 .097 1.115 * .648 .087
Country effect .621 1.017 .543 .780 1.020 .446 .569 1.009 .574 .550 1.004 .585 .602 1.012 .553 .577 1.012 .569
Independent variables
Age -.043 .038 .260 -.042 .038 .272 -.046 .038 .226 -.041 .038 .285 -.044 .038 .244 -.048 .038 .210
Level of education .688 .429 .111 .658 .426 .124 .677 .428 .115 .688 .426 .108 .727 .436 .101 .688 .430 .112
Major in business -.303 .470 .520 -.324 .468 .489 -.312 .470 .508 -.316 .468 .500 -.302 .470 .521 -.316 .470 .503
Elite education -.042 .542 .939 -.028 .540 .959 -.036 .542 .947 -.107 .542 .843 -.043 .542 .937 -.033 .542 .952
Tenure .048 .031 .119 .041 .031 .186 .055 * .030 .070 .048 .030 .108 .047 * .031 .099 .053 * .030 .081
Functional background .584 .497 .241 .641 .497 .199 .592 .497 .235 .616 .494 .214 .558 .496 .262 .550 .497 .270
Moderators
Variable pay -.010 .009 .231 -.011 .009 .211 -.010 .009 .251 -.010 .009 .234 -.011 .009 .213 -.010 .009 .264
Shareholdings .240 .897 .789 .196 .892 .826 -.203 1.083 .851 1.066 1.073 .322 .136 .904 .880 .467 1.078 .666
Interactions
Age X Variable pay
Educational level X Variable pay
Major in school X Variable pay
Elite education X Variable pay
Tenure x Variable pay
Output Functional background x Variable pay
Age X Shareholdings .133 .226 .558
Educational level X Shareholdings -.294 .219 .182
Major in school X Shareholdings .323 .468 .491
Elite education X Shareholdings -.673 .473 .157
Tenure x Shareholdings .148 .219 .498
Output Functional background x Shareholdings -.199 .476 .677







* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Alliance StrategyAlliance Strategy Alliance Strategy Alliance Strategy
Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15Model 10 Model 11




















3.372***3.384*** 3.482*** 3.393*** 3.497*** 3.392 ***
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Table 2- 7: Regression results 1 for PCB industry (122 firms) 
 
Dependent Variable
Control Varaibles B SE Sig B SE Sig
Firm age .008 .018 .654 .013 .018 .452
Firm size .000 .000 .103 .000 .000 .229
International sales .016 .010 .125 .014 .010 .156
RD orientation .246 .311 .431 .416 .333 .214
Alliance Function 1.709 *** .617 .007 2.009 *** .639 .002
Alliance Number -.021 .027 .426 -.028 .027 .296
Past performance .283 *** .076 .000 .202 ** .079 .012
Industry effect 1 1.264 ** .626 .046 1.939 *** .655 .004
Country effect .090 1.008 .929 .335 1.005 .740
Independent Varaibles
Age -.101 ** .045 .026
Educational Level .567 .505 .264
Major in School .120 .625 .847
Elite education .106 .680 .876
Tenure .062 * .035 .077
Functional Background 1.134 .605 .112







* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Alliance Strategy Alliance Strategy
Model 1 Model 2







Table 2- 8: Regression results 1 for PCB industry (122 firms) 
 
Dependent Variable
Control Variables B SE Sig. B SE Sig. B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig
Firm age .014 .018 .455 .014 .018 .458 .012 .018 .513 .014 .018 .449 .012 .018 .515 .013 .018 .480 .011 .018 .560
Firm size .000 .000 .281 .000 .000 .293 .000 .000 .285 .000 .000 .348 .000 .000 .264 .000 .000 .339 .000 .000 .243
International sales .014 .010 .161 .014 .010 .173 .016 .010 .132 .015 .010 .132 .015 .010 .150 .014 .010 .158 .017 * .010 .095
RD orientation .480 .345 .167 .478 .348 .173 .444 .348 .205 .509 .340 .137 .478 .346 .171 .488 .345 .160 .604 * .352 .090
Alliance Function 2.024 *** .642 .002 2.028 *** .653 .002 2.098 *** .649 .002 2.230 *** .642 .001 2.038 *** .646 .002 2.070 *** .644 .002 2.005 *** .639 .002
Alliance Number -.027 .027 .320 -.027 .027 .322 -.028 .027 .309 -.032 .027 .245 -.027 .027 .330 -.027 .027 .322 -.030 .027 .264
Past performance .203 ** .079 .012 .203 ** .081 .013 .208 ** .080 .011 .231 *** .080 .005 .204 ** .080 .012 .215 ** .080 .009 .190 ** .079 .019
Industry effect 1 1.846 *** .666 .007 1.843 ** .673 .007 1.913 ** .672 .005 1.717 ** .660 .011 1.837 ** .669 .007 1.848 *** .666 .007 1.906 *** .663 .005
Country effect .358 1.036 .730 .355 1.045 .735 .471 1.047 .654 -.068 1.043 .948 .388 1.043 .710 .299 1.038 .774 .437 1.031 .673
Independent variables
Age -.096 ** .045 .035 -.097 ** .046 .040 -.096 ** .045 .036 -.093 ** .045 .039 -.094 ** .046 .043 -.103 ** .046 .026 -.106 ** .045 .022
Level of education .654 .516 .207 .653 .519 .211 .636 .517 .222 .517 .513 .316 .649 .518 .213 .650 .515 .210 .616 .513 .232
Major in business .096 .633 .880 .095 .637 .882 .090 .634 .887 -.070 .630 .911 .074 .638 .908 .042 .635 .947 .147 .630 .816
Elite education .148 .686 .829 .145 .694 .835 .140 .688 .839 .242 .678 .721 .154 .689 .823 .083 .689 .904 .138 .682 .840
Tenure .057 * .036 .091 .057 * .037 .080 .059 * .036 .061 .056 * .036 .046 .058 * .037 .072 .060 * .036 .061 .061 * .036 .094
Functional background 1.092 .613 .102 1.091 .616 .123 1.177 .622 .111 1.226 .608 .124 1.130 .622 .116 1.170 .617 .105 .991 .612 .109
Moderators
Variable pay -.008 .009 .406 -.008 .009 .418 -.010 .010 .297 .004 .011 .708 -.012 .013 .378 -.006 .010 .564 .002 .011 .879
Shareholdings .414 1.041 .691 .416 1.047 .692 .402 1.043 .700 .431 1.027 .675 .374 1.050 .722 .481 1.043 .646 .478 1.036 .645
Interactions
Age X Variable pay -.010 .239 .968
Educational level X Variable pay .178 .214 .406
Major in school X Variable pay -1.038 ** .516 .047
Elite education X Variable pay .210 .490 .668
Tenure x Variable pay -.221 .216 .309
Output Functional Background x Variable pay -.801 .527 .132
Age X Shareholdings
Educational level X Shareholdings
Major in school X Shareholdings
Elite education X Shareholdings
Tenure x Shareholdings
Output Functional Background x Shareholdings







* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Model 8 Model 9















3.835*** 4.143*** 3.788*** 3.867*** 3.983***
















Control Variables B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig
Firm age .014 .018 .460 .012 .018 .525 .013 .018 .462 .013 .018 .461 .012 .019 .512 .014 .018 .454
Firm size .000 .000 .294 .000 .000 .299 .000 .000 .282 .000 .000 .245 .000 .000 .315 .000 .000 .280
International sales .014 .010 .167 .015 .010 .144 .014 .010 .165 .015 .010 .138 .014 .010 .165 .014 .010 .161
RD orientation .479 .351 .176 .484 .344 .162 .470 .347 .179 .485 .345 .163 .493 .349 .160 .483 .348 .167
Alliance Function 2.026 *** .653 .002 1.989 *** .642 .002 2.059 *** .650 .002 1.994 *** .644 .003 2.003 *** .648 .003 2.020 *** .646 .002
Alliance Number -.027 .027 .323 -.027 .027 .321 -.027 .027 .324 -.026 .027 .336 -.028 .027 .311 -.027 .027 .325
Past performance .203 ** .080 .013 .197 ** .079 .015 .197 ** .081 .017 .195 ** .080 .017 .203 ** .080 .012 .204 ** .080 .013
Industry effect 1 1.848 *** .676 .007 1.819 *** .665 .007 1.851 *** .669 .007 1.835 ** .667 .007 1.821 *** .673 .008 1.849 ** .670 .007
Country effect .355 1.053 .737 .569 1.049 .589 .368 1.041 .725 .331 1.038 .750 .405 1.050 .700 .347 1.045 .740
Independent variables
Age -.097 ** .047 .042 -.090 * .045 .051 -.096 ** .045 .036 -.090 * .046 .051 -.095 ** .046 .041 -.096 ** .046 .038
Level of education .653 .520 .212 .623 .515 .229 .659 .518 .206 .702 .519 .179 .695 .532 .194 .649 .519 .214
Major in business .095 .637 .881 .077 .632 .903 .144 .646 .824 .072 .634 .909 .102 .636 .872 .095 .636 .882
Elite education .149 .690 .830 .171 .685 .804 .153 .689 .824 .029 .700 .968 .153 .690 .825 .147 .690 .832
Tenure .057 * .037 .080 .046 * .037 .063 .058 * .037 .074 .052 * .037 .066 .056 * .037 .081 .057 * .037 .080
Functional background 1.091 .617 .128 1.152 .613 .221 1.114 .617 .115 1.146 .616 .157 1.085 .616 .130 1.107 .626 .123
Moderators
Variable pay -.008 .009 .409 -.009 .009 .361 -.008 .009 .418 -.008 .009 .404 -.008 .009 .383 -.008 .009 .402
Shareholdings .416 1.049 .692 .375 1.040 .719 .143 1.230 .908 1.165 1.337 .385 .283 1.117 .801 .315 1.291 .808
Interactions
Age X Variable pay
Educational level X Variable pay
Major in school X Variable pay
Elite education X Variable pay
Tenure x Variable pay
Output Functional background x Variable pay
Age X Shareholdings -.006 .267 .981
Educational level X Shareholdings -.289 .240 .232
Major in school X Shareholdings .241 .574 .676
Elite education X Shareholdings -.485 .541 .372
Tenure x Shareholdings .091 .272 .738
Output Functional background x Shareholdings .074 .560 .896







* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Alliance StrategyAlliance Strategy Alliance Strategy Alliance Strategy
Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15Model 10 Model 11




















3.772***3.771*** 3.904*** 3.787*** 3.845*** 3.781 ***
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Control Varaibles B SE Sig B SE Sig
Firm age .009 .018 .627 .015 .018 .419
Firm size .000 .000 .126 .000 .000 .275
International sales .014 .010 .178 .013 .010 .203
RD orientation .149 .322 .644 .324 .340 .343
Alliance Function 1.662 *** .625 .009 1.900 *** .649 .004
Alliance Number -.022 .027 .407 -.030 .027 .270
Past performance .275 *** .077 .001 .192 ** .080 .018
Equipment& Machinery -.880 .703 .214 -1.540 ** .719 .035
Raw Material & Chemical -2.078 ** 1.028 .046 -2.701 ** 1.052 .012
     Others -1.630 * .928 .082 -2.537 ** .953 .009
Country effect .273 1.021 .790 .579 1.022 .572
Independent Varaibles
Age -.106 ** .045 .020
Educational Level .643 .511 .211
Major in School .165 .628 .793
Elite education .067 .690 .923
Tenure .061 * .035 .082
Functional Background 1.027 .611 .101











Model 1 Model 2
1.194-1.863
Alliance Strategy Alliance Strategy
0.329 0.402
4.905 *** 4.119 ***
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Table 2- 10: Regression results 2 for PCB industry (122 firms) 
 
Dependent Variable
Control Variables B SE Sig. B SE Sig. B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig
Firm age .014 .018 .428 .014 .018 .429 .012 .018 .499 .014 .018 .417 .014 .019 .461 .013 .018 .461 .011 .018 .536
Firm size .000 .000 .340 .000 .000 .340 .000 .000 .338 .000 .000 .421 .000 .000 .334 .000 .000 .408 .000 .000 .298
International sales .013 .010 .215 .013 .011 .217 .015 .011 .169 .014 .010 .184 .013 .011 .213 .013 .010 .203 .016 .010 .126
RD orientation .394 .350 .263 .397 .353 .263 .354 .354 .320 .421 .345 .225 .395 .352 .264 .398 .350 .258 .521 .355 .146
Alliance Function 1.907 *** .651 .004 1.897 *** .662 .005 1.970 *** .656 .003 2.120 *** .650 .002 1.915 *** .656 .004 1.940 *** .651 .004 1.873 *** .646 .005
Alliance Number -.029 .027 .287 -.029 .027 .289 -.030 .027 .283 -.034 .027 .213 -.029 .027 .294 -.029 .027 .293 -.033 .027 .227
Past performance .192 ** .080 .018 .190 ** .082 .021 .199 ** .081 .015 .220 *** .080 .007 .193 ** .081 .019 .206 ** .081 .012 .177 ** .080 .029
Equipment& Machinery -1.412 * .733 .057 -1.416 * .738 .058 -1.496 ** .741 .046 -1.262 * .726 .085 -1.419 * .738 .057 -1.405 * .733 .058 -1.429 * .727 .052
Raw Material & Chemical -2.616 ** 1.070 .016 -2.644 ** 1.106 .019 -2.515 ** 1.078 .022 -2.567 ** 1.054 .017 -2.586 ** 1.088 .019 -2.512 ** 1.073 .021 -2.765 ** 1.065 .011
     Others -2.486 ** .964 .011 -2.486 ** .969 .012 -2.694 ** .995 .008 -2.336 ** .952 .016 -2.474 ** .971 .012 -2.621 *** .971 .008 -2.634 *** .960 .007
Country effect .642 1.060 .546 .656 1.073 .542 .735 1.067 .493 .226 1.063 .832 .647 1.065 .545 .566 1.061 .595 .761 1.053 .472
Independent variables
Age -.102 ** .045 .027 -.101 ** .047 .034 -.102 .045 .027 -.098 ** .045 .030 -.100 ** .046 .032 -.110 ** .046 .019 -.113 ** .045 .015
Level of education .743 .522 .158 .748 .527 .159 .708 .525 .180 .611 .518 .241 .738 .526 .163 .730 .522 .165 .711 .518 .173
Major in business .134 .638 .833 .136 .641 .833 .146 .639 .819 -.040 .633 .950 .125 .643 .846 .091 .638 .886 .196 .633 .757
Elite education .120 .695 .864 .126 .701 .858 .139 .696 .842 .206 .686 .764 .124 .699 .859 .069 .696 .921 .106 .689 .878
Tenure .057 .036 .123 .057 .037 .125 .059 * .036 .093 .055 * .036 .077 .057 .037 .122 .060 * .036 .093 .061 * .036 .092
Functional background .969 .620 .121 .971 .623 .123 1.074 .633 .111 1.098 .614 .125 .989 .633 .121 1.061 .625 .103 .844 .619 .176
Moderators
Variable pay -.009 .009 .338 -.009 .010 .338 -.011 .010 .243 .003 .011 .784 -.011 .014 .428 -.006 .010 .503 .001 .011 .907
Shareholdings .353 1.068 .741 .345 1.076 .749 .402 1.071 .708 .349 1.051 .740 .340 1.075 .752 .473 1.072 .660 .419 1.059 .693
Interactions
Age X Variable pay .026 .245 .915
Educational level X Variable pay .192 .224 .394
Major in school X Variable pay -1.061 ** .516 .043
Elite education X Variable pay .091 .499 .856
Tenure x Variable pay -.243 .220 .272
Output Functional Background x Variable pay -.885 * .528 .097
Age X Shareholdings
Educational level X Shareholdings
Major in school X Shareholdings
Elite education X Shareholdings
Tenure x Shareholdings
Output Functional Background x Shareholdings







* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Alliance StrategyAlliance Strategy Alliance Strategy Alliance Strategy Alliance Strategy Alliance Strategy
Main Effects (Model 3) Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Alliance Strategy
3.714 *** 3.494*** 3.555*** 3.850*** 3.496*** 3.579***
0.409 0.409 0.413 0.433 0.409
3.731***
0.299 0.292 0.297 0.320 0.292 0.300
0.416 0.425
0.311
0.007 0.000 0.004 0.024 0.000







Control Variables B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig
Firm age .015 .018 .427 .012 .018 .510 .014 .018 .434 .014 .018 .434 .013 .019 .496 .014 .018 .427
Firm size .000 .000 .343 .000 .000 .375 .000 .000 .341 .000 .000 .292 .000 .000 .387 .000 .000 .337
International sales .013 .011 .217 .014 .010 .192 .013 .010 .220 .014 .010 .180 .013 .010 .222 .013 .010 .215
RD orientation .388 .357 .281 .382 .348 .275 .388 .352 .274 .392 .350 .265 .409 .353 .250 .398 .353 .262
Alliance Function 1.917 *** .661 .005 1.833 *** .649 .006 1.939 *** .661 .004 1.856 *** .653 .005 1.879 *** .657 .005 1.903 *** .655 .005
Alliance Number -.029 .027 .291 -.029 .027 .283 -.029 .027 .290 -.028 .027 .303 -.030 .028 .275 -.029 .027 .292
Past performance .192 ** .080 .019 .183 ** .080 .024 .187 ** .082 .024 .182 ** .081 .026 .193 ** .080 .018 .193 ** .081 .019
Equipment& Machinery -1.420 * .741 .058 -1.296 * .733 .080 -1.423 * .737 .056 -1.364 * .734 .066 -1.370 * .743 .068 -1.416 * .737 .058
Raw Material & Chemical -2.622 ** 1.077 .017 -2.665 ** 1.064 .014 -2.623 ** 1.075 .016 -2.621 ** 1.070 .016 -2.604 ** 1.075 .017 -2.621 ** 1.076 .017
     Others -2.503 ** .983 .012 -2.634 *** .963 .007 -2.468 ** .970 .012 -2.568 *** .966 .009 -2.464 ** .969 .013 -2.491 ** .969 .012
Country effect .626 1.076 .562 .954 1.074 .376 .647 1.065 .545 .627 1.059 .556 .710 1.076 .511 .630 1.068 .557
Independent variables
Age -.103 ** .047 .032 -.095 ** .045 .039 -.101 ** .046 .028 -.095 ** .046 .040 -.100 ** .046 .032 -.101 ** .046 .030
Level of education .739 .527 .164 .715 .520 .172 .747 .525 .158 .804 .525 .129 .799 .540 .142 .738 .526 .164
Major in business .133 .641 .836 .126 .634 .843 .170 .649 .794 .115 .637 .858 .143 .640 .824 .133 .641 .836
Elite education .122 .699 .862 .153 .691 .825 .122 .698 .862 -.019 .706 .979 .124 .698 .859 .118 .698 .867
Tenure .057 .037 .126 .043 * .037 .100 .058 .037 .119 .051 .037 .165 .055 .037 .134 .057 .037 .125
Functional background .965 .624 .125 1.026 .618 .252 .987 .625 .117 1.027 .622 .102 .957 .623 .128 .987 .633 .122
Moderators
Variable pay -.009 .009 .343 -.010 .009 .278 -.009 .009 .348 -.009 .009 .332 -.010 .010 .310 -.009 .009 .334
Shareholdings .363 1.077 .737 .316 1.061 .766 .135 1.261 .915 1.267 1.367 .356 .179 1.144 .876 .238 1.313 .857
Interactions
Age X Variable pay
Educational level X Variable pay
Major in school X Variable pay
Elite education X Variable pay
Tenure x Variable pay
Output Functional background x Variable pay
Age X Shareholdings -.028 .269 .919
Educational level X Shareholdings -.366 .244 .137
Major in school X Shareholdings .189 .577 .743
Elite education X Shareholdings -.583 .545 .287
Tenure x Shareholdings .119 .272 .664
Output Functional background x Shareholdings .085 .560 .879







* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Alliance Strategy
Model 10 Model 11
Alliance Strategy Alliance Strategy Alliance Strategy Alliance Strategy Alliance Strategy
Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15
3.495***3.502*** 3.590*** 3.509 ***
0.409 0.422
3.494*** 3.684***
0.410 0.416 0.410 0.409
0.2920.293 0.300 0.2930.292 0.307
0.001 0.007 0.001 0.000
1.220-2.085
0.000 0.013
1.220-1.933 1.208-2.902 1.233-1.902 1.220-1.904 1.221-1.914
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Control Varaibles B SE Sig B SE Sig
Firm age -.003 .031 .915 -.016 .034 .632
Firm size .000 .001 .826 .000 .001 .831
International sales .003 .027 .915 .008 .028 .778
RD orientation .278 .579 .633 .203 .590 .732
Alliance Function .478 .788 .547 .248 .796 .757
Alliance Number -.005 .016 .760 -.010 .018 .575
Past performance -.193 .125 .127 -.167 .127 .193
Country effect -.584 1.858 .754 -.162 1.879 .931
Independent Varaibles
Age .096 .068 .164
Educational Level .393 .740 .597
Major in School -.956 .664 .156
Elite education -.080 .847 .925
Tenure .001 .051 .989
Functional Background -.303 .753 .689












Alliance Strategy Alliance Strategy




Table 2- 12: Regression results for Alliance strategy with 2-item scale (N= 190) 
 
Dependent Variable
Control Varaibles B SE Sig B SE Sig
Firm age .012 .011 .259 .011 .011 .288
Firm size .000 ** .000 .029 .000 * .000 .075
International sales .012 * .006 .072 .011 * .007 .098
RD orientation .157 .191 .410 .195 * .203 .337
Alliance Function .788 ** .342 .023 .964 *** .352 .007
Alliance Number -.009 .009 .330 -.011 .009 .239
Past Performance .147 *** .046 .002 .129 *** .047 .006
     Industry effect 1 1.319 *** .412 .002 1.566 *** .429 .000
Industry effect 2 .536 .394 .175 .166 .426 .697
Country effect .358 .618 .564 .492 .624 .432
Independent Varaibles
Age -.039 .026 .142
Educational Level .396 .292 .176
Major in School -.421 .326 .198
Elite education -.061 .377 .871
Tenure .039 * .020 .054
Functional Background .514 .340 .133






Note: N = 190




Model 1 Model 2
1.123-1.946





Table 2- 13: Regression results for Alliance strategy with 2-item scale (N= 190) 
 
Dependent Variable
Control Variables B SE Sig. B SE Sig. B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig
Firm age .011 .011 .319 .011 .011 .318 .010 .011 .341 .010 .011 .347 .010 .011 .371 .011 .011 .323 .009 .011 .431
Firm size .000 .000 .102 .000 .000 .086 .000 .000 .104 .000 .000 .114 .000 .000 .092 .000 .000 .111 .000 * .000 .073
International sales .011 .007 .105 .011 .007 .087 .011 * .007 .094 .011 * .006 .098 .011 * .007 .088 .011 .007 .105 .013 * .007 .057
RD orientation .245 .209 .243 .258 ** .210 .221 .234 .211 .268 .260 .207 .212 .245 .209 .244 .247 .210 .240 .308 .211 .147
Alliance Function .969 *** .353 .007 .930 ** .358 .010 .987 *** .356 .006 1.046 *** .352 .003 .980 *** .354 .006 .977 *** .355 .007 .940 *** .352 .008
Alliance Number -.011 .009 .230 -.011 .009 .233 -.012 .009 .212 -.011 .009 .224 -.012 .009 .207 -.011 .009 .237 -.012 .009 .210
Past performance .128 *** .047 .007 .124 .047 .010 .129 *** .047 .007 .140 *** .047 .003 .128 *** .047 .007 .130 *** .047 .007 .121 ** .047 .011
     Industry effect 1 1.517 *** .432 .001 1.549 .435 .000 1.550 *** .438 .001 1.459 *** .429 .001 1.522 *** .433 .001 1.515 *** .433 .001 1.569 *** .431 .000
Industry effect 2 .156 .439 .723 .104 .446 .817 .131 .443 .768 .106 .435 .807 .127 .442 .774 .178 .445 .689 .095 .439 .828
Country effect .553 .634 .385 .592 .638 .354 .586 .639 .360 .344 .635 .589 .578 .636 .365 .546 .636 .392 .561 .631 .375
Independent variables
Age -.037 .026 .166 -.033 .027 .222 -.037 .026 .166 -.035 .026 .180 -.035 .027 .189 -.038 .027 .157 -.041 .026 .126
Level of education .464 .299 .123 .477 .300 .114 .459 .300 .129 .388 .299 .195 .466 .300 .122 .463 .300 .125 .418 .299 .164
Major in business -.443 .328 .179 -.440 .328 .182 -.438 .329 .185 -.454 .325 .164 -.457 .329 .167 -.448 .329 .175 -.413 .327 .209
Elite education -.033 .379 .930 -.011 .381 .978 -.036 .380 .924 .045 .377 .906 -.038 .380 .920 -.043 .381 .911 -.044 .377 .908
Tenure .038 * .021 .073 .038 .021 .071 .038 * .021 .074 .038 .021 .072 .038 * .021 .071 .038 * .021 .074 .041 * .021 .053
Functional background .508 .342 .139 .525 .343 .128 .538 .348 .124 .573 * .340 .093 .547 .347 .117 .512 .343 .137 .503 .340 .141
Moderators
Variable pay -.006 .006 .298 -.007 .006 .264 -.007 .006 .259 .002 * .007 .788 -.010 .008 .224 -.006 .006 .339 .001 .007 .900
Shareholdings .033 .608 .957 .024 .609 .968 .023 .610 .969 -.030 .603 .961 -.002 .611 .998 .046 .611 .940 .076 .606 .900
Interactions
Age X Variable pay .106 .153 .489
Educational level X Variable pay .068 .139 .626
Major in school X Variable pay -.697 ** .327 .034
Elite education X Variable pay .216 .317 .497
Tenure x Variable pay -.049 .137 .722
Output Functional Background x Variable pay -.561 * .338 .099
Age X Shareholdings
Educational level X Shareholdings
Major in school X Shareholdings
Elite education X Shareholdings
Tenure x Shareholdings
Output Functional Background x Shareholdings







* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Model 8 Model 9















3.889*** 4.214*** 3.309*** 3.881*** 4.097***















Control Variables B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig
Firm age .011 .011 .325 .010 .011 .373 .010 .011 .340 .011 .011 .313 .010 .011 .384 .011 .011 .320
Firm size .000 .000 .118 .000 .000 .121 .000 .000 .103 .000 .000 .072 .000 .000 .137 .000 .000 .104
International sales .011 .007 .109 .011 .007 .086 .011 .007 .106 .011 * .007 .086 .011 * .007 .098 .011 .007 .106
RD orientation .249 .213 .244 .245 .209 .241 .240 .210 .253 .252 .208 .228 .262 .210 .214 .246 .210 .244
Alliance Function .966 *** .355 .007 .974 *** .352 .006 .998 *** .356 .006 .944 *** .352 .008 .966 *** .354 .007 .967 *** .355 .007
Alliance Number -.011 .009 .230 -.012 .009 .184 -.011 .009 .238 -.012 .009 .218 -.012 .009 .197 -.011 .009 .232
Past performance .128 *** .047 .007 .123 *** .047 .009 .124 *** .047 .010 .120 ** .047 .012 .128 *** .047 .007 .128 *** .047 .007
     Industry effect 1 1.513 *** .436 .001 1.509 *** .431 .001 1.517 *** .433 .001 1.503 *** .431 .001 1.480 *** .435 .001 1.518 *** .434 .001
Industry effect 2 .156 .441 .724 .169 .438 .700 .145 .440 .742 .218 .439 .620 .124 .442 .780 .157 .441 .723
Country effect .560 .640 .383 .691 .640 .282 .545 .635 .392 .579 .632 .361 .581 .636 .362 .549 .640 .392
Independent variables
Age -.036 .027 .176 -.033 .026 .216 -.036 .026 .170 -.032 .026 .223 -.035 .027 .189 -.037 .027 .172
Level of education .466 .301 .123 .455 .299 .129 .468 .300 .121 .479 .298 .110 .511 * .305 .096 .462 .302 .128
Major in business -.442 .329 .181 -.461 .327 .161 -.438 .329 .184 -.455 .327 .165 -.434 .328 .188 -.442 .329 .181
Elite education -.034 .380 .929 -.034 .378 .929 -.032 .380 .934 -.093 .380 .808 -.040 .380 .916 -.033 .380 .930
Tenure .037 * .022 .086 .030 .022 .169 .040 * .021 .061 .035 * .021 .096 .033 .022 .127 .038 * .021 .074
Functional background .511 .343 .139 .572 * .344 .098 .530 .344 .125 .548 .341 .111 .503 .342 .144 .510 .344 .140
Moderators
Variable pay -.006 .006 .298 -.007 .006 .271 -.006 .006 .319 -.006 .006 .290 -.007 .006 .264 -.006 .006 .300
Shareholdings .037 .612 .952 .007 .607 .991 -.253 .727 .729 .637 .724 .380 -.028 .614 .964 .010 .738 .990
Interactions
Age X Variable pay
Educational level X Variable pay
Major in school X Variable pay
Elite education X Variable pay
Tenure x Variable pay
Output Functional background x Variable pay
Age X Shareholdings .016 .158 .922
Educational level X Shareholdings -.212 .152 .165
Major in school X Shareholdings .234 .324 .473
Elite education X Shareholdings -.501 .329 .130
Tenure x Shareholdings .123 .153 .421
Output Functional background x Shareholdings .019 .335 .955







* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Alliance Strategy 2iAlliance Strategy 2i Alliance Strategy 2i Alliance Strategy 2i
Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15Model 10 Model 11




















3.871***3.872*** 4.018*** 3.910*** 4.046*** 3.920 ***
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Table 2- 14: Regression results for Alliance strategy with 2-item scale (N= 122) 
 
Dependent Variable
Control Varaibles B SE Sig B SE Sig
Firm age .009 .013 .476 .012 .013 .351
Firm size .000 * .000 .093 .000 .000 .275
International sales .012 * .007 .099 .011 .007 .123
RD orientation .165 .228 .470 .294 .244 .231
Alliance Function 1.122 ** .453 .015 1.453 *** .468 .002
Alliance Number -.017 .020 .386 -.025 .020 .204
Past Performance .213 *** .056 .000 .162 *** .058 .006
     Industry effect 1 1.187 ** .459 .011 1.614 *** .480 .001
Country effect .441 .740 .552 .644 .735 .383
Independent Varaibles
Age -.071 ** .033 .032
Educational Level .407 .369 .273
Major in School -.329 .457 .473
Elite education -.001 .498 .998
Tenure .044 * .025 .082
Functional Background .945 ** .443 .035






Note: N = 122
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
6.517 *** 5.025***
Alliance Strategy 2i Alliance Strategy 2i







Table 2- 15: Regression results for Alliance strategy with 2-item scale (N= 122) 
 
Dependent Variable
Control Variables B SE Sig. B SE Sig. B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig
Firm age .012 .013 .366 .012 .013 .367 .010 .013 .432 .012 .013 .356 .010 .013 .448 .011 .013 .387 .010 .013 .459
Firm size .000 .000 .328 .000 .000 .324 .000 .000 .332 .000 .000 .412 .000 .000 .293 .000 .000 .388 .000 .000 .286
International sales .011 .007 .132 .012 .008 .133 .013 .008 .099 .012 .007 .101 .012 .008 .114 .011 .007 .130 .014 * .008 .076
RD orientation .342 .253 .178 .347 .255 .177 .307 .254 .230 .367 .248 .141 .340 .253 .183 .348 .253 .172 .433 * .258 .097
Alliance Function 1.463 *** .471 .002 1.452 *** .478 .003 1.535 *** .475 .002 1.639 *** .467 .001 1.480 *** .472 .002 1.496 *** .472 .002 1.450 *** .468 .002
Alliance Number -.025 .020 .215 -.025 .020 .217 -.026 .020 .203 -.029 .020 .148 -.024 .020 .226 -.025 .020 .216 -.027 .020 .173
Past performance .162 *** .058 .006 .161 *** .059 .007 .167 *** .058 .005 .186 *** .058 .002 .164 *** .058 .006 .171 *** .059 .005 .153 *** .058 .010
     Industry effect 1 1.548 *** .488 .002 1.556 *** .493 .002 1.613 *** .491 .001 1.439 *** .480 .003 1.538 *** .490 .002 1.550 *** .488 .002 1.592 *** .486 .001
Country effect .687 .759 .368 .697 .765 .364 .795 .765 .301 .324 .759 .670 .722 .763 .346 .646 .761 .398 .744 .755 .327
Independent variables
Age -.068 ** .033 .042 -.067 ** .034 .051 -.068 ** .033 .042 -.065 ** .032 .046 -.065 * .033 .054 -.073 ** .033 .031 -.075 ** .033 .026
Level of education .468 .378 .219 .470 .380 .219 .450 .378 .236 .351 .373 .349 .461 .379 .226 .464 .378 .222 .440 .376 .244
Major in business -.355 .464 .446 -.352 .466 .452 -.360 .463 .438 -.496 .458 .281 -.381 .467 .416 -.392 .466 .402 -.317 .462 .494
Elite education .031 .503 .950 .041 .508 .936 .023 .502 .963 .112 .493 .822 .038 .504 .940 -.014 .505 .978 .024 .500 .962
Tenure .042 .027 .117 .042 .027 .118 .044 .027 .103 .041 .026 .118 .044 .027 .106 .044 .027 .102 .045 * .027 .090
Functional background .910 ** .449 .045 .914 ** .451 .046 .993 ** .455 .031 1.024 ** .442 .022 .955 ** .455 .038 .965 ** .452 .035 .837 * .449 .065
Moderators
Variable pay -.006 .007 .403 -.006 .007 .397 -.008 .007 .259 .004 .008 .582 -.011 .010 .284 -.004 .007 .554 .001 .008 .883
Shareholdings .162 .763 .832 .159 .767 .836 .151 .762 .844 .176 .747 .814 .115 .768 .881 .208 .765 .786 .209 .759 .784
Interactions
Age X Variable pay .028 .175 .871
Educational level X Variable pay .172 .156 .274
Major in school X Variable pay -.883 ** .376 .021
Elite education X Variable pay .247 .358 .492
Tenure x Variable pay -.154 .158 .334
Output Functional Background x Variable pay -.585 .386 .133
Age X Shareholdings
Educational level X Shareholdings
Major in school X Shareholdings
Elite education X Shareholdings
Tenure x Shareholdings
Output Functional Background x Shareholdings







* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Alliance Strategy 2iAlliance Strategy 2i Alliance Strategy 2i Alliance Strategy 2i Alliance Strategy 2i Alliance Strategy 2i
Main Effects (Model 3) Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Alliance Strategy 2i
4.430 *** 4.417*** 4.260*** 4.674*** 4.190*** 4.234***
0.420 0.420 0.427 0.450 0.423
4.364***
0.325 0.319 0.327 0.353 0.322 0.325
0.425 0.433
0.334
0.000 0.007 0.030 0.003






Control Variables B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig
Firm age .013 .013 .331 .010 .013 .433 .012 .013 .374 .012 .013 .371 .010 .014 .441 .012 .013 .352
Firm size .000 .000 .283 .000 .000 .349 .000 .000 .328 .000 .000 .277 .000 .000 .379 .000 .000 .294
International sales .012 .008 .117 .012 .007 .115 .011 .007 .135 .012 .007 .107 .011 .007 .136 .012 .008 .121
RD orientation .319 .257 .217 .346 .252 .172 .331 .254 .195 .347 .252 .172 .357 .255 .165 .356 .254 .165
Alliance Function 1.504 *** .478 .002 1.436 *** .469 .003 1.502 *** .476 .002 1.436 *** .471 .003 1.440 .474 .003 1.450 *** .472 .003
Alliance Number -.025 .020 .220 -.025 .020 .215 -.025 .020 .218 -.024 .020 .229 -.026 .020 .204 -.024 .020 .226
Past performance .162 *** .058 .007 .158 *** .058 .008 .156 *** .059 .010 .155 *** .059 .009 .163 .058 .006 .166 *** .059 .006
     Industry effect 1 1.585 *** .494 .002 1.526 *** .487 .002 1.554 *** .490 .002 1.538 *** .488 .002 1.520 .493 .003 1.561 *** .490 .002
Country effect .625 .770 .419 .857 .767 .267 .697 .762 .362 .663 .759 .385 .740 .769 .338 .645 .764 .400
Independent variables
Age -.073 ** .034 .036 -.063 * .033 .061 -.068 ** .033 .043 -.063 * .033 .063 -.066 .033 .050 -.066 * .033 .051
Level of education .451 .380 .238 .442 .377 .243 .473 .379 .215 .511 .379 .181 .514 .389 .190 .450 .380 .238
Major in business -.365 .466 .435 -.370 .462 .426 -.302 .473 .524 -.376 .464 .419 -.347 .466 .457 -.360 .465 .441
Elite education .036 .505 .944 .049 .501 .922 .037 .504 .942 -.077 .512 .881 .036 .505 .943 .025 .504 .961
Tenure .045 .027 .103 .033 .027 .224 .044 .027 .106 .038 .027 .158 .041 .027 .128 .042 .027 .118
Functional background .895 ** .451 .050 .959 ** .449 .035 .934 ** .452 .041 .959 ** .450 .036 .902 .451 .048 .967 ** .458 .037
Moderators
Variable pay -.006 .007 .420 -.006 .007 .353 -.006 .007 .421 -.006 .007 .400 -.006 .007 .364 -.006 .007 .357
Shareholdings .191 .767 .804 .130 .761 .864 -.136 .900 .881 .841 .977 .392 .013 .818 .988 -.211 .944 .824
Interactions
Age X Variable pay
Educational level X Variable pay
Major in school X Variable pay
Elite education X Variable pay
Tenure x Variable pay
Output Functional background x Variable pay
Age X Shareholdings -.108 .196 .580
Educational level X Shareholdings -.233 .176 .187
Major in school X Shareholdings .264 .420 .531
Elite education X Shareholdings -.439 .395 .270
Tenure x Shareholdings .104 .199 .604
Output Functional background x Shareholdings .276 .409 .502







* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
1.204-1.905 1.161-1.890 1.217-1.891 1.204-2.177 1.203-1.901








Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15
4.188***4.182*** 4.262*** 4.170***
Alliance Strategy 2i
Model 10 Model 11
Alliance Strategy 2i Alliance Strategy 2i Alliance Strategy 2i Alliance Strategy 2i Alliance Strategy 2i
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Control Varaibles B SE Sig B SE Sig
Firm age .009 .021 .668 -.008 .023 .716
Firm size .000 .001 .804 .000 .001 .739
International sales -.003 .017 .849 .003 .018 .858
RD orientation .286 .370 .443 .211 .376 .578
Alliance Function .173 .504 .733 -.071 .514 .890
Alliance Number -.001 .010 .885 -.005 .011 .643
Past Performance -.112 .079 .163 -.099 .080 .223
     Industry effect 1 -.231 .762 .762 .736 .854 .393
Country effect -.246 1.179 .836 .083 1.191 .945
Independent Varaibles
Age .058 .044 .191
Educational Level .268 .471 .572
Major in School -.768 .434 .083
Elite education .054 .546 .921
Tenure -.001 .032 .964
Functional Background -.315 .485 .519






Note:  N = 68





Alliance Strategy 2i Alliance Strategy 2i




Table 2- 17: A summarised comparison table for different robustness tests with 
original regression results 
 




3 dummies 1 Dummy 3 dummies 1 Dummy 3 dummies
Eiganvalue 3.04 3.098 2.921
AVE 75.997 77.448 73.013
Cronbach Alpha 0.894 0.991 0.876
Eiganvalue 1.637 1.868 1.571
AVE 81.857 84.285 78.55
Cronbach Alpha 0.776 0.814 0.693
F statistics (sig) P < 0.01 P < 0.01 P < 0.01 P < 0.01 P < 0.01 P < 0.01
Adjusted R sqaure (range) 0.216 ~ 0.231 0.209 ~ 0.225 0.292 ~ 0.319 0.292 ~ 0.320 -0.115 ~ 0.010 -0.133  0.015 0.229-0.244 0.306 ~ 0.353 -0.127 ~ 0.000




H3_Tenure p < 0.05 p < 0.1 p < 0.1 p < 0.1 p < 0.1 p < 0.1
H4_Functional Background p <0.05
H5_Variable pay
       Variable pay X Major in business p < 0.1 p < 0.1 p < 0.05 p < 0.05 p < 0.05 p < 0.05
       Variable pay X Output function Bgd p < 0.1 p < 0.1 p < 0.1 p < 0.1
H6_Equity Ownership p < 0.1
Firm size p < 0.05 p < 0.1 p < 0.05 p < 0.1
International Sales p < 0.1 p < 0.1
Alliance Function p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 P < 0.05 P < 0.05
Past Performance p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 P < 0.01 P < 0.01
Mananufacturing (Industry effect 1)  p < 0.05 P < 0.05 P < 0.01 P < 0.05
Equipment & Machinery p < 0.05
RawMaterials p < 0.05 p < 0.05
Others p < 0.05 p < 0.1



































Strategic alliances play a vital role in today’s collaborative business 
relationships, and for this reason scholars have expended considerable efforts in trying 
to formulate theories to understand the outcome of strategic alliances (Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven, 1996, Parise and Casher, 2003, Hoffmann, 2005, Hoffmann, 2007). In 
this study, I began by highlighting the importance of top executives in determining the 
nature of alliance strategy. I grounded my work in the theoretical underpinnings of 
upper echelons theory (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) and agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) to uncover managerial orientations in relation to alliance strategy. 
Previous studies on alliance strategy do not take into account the influence of 
top executives on the choice of alliance strategy (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). 
Although scholars have shown the effect of managerial characteristics on strategic 
choice and strategic decision-making (e.g. Brouthers et al., 2000, Hitt and Tyler, 1991), 
we know little about how managerial characteristics may influence the choice of 
alliance strategy. Also, how the relationship between managerial characteristics and 
choice of alliance strategy may be influenced when we take executive compensation 
package into account. From the literature, we know that compensation package can 
mitigate managerial self-interest and may reduce agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976, Jensen and Murphy, 1990). However, the effect of compensation package on 
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alliance strategy was not well documented. Hence, I attempted to extend alliance 
research in the areas of strategic orientations, upper echelons and alliance strategy by 
examining the influence of managerial characteristics on the choice of alliance strategy. 
I explored the moderating effects of financial alignment mechanisms on managerial 
behaviours in relation to alliance strategy. I found some empirical support in both 
direct and indirect relations relating to the orientation of alliance strategy toward 
portfolio or standalone strategies.  
I hypothesised that managerial characteristics – namely, age, education level, 
major in business, elite education, tenure and functional background – would influence 
the choice of alliance strategy. Based on my sample, I found that tenure (H3) was a 
significant influence on the choice of alliance strategy.  
Furthermore, I hypothesised that financial alignment mechanisms such as 
variable pay and equity ownership in the firm would moderate the relationship 
between managerial characteristics and alliance strategy. I found that compensation 
package of variable pay (H5) had significant moderating effects when executives 
majored in business-related subjects as well as when executives were from output 
functional backgrounds. My findings suggest that variable pay may be an important 
element in the relationship between top managers’ characteristics and the choice of 
alliance strategy. The moderating influences of variable pay had a significant impact 
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on the relationship between major in business and alliance strategy. It also has a 
significant effect between output functional background and alliance strategy. I found 
that executives with a business major were more than likely to have the tendency to 
choose a standalone strategy when they received a high variable pay than executives 
who majored in other subjects. As my result has shown, an increase in variable pay 
appears to negatively impact the association between alliance strategy and major in 
business. 
Moreover, I found that executives with output functional backgrounds were 
more likely to choose a standalone strategy when they received a high variable pay. 
Indeed, the result showed that an increase in variable pay negatively influenced the 
relationship between output functional background and alliance strategy.  
In my robustness tests, when I split the samples by industries – printed circuit 
board (PCB) and Plastic rubber (PLAS), with industry effect 1 as three dummy 
variables, I found executives with output functional background in PCB industry were 
more likely to choose a standalone strategy when they received a high variable pay, 
but not for PLAS industry. When industry effect 1 is used as a control variable for the 
two samples, I found no significant results for PLAS industry, probably because of 
small sample size.  
Also, when I tested alliance strategy with a two-item scale, without splitting the 
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sample, I found executives with output functional background were more likely to 
choose a standalone strategy when they received a high variable pay. This is the same 
as the original result. 
The study failed to find support for some of the hypotheses. First, age was not 
a significant predictor of choosing alliance strategy contrary to the hypothesis (H1). 
Two possible explanations for the differences from my hypothesis related to age (H1) 
are: (1) age is related to risk-taking propensity (Bantel and Jackson, 1989, Hambrick 
and Mason, 1984, Wiersema and Bantel, 1992) and managers in my samples do not 
perceive standalone as a riskier strategy than portfolio strategy, and (2) as strategic 
change of alliances operations in the PCB and plastic rubber industries are common, 
younger and older managers are relatively adaptable to the industrial environment. 
Alliances may be orchestrated due to market demand or technological changes. 
Experience and professional background are likely to facilitate alliance formation and 
may be more relevant to the choice of alliance strategy than age. These two reasons 
may explain why age does not have a significant influence on the choice of alliance 
strategy.  
However, in my robustness tests, when I split the samples by industries – printed 
circuit board (PCB) and Plastic rubber industries (PLAS), I found age became 
significant for the PCB industry (p < 0.020). Also, the robustness test for alliance 
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strategy with two-item scale, I found that age is significant for PCB industry (p < 
0.032). This seems to suggest that managerial characteristics of age for executives in 
the PCB industry is more related to firm alliance strategy. For the PLAS industry, I 
found no significant results for both robustness tests due to the small sample size. 
Second, educational background was not found to be significant in predicting 
the choice of alliance strategy contrary to hypotheses H2a, H2b and H2c. The possible 
explanations why educational backgrounds do not appear as the key determinants of 
alliance strategy are as follows: strategic alliances formed in the two sample industries 
are often related to product development and market channels which tend to be more 
related to managerial experiences and professional network. Hence, (1) The level of 
education is not sufficient for developing industrial specific knowledge required for 
formulating alliance strategy, (2) Executives may have completed their formal 
education many years ago so educational background does not play an important role 
in certain strategic decision-making scenarios (Shenkar and Zeira, 1992, Finkelstein 
and Hambrick, 1996), and (3) The network from elite education may be obsolete, and 
classmates are in different fields rather than in my sample industries. The social capital 
gained from elite education does not really provide suitable external resources to 
facilitate alliance formation. Hence, educational background does not influence 
alliance strategy in the sample industries. 
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Although scholars have suggested that functional backgrounds influence 
strategic orientation (Brouthers et al., 2000, Bantel and Jackson, 1989, Geletkanycz 
and Black, 2001, Bermiss and Murmann, 2014), in my study, functional backgrounds 
(H4) did not have an impact on alliance strategy. I suspect that this can be a 
methodological issue as we only categorised executives into output functional 
background (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) and non-output functional background. If 
we are able to categorise executives into more detailed functional backgrounds, we 
might be able to see the impact on alliance strategy.  
However, in my robustness tests, when using alliance strategy with two-item 
scale, output functional background for PCB industry became significant at (p < 0.035). 
This seems to suggest that output functional background is more related to alliance 
strategy when executives do not consider the time horizon of the alliances. 
For the moderating influence of equity ownership in the firms, my empirical 
result did not show the moderating effect of equity ownership in the firm on the 
relationship between managerial characteristics and alliance strategy. A possible 
explanation is that more than 60% of the sample executives have less than 25% of 
shareholdings in their firms. A small percentage of shareholdings does not affect their 
personal wealth or influence their risk propensity. Therefore, it does not moderate the 
relationship between managerial characteristics and alliance strategy. 
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In sum, the empirical results provide some initial support for expanding alliance 
strategy research using key elements related to top executives such as managerial 
background and compensation package to understand the choice of alliance strategy.   
This study makes a start at distinguishing managerial orientation for alliance strategy. 
The empirical results not only support the proposed theory that top managers’ 
characteristics impact on the orientation of alliance strategy toward standalone or 
portfolio strategy, but also provide evidence that compensation package is related to 
the relationship between top managers’ characteristics and their orientation toward 
alliance strategy. In light of alliance research, my result suggests that much more work 
needs to be done in examining top managers’ characteristics and compensation 
package in relation to their choice of alliance strategy. This study has conceptualised 
and validated variable pay in the context of choosing alliance strategy. However, 
compensation package consists of other elements such as stock options, employee 
perks and retirement funds. It can be fruitful for future alliance researchers to explore 
the impact of other elements in the compensation package on the relationship between 
managerial characteristics and choice of alliance strategy. Furthermore, the likelihood 
of industrial differences in relation to alliance strategy requires further investigations 
so that we can make generalisations confidently as the sample only consists of the 




Although the study provides valuable insights about alliance strategy orientation 
and the influence of financial incentives on such orientation, it suffers from a number 
of limitations. First, I collected the data on the tendency of choosing alliance strategy 
after the choice was made. The responses may be an adjusted perception (Brouthers et 
al., 2003, Brouthers et al., 2000). Future research may consider a longitudinal study, 
and, using improved measures, could clarify how alliance strategic orientation was 
formed and also the process to formulate its alliance strategy. 
A second limitation is that only perceptual measures of alliance strategy and 
past performance were used as control variables. Perceptual measures may be biased 
and reflect a desired state rather than an actual scenario (Brouthers et al., 2003). Future 
research efforts may consider to evaluate secondary data on the collections of firm 
alliances to validate firm alliance strategy. For past performance measure, financial 
data from secondary sources can be used for triangulation. 
Third, response bias may be present. My observation is that Chinese executives 
or Chinese in general tend to avoid extreme response options, or exaggerate in their 
answers. Krosnick (1999) suggests that avoiding extreme answers in surveys may 
represent a response bias. Future research may consider to design the questionnaire 
differently to overcome this issue. 
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Fourth, future research may consider extending the range and measure of the 
managerial characteristics. This may help to identify other personal factors that have 
an influence on the tendency of alliance strategy. Additional factors may include socio-
economic background such as income, cultural/ethnicity and religion, because these 
factors may influence one’s attitudes, beliefs and behaviours. 
Fifth, this study did not consider the outcome of alliance strategy. Future studies 
may wish to extend my study to include the evaluation of alliance strategy choice in 
light of firms’ performance or realised value creation. 
Sixth, I control for country effect in my study, as firms in my sample consist of 
Taiwanese and Chinese firms. It is likely that these firms are similar in culture as they 
speak the same language, but their business practices and norms can be quite different. 
In my study, this control was statistically insignificant. Future studies may consider 
using a more detailed measure to test institutional differences such as used in 
Brouthers (2013a). 
Seventh, I was not sure if the two industries in my sample have similar strategies 
(business level or corporate level), and I do not know if firms’ competitive strategies 
may have an impact on the choice of alliance strategy. I failed to include other strategic 
and environmental factors that may have influenced the choice of alliance strategy. 
Future studies may take into consideration more strategies factors within the model. 
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This may help to achieve a better model specification and potentially find stronger 
TMT effects. 
Eighth, the sample consists of firms from Taiwan and China in both the printed 
circuit board and the plastic rubber industries. These are quite specific industries. 
Therefore, the result of my studies may not be generalisable to other industries. 
Ninth, I did not look at how innovative the firms in my sample were. It would 
be valuable to compare firms with high innovation to firms with low innovation in the 
two industries, to see if innovativeness influences how firms choose their alliance 
strategy. Future studies may consider capture innovativeness of firms in the research 
design. 
Management implications 
This study confirms that executives do adopt different alliance strategies. To 
some extent, their managerial background characteristics are related to their choice of 
alliance strategy. Thus, this study provides insights on how to match the right 
managers to the job and provide suitable packages to retain these managerial talents 
for long-term growth. 
First, tenure is an important characteristic in choosing alliance strategy. 
Executives with longer tenure in their positions tend to adopt a portfolio strategy. 
Executives with shorter tenure in their positions tend to adopt a standalone strategy. 
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This largely relates to executives’ industrial experiences and the specific job-related 
skills they have. This is an important finding for firms’ alliance operations. When firms 
frequently form alliances with other firms, they need executives suitable for the job in 
order to achieve better firm performance. Firms that have a portfolio of alliances can 
consider executives with longer tenure for their alliance operations because these 
executives tend to have the capabilities to initiate, coordinate and manage firms’ 
different alliances together. This can lead to better firm performance, as firms can 
benefit from these executives’ abilities to assess strategic risks of different alliances as 
well as their deeper industrial knowledge to establish a firm’s alliance portfolio. 
 Second, executives with an educational background majoring in business-
related subjects tend to choose a standalone strategy when they receive a high 
percentage of variable pay in their total salary package, e.g. high bonus. These 
executives tend to choose portfolio strategies when variable pay is only a low 
percentage in their total salary package. This suggests that for firms with more result-
oriented alliances, a standalone strategy may be preferred. High bonus is an important 
incentive to maintain a standalone strategy orientation for executives with a major in 
business-related subjects. However, firms that operate projects with a long-term 
projection for their alliance operations need executives adopting a portfolio strategy. 
High bonus ratio to its total salary may not be an effective incentive to maintain the 
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portfolio strategic orientation for executives with a major in a business-related subject. 
Therefore, for executives with a major in business-related subjects, changes in bonus 
ratio may lead to a change in their strategic orientation. Firms need to understand the 
effect of this type of compensation package in order to maintain firms’ preferred 
alliance strategies.  
Third, executives with output functional background such as sales and 
marketing tend to choose a standalone strategy when they receive high variable pay, 
and they tend to choose a portfolio strategy when they receive a low variable pay. As 
variable pay is a portion of compensation package and appears to play an influencing 
role on the choice of alliance strategy for executives with sales and marketing 
backgrounds, firms can design and use this type of compensation package, i.e. the 
bonus pay, to maintain or encourage preferred alliance strategy for executives with 
sales and marketing backgrounds.  
The results of my research suggest that it is important for firms to understand 





 My study makes several important contributions. Prior to this research there 
was little understanding of managerial characteristics on alliance strategy. Previously, 
scholars have shown that managerial characteristics are important in determining firm 
strategy. For example, Brouthers et al. (2000) found empirical support that managerial 
characteristics (e.g. age, experience, education and risk propensity) were all important 
predictors of strategic aggressiveness. Hitt and Tyler (1991) found that managers’ age, 
educational level, work experience and managerial level influence their strategic 
decision formulation. However, no studies considered the strategic orientation of top 
managers on their alliance strategy. By exploring the factors leading to the choice of 
alliance strategy, I add insights about how managerial characteristics can impact the 
choice of alliance strategy. This is important because CEOs’ decisions on alliance 
strategy are likely to impact the outcome of organisations (Hambrick et al., 2005).  
Moreover, I clarify the notion of alliance strategy as two distinctive strategies 
that are standalone and portfolio strategies. Previous studies tend to suggest that firms 
should operate their alliance operations with a holistic view (Parise and Casher, 2003) 
and suggest that portfolio alliance strategy may be more beneficial (Ozcan and 
Eisenhardt, 2009, Hoffmann, 2007), but the distinction of the two alliance strategies 
are blurry and rather descriptive. In this study, I clarified the distinctions between 
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standalone and portfolio strategies; I made the two strategies more explicit and created 
measures for alliance strategy which gauge the choice of alliance strategy orientation. 
This enables us to better appreciate the different approaches to alliance strategy and 
explore the factors that may influence the choice of alliance strategy. My study shows 
that firms adopt different alliance strategies contingent on managerial backgrounds as 
well as compensation packages. This adds to the current alliance research as well as 
creates more discussion on top managers’ strategic perspective.  
Finally, my study highlights the importance of managerial compensation 
package for strategic decision-making in terms of alliance strategy. Thus, I advance 
firm strategic orientation research and provide some valuable insight on human 
resources consideration.  
Overall, my study implies the need to rethink conventional approaches to 
managing strategic alliances. Alliances are no longer isolated incidents and have 
become an inevitable part of business. Thus, ad hoc strategy no longer suffices to 
manage a firm’s alliance operation. Rather, top managers need to take a holistic view 
in order to reconfigure and integrate a firm’s resources with resources of alliance 
partners so that it enables them to generate optimal value in a firm’s alliance operation. 
Moreover, to capitalise on the joint effect of firm alliances, top managers need to 
evaluate the interdependence of all alliances, and assess overall risks and uncertainties 
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for firm alliances. In addition, companies need to evaluate if they are providing 
suitable compensation packages to these top managers and be able to retain these 
talents. In conclusion, the findings in this study can serve as a useful basis for making 
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III.  DO ALLIANCE STRATEGY AND ALLIANCE DIVERSITY 
CONTRIBUTE TO FIRM PERFORMANCE? 
3.1. Introduction 
Firms are increasingly engaged in multiple alliances with different partners, 
because businesses can no longer compete effectively without inter-firm 
collaborations in today’s business environment (Hoffmann, 2005, Hoffmann, 2007, 
Ireland et al., 2002, Lavie, 2007, Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009, Parise and Casher, 
2003). Firms require a comprehensive alliance strategy that enables them to locate 
necessary external resources and capabilities, using several coordinated alliances 
(Gomes-Casseres, 1996). Through re-combination of heterogeneous resources from 
coordinated alliances, a firm is able to develop a collection of unique and value-
creating resources which cannot be created independently (Ireland et al., 2002). As a 
consequence, many firms are engaged in multiple alliances simultaneously. This 
phenomenon has led to a series of research in the areas of emergence, configuration, 
and management of firm alliances (Wassmer, 2010).  
One important stream of the research relating to the configuration of firm 
alliances is alliance diversity (Baum et al., 2000, De Leeuw et al., 2014, Duysters and 
Lokshin, 2011, Duysters et al., 2012, Goerzen and Beamish, 2005, Hoehn-Weiss and 
Karim, 2014, Hoffmann, 2007, Jiang et al., 2010, Koka and Prescott, 2008, Lee, 2007, 
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Swaminathan and Moorman, 2009, Terjesen et al., 2011, van Beers and Zand, 2014, 
Wuyts and Dutta, 2014). Alliance diversity has been defined as ‘the degree of variance 
in partners, functional purposes and governance structures of the alliances’(Jiang et 
al., 2010 p: 1137). The notion of diversity indicates a firm’s potential to access 
heterogeneous resources which can be recombined with the firm’s internal resources 
to develop competitive advantage (Barney, 1991).  
Studies have demonstrated that alliance diversity is positively related to a firm’s 
financial and innovation performance (Baum et al., 2000, Mouri et al., 2012, Phelps, 
2010, Sampson, 2007, van Beers and Zand, 2014). Alliance diversity also appears to 
be an important element for firm strategy and performance; it can facilitate 
diversification, and diverse external partners can be a vehicle to access external 
resources that are not otherwise available (Das and Teng, 2000, Lavie, 2006). 
However, high levels of diversity in a firm’s collection of alliances can also 
backfire and have negative consequences on firm performance (Faems et al., 2010, 
Goerzen and Beamish, 2005, Koka and Prescott, 2008, Vasudeva and Anand, 2011). 
Indeed, increased diversity magnifies managerial challenges in relation to resource 
coordination among alliance partners. For example, a high level of diversity creates 
additional transaction and coordination costs due to difficulties in goal-alignment for 
different alliances (Duysters and Lokshin, 2011, Goerzen and Beamish, 2005, Hoang 
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and Rothaermel, 2005, Hoffmann, 2005). Nonetheless, alliance diversity has the 
advantage of providing opportunities to access diverse information and resources, as 
well as to leverage different capabilities from various alliances (Beckman and 
Haunschild, 2002, Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006, Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004).  
Alliance diversity has been studied in different ways. For example, Jiang et al. 
(2010) investigate partner diversity (measured by industry, nationality and 
organizational types), functional diversity and governance diversity. Koka and 
Prescott (2002) discuss information diversity within firms’ repeat ties or multiple 
current ties. Goerzen and Beamish (2005) evaluate alliance network diversity, 
geographical diversity and product diversity in the context of international joint 
ventures of multinational companies. Duysters and Lokshin (2011) show partner 
diversity of innovator and imitator, in terms of industry and foreign and domestic 
partners. Alliance diversity has also been discussed in relation to functional diversity 
and governance diversity (Jiang et al., 2010).  
Different types of alliance diversity appear to have varying effects on 
performance. Studies show that partner diversity has a U-shaped relationship with 
performance (Jiang et al., 2010), and information diversity is significantly related to 
firm performance (Koka and Prescott, 2002). Alliance network diversity is negatively 
related to economic performance, geographical diversity has a positive and  
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significant associated with economic performance, and product diversity has an 
insignificant effect on performance (Goerzen and Beamish, 2005). Alliance diversity 
(i.e. alliance complexity) has an inverted U-shape relationship to innovative 
performance (Duysters and Lokshin, 2011). Functional diversity is positively related 
to firm performance (Hoehn-Weiss and Karim, 2014, Jiang et al., 2010). Governance 
diversity seems to be negatively related to firm performance (Goerzen, 2007, Jiang 
et al., 2010).  
The variation in performance outcomes has led scholars to investigate the 
possible causes of the different outcomes in the diversity and performance 
relationship. One recent study asserted that alliance diversity and performance 
relationship may be contingent on firms’ alliance experience and capabilities 
(Duysters et al., 2012).  
In this paper, I seek to contribute to the debate on why diversity and performance 
may have varying relationships. I explore whether the mixed results of previous 
studies on alliance diversity and performance may be explained by a strategic 
consideration in forming alliances. Alliance diversity provides the opportunity to 
access a variety of resources and capabilities. A firm’s strategy must reconfigure these 
resources and capabilities in order to adapt to the market, so that the firm can maintain 
its competitive position in a timely and efficient manner (He et al., 2013, Ozcan and 
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Eisenhardt, 2009).  
Alliance can differ in nature depending on the manager’s strategic 
considerations. For example, managers can form alliances in a standalone fashion or 
with a portfolio perspective. If a manager treats all of their alliances as standalone 
occurrences, synergistic effects derived from alliances are less likely to be fully 
realised, because each alliance may aim for a specific goal, and the firm is constrained 
on resources and capabilities from one alliance at a time. In comparison, when a 
manager takes a portfolio perspective in forming alliances, all alliances are evaluated 
based on the firm’s overall corporate objective and then incorporated into the firm’s 
alliance portfolio (Hoffmann, 2007). The overall combination of resources and 
capabilities available to the firm from multiple alliances will be channelled to suit 
multiple goals and fit into the firm’s overall objective (Miles and Snow, 1984); 
therefore the synergistic effects may be greater. This implies that a manager’s choice 
of alliance strategy is likely to influence the success of its alliance operation and 
impact its performance outcome. In other words, a firm’s strategy for strategic alliance 
– either standalone or portfolio – can have a critical impact on alliance diversity and 
performance relationship. 
I theorise that a firm’s strategy – i.e. standalone or portfolio – will influence the 
relationship between alliance diversity and firm performance. The resource-based 
188 
 
view suggests that resource heterogeneity is the basic condition to achieve sustainable 
competitive advantage (Peteraf, 1993). Standalone strategy enables firms to access 
heterogeneous resources and capabilities from its alliance partners, but it may be less 
integrated, because managers with a standalone orientation do not view the overall 
effects of all alliances combined. The literature suggests that different types of 
diversity enable firms to access different resources and capabilities. If managers opt 
for a standalone strategy, they can still access different resources and capabilities, but 
they may create inefficient or redundant configurations (Vassolo et al., 2004), or more 
conflicts to overall strategy due to only considering one alliance at a time (Parise and 
Casher, 2003). This may result in multiple partners with the same or similar 
capabilities and resources, which may prevent firms from realising the possible 
synergistic effects of different alliances (Cui and O'Connor, 2012). In addition, these 
multiple partners are also likely to have competing interests. For example, when 
developing a product with alliance partners, the firm may not have a clear contract 
which specifies the proprietary rights and share of the profits associated with the 
output of the product development. This causes conflicts/competing interests, because 
each partner may aim for the highest share of proprietary rights and profits from the 
development. Strategic alliance often has such contract issues relating to proprietary 
rights and share of the profits associated with alliance output and profits (Baum et al., 
189 
 
2000, Khanna et al., 1998, White and Lui, 2005, Williamson, 1991). Furthermore, 
firms that form alliances using the standalone strategy tend to fulfil the specific 
objectives of those alliances, but the effects may be temporary and encourage short-
term gain (e.g. increasing revenue). Therefore, I theorise that when managers form 
alliances in a standalone fashion, the relationship between alliance diversity and 
performance will be negative. 
 In contrast, when managers take a portfolio approach, the access to different 
resources and capabilities from partners is managed holistically, taking into account 
the impact of integrating partners’ and firms’ resources more carefully. Evidence from 
research suggests that it is not a single resource that matters; rather, the synergistic 
combination and bundles of resources created by firms are more important (Grant, 
1996, Hoffmann, 2007, Teece, 2007, Vassolo et al., 2004). The portfolio strategy 
enables firms to consider their overall diversification direction and risk levels so that 
they can better match external opportunities and internal resources (Hoffmann, 2005, 
Hoffmann, 2007, Parise and Casher, 2003). As a result, it facilitates the long-term 
prospects of the firm (Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009). In theory, alliance portfolio 
strategy enables firms to strategically evaluate their diverse partners’ resources and 
capabilities, incorporate these into their own resources/stocks, and achieve a better 
sustainable competitive advantage than the standalone strategy (Hoffmann, 2005, 
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Hoffmann, 2007, Sarkar et al., 2009). Therefore, I theorise that when managers form 
alliances using a portfolio strategy, the relationship between alliance diversity and 
performance will be positive.  
In this study, I contribute to the alliance diversity literature by developing and 
testing theories to explain how alliance strategy can impact the relationship between 
different alliance diversities and firm performance. The contribution of the paper is 
twofold. First, my study shows that the choice of strategic orientation in alliance 
formation (standalone versus portfolio) influences the relationship between alliance 
diversity and firm performance. Prior studies have demonstrated that the influence of 
alliance diversity on performance has so far been conflicting (Duysters et al., 2012, 
Lee et al., 2014). My study advances our understanding of how alliance strategies – 
i.e. either standalone or portfolio – influence the relationship between different types 
of alliance diversity and firm performance. In contrast to previous studies, the main 
interest of this study is not the relationship between various types of alliance diversity 
and performance. Rather, it focuses on how firms’ alliance strategies and alliance 
diversity jointly affect firm performance, because a firm’s strategy is likely to have a 
deterministic effect on its performance. The effects of two different alliance strategies 
– standalone and portfolio – are likely to provide a better explanation of the alliance 
diversity and performance relationship. In addition, a firm’s choice of alliance strategy 
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is likely to have associated managerial implications. It is important for managers to 
understand that diversity may or may not lead to superior performance depending on 
the choice of alliance strategy. Taking a standalone approach may reduce the efficiency 
of having diversity within the alliances, as resource integration and reconfiguration 
are not easily achievable when each alliance is dealt with independently from other 
alliances. In comparison, a portfolio strategy may enhance the positive effect diversity 
can have on performance because this strategy encourages a holistic mind-set. Thus, 
resources and capabilities are shared and re-combined to effectively accumulate 
idiosyncratic resources which enhance a firm’s competitive advantage. 
Second, my study contributes to alliance literature by demonstrating that firms 
choosing a portfolio strategy result in high firm performance when they have a high 
level of partner diversity. However, firms choosing a standalone strategy suffer from 
low firm performance when they have a high level of partner diversity because a 
standalone strategy reduces the ability to recombine partners’ resources and 
capabilities. In contrast, firms with higher partner diversity tend to benefit from a 
portfolio strategy because a portfolio strategy enables firms to better integrate firms’ 
resources with external resources from partners. 
 In the following section, I discuss the literature and hypotheses underlying my 
analysis, and illustrate the theoretical model of alliance diversity and the impact of 
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firms’ alliance strategy on firm performance. I then discuss the research design, 
followed by the empirical results. The final section concludes the paper by discussing 




3.2. Theory and Hypotheses 
Formulating an effective alliance strategy can be vital for exploiting resources 
and exploring new opportunities for achieving superior firm performance (Brouthers 
et al., 2009, Brouthers et al., 2014, Cui and O'Connor, 2012, Hoffmann, 2007, Jiang 
et al., 2010, Lavie, 2006, Lavie and Miller, 2008). Companies have used strategic 
alliances for foreign market entry and for overcoming resource deficiency at the 
entrepreneurial founding stage (Brouthers et al., 2014, Nakos et al., 2014, Rothaermel, 
2001b, Shan et al., 1994). Often, firms are engaged in more than one alliance in order 
to meet competitive challenges in the market environment (Hoffmann, 2007, Ireland 
et al., 2002, Parise and Casher, 2003). Engaging in multiple alliances allows firms to 
access a greater knowledge base for learning (Anand and Khanna, 2000) and 
complementary resources from different partners (Ahuja, 2000a, Gulati, 2007, 
Hoffmann, 2007, Lavie, 2006). 
A company’s network of alliances can have varying degrees of diversity. 
Alliance diversity refers to the differences in relation to alliance characteristics when 
determining the level of diversity within multiple alliances (De Leeuw et al., 2014). 
Jiang et al. (2010) refer to alliance diversity as partner diversity, functional diversity 
and governance diversity because these address three fundamental questions relating 
to an alliance: (1) Who does the firm ally with? (2) What is the purpose of the alliance 
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the firm intends to achieve? (3) How is the alliance governed? Partner diversity is the 
diversity of partners with whom the firm allies. It is related to a partner’s industry, 
nationality and organisational types such as public or private firms, and for profit and 
not-for-profit organisations (Jiang et al., 2011). Functional diversity is concerned 
with ‘the range of activities for which the firm uses alliances’ (Jiang et al., 2010 
p:1139). It arises from different functional purposes of an alliance, such as marketing, 
Research and Development (R&D), manufacturing and distribution (Brouthers et al., 
2014, Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). Governance diversity refers to ‘the variety of 
structure with which the firm manages alliances’. For example, alliances can be 
structured as non-equity or equity ownership (Jiang et al., 2010). 
A large number of studies suggest that a diverse collection of alliances enhances 
firm growth, financial performance, innovation performance, and increases a firm’s 
ability to survive (Baum et al., 2000, Mouri et al., 2012, Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009, 
Phelps, 2010, Powell et al., 1996). Other studies have discussed the potential 
disadvantages of alliance diversity due to managerial challenges linked to the 
complexity of managing multiple related alliances (Duysters et al., 2012, Faems et al., 
2010, Vasudeva and Anand, 2011). The findings of alliance diversity relating to 
performance are still equivocal (Duysters et al., 2012, Lee et al., 2014).  
The positive and negative relationships found between alliance diversity and 
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performance have been explained using different theoretical orientations such as the 
Resource-Based View (RBV), Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), learning and 
knowledge, and social network (Lee et al., 2014). The Resource-Based View suggests 
that alliance diversity can increase resource accessibility and synergies. A high level 
of diversity can result in positive performance effects because it allows accessibility 
of a wide range of resources that would lead to a positive performance and help a firm 
overcome its internal resource constraints (Ahuja, 2000b, Baum et al., 2000, Das and 
Teng, 2000, Dyer and Singh, 1998, Lavie, 2006, Zaheer and Bell, 2005).  
Transaction Cost Economics perspective tends to show a negative effect on 
performance because a high level of alliance diversity tends to increase transaction 
costs (Coase, 1937, Williamson, 1991). For example, high management and 
monitoring costs may occur when firms have a highly diverse set of partners and there 
is a lack of trust and familiarity (Dyer and Chu, 2003). Also, increasing the scope of 
the business with a diverse set of partners can lead to conflict and coordination 
problems, hence lowering firm performance (Goerzen and Beamish, 2005).  
Social network theory tends to view alliance diversity as a network of 
partnerships whereby the resources from diverse network partners are likely to have 
implications on firm performance. For example, diverse information and experience 
enables quality decision-making (Gulati et al., 2000, Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009, 
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Zaheer and Bell, 2005). A diverse set of alliances enables learning and expansion of 
knowledge, which are likely to contribute positively to performance (Kale and Singh, 
2007). For example, complementary knowledge leads to better knowledge sharing, 
resulting in positive firm performance (Gulati, 1999a, Jiang et al., 2010, Lavie and 
Miller, 2008).  
Taken together, previous studies appear to agree that alliance diversity is 
important, but its effect on firm performance is still debated, as summarised in Table 
3-1 below. 
Table 3- 1: Selected empirical studies of performance implications of alliance 
diversity 
 
3.2.1. Role of Alliance Strategy in Determining the Effect of Diversity on Firm 
Performance 
I argue that the conflicting findings of the alliance diversity and performance 




Performance measure Theoretical orientations
Baum et al. (2000)
+
Revenue growth, RD spending growth, non RD
employee growth, RD employee growth, Patenting
rate
Social Network Theory
Beckman and Haunschild (2002) + Acquisition premiums and performance Knowledge and learning
Cui and O'Conner 2012 +/- Firm Innovation Resource-Based View
De Leeuw et al. (2014) + Innovation performance and productivity Resource-Based View
Duysters et al. (2012) +/- Alliance portfolio performance Knowledge and learning
Goerzen and Beamish (2005) + Returns on sales, ROA, ROC Social Network Theory
Hoehn-weiss and Karim (2013) + Young firm outcomes (IPO, acquisition or other) Signaling theory
Jiang et al. (2009) +/- Net profit margin Resource-Based View
Koka and Prescott (2002) +/- Productivity Social Network Theory
Lavie and Miller (2008) +/- ROA Knowledge and learning
Lee et al. (2001) +/- Start-up performance Resource-Based View and Network theory
Lee (2007) + Rate of market entry Social Network Theory
Leeuw et al. (2014) +/- Productivity, radical and incremental innovation Resource-based View
Miller et al. (1998) − Decision extensiveness and comprehensiveness Upper Echelons Theory
Powell et al. (1996) + Rate of growth Social Network Theory
Phelps (2010) + Exploratory innovation Social Network Theory
Terjesen et al. (2011) +/- High Tech. Venture performance Resource-Based View
Van Beers ad Zand (2014) +/- Innovation performance Knowledge and learning
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depends on firm strategy and its resource reconfiguration (Miles and Snow, 1984). 
Alliance strategy can determine how businesses operate their alliances, and this can 
impact on performance results (Hoffmann, 2007, Parise and Casher, 2003). Alliance 
strategy refers to the approach that firms adopt to establish their alliances. They can 
be formed using a standalone approach, in which a firm considers alliances as 
standalone (one-off) occurrences. In other words, each alliance has its own objective, 
and firms are not concerned with synergies or conflicts with other alliances. 
Standalone alliances may have specific goals, such as market entry or new product 
development (Brouthers et al., 2014, Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996, Ireland et 
al., 2002). Alliances can also be formed using a portfolio approach. This approach 
encourages firms to take a holistic view of their alliances. Using a portfolio approach, 
managers will think about the strategic implications across the whole collection of 
alliances when making alliance decisions (Hoffmann, 2005, Hoffmann, 2007, Parise 
and Casher, 2003, Vassolo et al., 2004, Vapola et al., 2010).  
A portfolio approach and standalone approach engender different managerial 
concerns and orientation towards alliance formation. When a firm forms multiple 
alliances, it is likely that there will be strategically important interdependencies among 
alliances (Hoffmann, 2005). Access to diverse resources from alliances does not 
guarantee that synergies will be realised, and the benefits of alliance diversity can only 
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be realised through effective sharing of information and resources (Cui and O'Connor, 
2012). Such information and resource sharing requires coordination among alliances. 
Firms need to recognise that potential synergies can be created among its collection of 
alliances. In other words, alliance diversity is not always beneficial if the firm cannot 
recognise the potential synergies throughout an effective alliance strategy, to manage 
and coordinate the diverse set of alliances.  
Focusing on individual alliances taking a standalone approach may prevent the 
firm from recognising such interdependencies and result in inefficiency (Ross Jr and 
Robertson, 2007). For example, alliances for innovation and product development 
may rely on the knowledge from alliance partners in new markets as well as 
manufacturing knowledge from production alliance partners. Adopting a standalone 
approach does not encourage coordination of market or industry information within 
the alliance network. The sharing of information and resources may be restrained 
because the firm may optimise the benefits from each alliance, but sub-optimise inter-
alliance benefits which may become detrimental to the firm as a whole. 
By taking a portfolio approach, the firm is able to coordinate alliances and 
realise such interdependent relationships, and effectively utilise the knowledge 
obtained from different alliances. This allows the firm to better manage its diverse set 
of alliances as well as avoiding conflicts among alliances (Doz and Hamel, 1998, 
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Gulati, 1998). When a portfolio approach is adopted, the sharing of information and 
resources can be implemented across alliances. Consequently, the firm is likely to 
benefit from alliance diversity because the diverse resources and knowledge from 
different partners may be shared, thereby generating new resource combinations that 
facilitate innovation and the development of new technologies or new products 
(Swaminathan and Moorman, 2009). Better coordination can also increase a firm’s 
efficiency by sharing production facilities, i.e. economies of scale (Cui and O'Connor, 
2012). 
Scholars have noted that firms not only benefit directly from individual alliances 
but can also obtain indirect benefits by learning from those alliances and applying the 
acquired capabilities and skills to other alliances or projects (Khanna et al., 1998). The 
ability to consolidate different knowledge bases from different alliances requires firms 
to establish learning initiatives which define processes to enhance learning. When a 
firm adopts a standalone strategy, it lacks the ability to consolidate knowledge bases 
and convert them to useful capabilities and skills. In contrast, a portfolio strategy can 
gather and consolidate a variety of knowledge bases from different alliances and retain 




3.2.2. The Moderating Effect of Alliance Strategy: Partner Diversity–Firm 
Performance Relationship 
Studies show that partner diversity may sometimes lead to better firm 
performance. For example, including large partners in a firm’s alliance network can 
give the focal firm more resources and capabilities, which leads to better performance 
outcomes (Duysters et al., 2012, Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994, Stuart, 2000). 
The diversity of nationality and geographical location often facilitates a firm’s access 
to knowledge and institutional resources in new markets, which can also result in 
enhanced performance (Brouthers et al., 2009, Brouthers et al., 2014, Wassmer, 2010). 
Lavie and Miller (2008) argue that geographical diversity improves firm performance 
due to better adaptation in foreign markets. Similarly, having partners in different 
industries may reduce competitive tension and facilitate learning, thus improving 
performance (Kale and Singh, 2007). 
Notwithstanding the above, partner diversity may also be detrimental to 
performance. For example, national culture and institutional differences may create 
tension between partners (Brouthers, 2013b). Trust-building among partners can take 
a long time, and engenders costs in monitoring, coordination and integration (Dyer 
and Chu, 2003, Gulati, 1995a, Jiang et al., 2010). Performance may be affected when 
diverse ideas from different partners cause problems in an absorptive capacity, because 
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managers cannot manage and choose from too many diverse ideas (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990). Leakage or knowledge spill-over to partners when a firm 
collaborates with its competitors in the market is also a major issue of concern, 
especially when competitors overlap in backgrounds, experience, knowledge and 
technological bases, allowing them to readily capitalise on the knowledge spillover 
(De Leeuw et al., 2014, Jiang et al., 2011) 
In general, most scholars find that partner diversity gives access to partners’ 
knowledge and experience about different markets and different industries. I argue that 
performance can be improved when there is an effective configuration of the diverse 
knowledge and resources. When a standalone strategy is adopted, the manager will 
focus on one alliance at a time. Resource allocation is based on a specific alliance and 
lacks the flexibility for resource sharing or reconfiguration (Baum et al., 2000). In this 
case, even though partner diversity gives access to partners’ knowledge and experience, 
it may not lead to a better performance, because resources are not leveraged jointly to 
be complimentary or to develop synergy. For example, partners can come from 
different industries that are somewhat related or completely unrelated. When using a 
standalone approach, there is less consideration for choosing partners from industries 
that are more related. When partners’ industry backgrounds are unrelated, they may 
not be able to complement each other, and unfamiliarity with each other’s industries 
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can result in ineffective collaboration (Dyer and Chu, 2003, Gulati, 1995a). Therefore, 
I argue that a standalone strategy negatively moderates the relationship between 
partner diversity and performance. When a portfolio strategy is adopted, the focus is 
on the totality of all alliances. It enables managers to effectively allocate resources 
among different alliances (Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009, Parise and Casher, 2003). This 
may lead to a better sharing of partners’ knowledge and experience. For example, in 
relation to market entry, a firm that adopts a portfolio approach can build on the 
experience of previous market entry experience with partners and recombine them 
with its internal processes to improve the firm’s capabilities (Sarkar et al., 2009). 
Studies have shown that performance improves when there is flexibility to allocate 
and reconfigure resources within a firm’s collection of alliances (Baum et al., 2000, 
Hoffmann, 2005, Hoffmann, 2007, Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009, Parise and Casher, 
2003). When a company adopts a portfolio strategy, the diversity of partners will tend 
to be managed in a holistic manner. Therefore, I argue that a portfolio strategy will 
enhance the effect of partner diversity on performance. 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Alliance strategy will moderate the relationship between 
partner diversity and firm performance. A portfolio strategy will strengthen the 
relationship between partner diversity and performance, whereas a standalone 




3.2.3. The Moderating Effect of Alliance Strategy: Functional Diversity–Firm 
Performance Relationship 
Firms can form alliances with partners who are specialised in the same or 
different functions. Firms that focus on same-function alliances can be described as 
having low functional diversity. Same-function alliances are easier for resources and 
information sharing because partners will have overlapping prior knowledge, which 
enhances absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Studies show that R&D-
related alliances facilitate innovations and may contribute to firm performance (Ahuja, 
2000a, Brouthers et al., 2014, Faems et al., 2010, Stuart, 2000). Similarly, marketing 
alliances give the focal firm greater access to new markets and can also improve 
performance (Brouthers et al., 2014, Hagedoorn, 1993, Merchant and Schendel, 2000). 
Furthermore, Amaldoss and Staelin (2010) find that the impact of partner shirking is 
less detrimental to firm performance in same-function alliances than in cross-function 
alliances. This is because a partner’s input in same-function alliances is compensatory 
and the focal firm can continue to perform even when shirking occurs. In cross-
function alliances, shirking can stop the focal firm from performing, as the focal firm 
may lack competencies in the particular function that the partner is supposed to bring 
to the alliance.  
Firms that favour cross-function alliances where partners have different 
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competencies (e.g. R&D and marketing) can be described as having high functional 
diversity. Different functional resources such as R&D and marketing can complement 
each other (Song et al., 2005). For example, biotechnology firms tend to focus their 
efforts on R&D and market their innovative drugs by allying with pharmaceutical 
firms, as the latter have stronger marketing competencies (Oliver, 2001, Rothaermel 
and Deeds, 2006). In addition, van Beers and Zand (2014) show that functional 
diversity enables the firm to learn and accumulate competencies from different 
functional sources to create and produce new products and consequently improve firm 
performance.  
High functional diversity also has the advantage of facilitating the exploitation 
of new business opportunities and new knowledge beyond the scope of current 
alliances (Amaldoss and Staelin, 2010, Dussauge et al., 2000). Scholars suggest that 
functional diversity is positively related to firm performance (Jiang et al., 2010) 
because it encourages firms to balance exploitative and explorative activities for long-
term viability (Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006).  
However, when functional diversity is high, low absorptive capacity may limit 
knowledge transfer across alliances (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). Firms with different 
functional backgrounds may be unfamiliar with each other’s specialisation, and this 
can cause conflicts within the alliance, resulting in ineffective collaboration 
205 
 
(Amaldoss et al., 2000, Amaldoss and Staelin, 2010). For example, when one alliance 
is R&D based and another alliance is purely marketing based, the lack of common 
language and protocol may increase difficulty in communication and knowledge 
sharing between alliances.  
I argue that the relationship between functional diversity and performance might 
be dependent on the alliance strategy chosen. When functional diversity is high, the 
problems associated with communication and with learning from partners from 
different functional backgrounds can be attenuated when there is sound coordination 
and adequate effort to create synergy between alliances. I theorise that a portfolio 
strategy can reduce the negative effect that high functional diversity can have on 
performance.  
Firstly, when a company adopts a portfolio strategy, functional diversity will 
tend to be managed in a holistic manner, and competence gaps are likely to be filled 
through integrating different functional alliances. For example, if the focal firm 
possesses strong R&D capabilities, and partners with a firm that has strong marketing 
capabilities and another that has strong distribution capabilities, then it will be able to 
expand its value chain and contribute to firm growth. I argue that a manager who 
adopts a portfolio strategy would be more careful when planning resources, thereby 
206 
 
ensuring that there is an effective combination of functional competencies that can 
bring long-term growth to the company.  
Secondly, high functional diversity can lead to task conflicts (Mohr and Puck, 
2005, Parkhe, 1991). A portfolio alliance strategy encourages managers to look at the 
relationship between alliances. This means that managers may become more aware of 
conflicts that may occur between different functions. I argue that portfolio strategy can 
reduce cross-functional conflicts in alliances and therefore mitigate the negative 
impact of functional diversity on performance.  
Thirdly, a portfolio strategy also leads managers to consider a longer-term 
perspective (Hoffmann, 2007, Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009, Parise and Casher, 2003). 
Scholars have shown that firms’ prior experience in engaging a large number of 
alliances enables the firms to accumulate knowledge about partners and facilitate the 
learning between alliances (Anand and Khanna, 2000, Heimeriks et al., 2007, 
Rothaermel and Deeds, 2006, Schilke and Goerzen, 2010). Adopting a portfolio 
strategy will encourage a long-term view whereby the firm engages in long-term 
partnerships and learns from diverse and complementary functional alliances. This 
enables to fill competence gap in firm’s certain functions. I argue that portfolio 
strategy can help managers to extract certain advantages from high functional diversity, 
and this is likely to offset the negative impact of functional diversity.  
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In contrast, I theorise that a standalone strategy can increase the negative effect 
that high functional diversity can have on performance. Firstly, when functional 
diversity is high, management practice can be very different among partners from 
different functional backgrounds, and task conflicts can also occur if the alliances are 
not effectively coordinated (Mohr and Puck, 2005, Parkhe, 1991). A standalone 
strategy tends to have a specific objective for a particular alliance, and in order to 
achieve the objective, managers may ignore all other alliances. Thus, managers using 
a standalone strategy may only resolve specific conflicts within the alliance, and 
neglect task conflicts and variations in management practices between cross-function 
alliances. This is likely to amplify the negative impact of high functional diversity.  
Secondly, high functional diversity means that the firm is simultaneously 
engaged in alliances of different functions (e.g. R&D, marketing, production), which 
may rely on the same internal resources. Conflicts can occur when different functional 
alliances compete for internal resources. For example, an R&D alliance may require 
market information from marketing managers. At the same time, these marketing 
managers may have specific time commitments to their own marketing alliances. They 
may be unwilling to devote time for the R&D alliance. I argue that adopting a 
standalone strategy will exacerbate the conflict in internal resources competition, 
because this strategy encourages a short-term focus on a single alliance. With a short-
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term focus on a single alliance, managers will only think about giving priority to their 
own alliances when competing for internal resources, as they aim for the shortest time 
frame for fulfilling alliance objectives. They will not consider the needs of any other 
alliances. Therefore, a standalone strategy is likely to increase the negative impact of 
high diversity on performance.  
Thirdly, when a standalone strategy is adopted, the manager will focus on the 
competencies required for a specific alliance and is unlikely to consider whether these 
competencies can be reconfigured to use in other alliances or in the future. 
Consequently, a standalone approach may create inefficiencies in a firm’s alliance 
knowledge and competencies management. The knowledge that can be gained from 
having high functional diversity is lost if there are no coordination efforts between 
alliances (Kale and Singh, 2007, Sarkar et al., 2009). Similarly, in the case of low 
functional diversity, although the absorptive capacity amongst same-function firms 
may be high (Amaldoss and Staelin, 2010), a standalone strategy does not encourage 
the synergistic deployment of competencies (Hoffmann, 2007, Kale and Singh, 2009). 
Overall, I argue that managers adopting a standalone strategy would have a short-term 
view and be less willing to build long-term and trusting relationships with partners 
from same-functional or cross-function alliances. Hence, a standalone strategy is 
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likely to increase the negative impact that high functional diversity can have on 
performance. 
In summary, a portfolio strategy encourages complementarity and can therefore 
positively moderate the relationship between functional diversity and performance. 
Integrating different yet complementary competencies presents opportunities for 
synergy derived from economies of scope. A standalone strategy may be less 
concerned about the impact of similarity and complementarity of functional 
collaborations. Therefore, a standalone strategy is likely to negatively moderate the 
relationship between functional diversity and performance.  
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Alliance strategy will moderate the positive relationship 
between functional diversity and firm performance. A portfolio strategy will 
strengthen the relationship between functional diversity and performance, 
whereas a standalone strategy will weaken this relationship.  
3.2.4. The Moderating Effect of Alliance Strategy: Governance Diversity–Firm 
Performance Relationship  
Research on alliance governance tends to be based on either the resource-based 
view or transaction cost theory. The resource-based view suggests that alliances are 
the outcome of resource integration among firms which allow partners to access 
valuable resources (Barney, 1991, Barney et al., 2001, Das and Teng, 2000). 
Governance structures are the organised method of transferring the resources and 
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knowledge from partner firms. From a transaction cost view, transferring resources 
and knowledge will incur costs of negotiation, monitoring and conflict resolving. 
Governance diversity refers to the extent to which a firm uses both equity and non-
equity alliances. The greater number of different equity structures a firm has in its 
collection of alliances, the greater the governance diversity.  
Strategic alliances are voluntary arrangements among firms where pooled or 
complementary resources are leveraged for competitive advantage (Ariño, 2003).  
Strategic alliance agreements can involve equity or non-equity. Equity alliance is 
formed by partners with unified governance in which partners contribute equity capital 
and share management control and risks (Wang and Nicholas, 2007). Profits and losses 
are shared among partners proportionally according to their equity capital contribution. 
Scholars suggest equity alliances are superior governance mechanisms for inter-firm 
learning and knowledge transfer (Kogut, 1988, Mowery et al., 1996). Equity alliance 
can also use ownership and profit distribution as an incentive to control opportunistic 
behaviours of partners and to facilitate the transfer of resources among partners. Equity 
alliance lacks strategic flexibility, as there is often a minimum requirement for 
investment and a certain restriction on the withdrawal of capital (Reuer et al., 2002, 
Reuer and Arino, 2007, Wang and Nicholas, 2007).  
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Non-equity alliances are formed by partners with either an arm’s length 
contractual agreement or bilateral governance (Oxley, 1997, Reuer et al., 2002, Wang 
and Nicholas, 2007). Non-equity alliances are more flexible in terms of resource 
commitments (Wang and Nicholas, 2007). They rely on contracting arrangements 
where management control and the distribution of profit are based on negotiation 
among partners. Thus, although non-equity alliances can be more flexible, they can 
also incur additional costs, as the terms and conditions for the collaboration, such as 
transfer of resources and knowledge, are negotiated among partners (Williamson, 
1991). Non-equity alliances tend to be of short duration and limited scope (Lavie et 
al., 2012). They can be established quickly to take advantage of short-term business 
opportunities and then be dissolved upon completion of the assignment.  
Firms in non-equity alliances maintain independent identities. Their governance 
is not formally shared. Non-equity alliances are contractually based, and it can be 
difficult to specify and enforce terms and conditions in an alliance agreement for 
explorative types of alliances (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). For example, partners in 
a non-equity alliance may worry about value appropriation, as it can be difficult to 
specify a clear share of R&D outcome which is typically uncertain. Also, partners may 
often be reluctant to provide extensive information on the R&D projects due to fears 
of being cheated. Each partner may disguise or limit their contribution, and careful 
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monitoring of partners’ activities becomes inevitable to control opportunistic 
behaviour (Gulati and Singh, 1998, Lavie et al., 2012, Oxley, 1997, Yang et al., 2014).   
Firms are likely to have different forms of governance structures to manage their 
alliances. Sampson (2005) argues that firms who work with a few familiar structures 
(i.e. low governance diversity) will find it easier to institutionalise protocols related to 
the commonly adopted governance structure. Drawing on Sampson (2005), Jiang et al. 
(2010) provide empirical evidence that greater governance diversity is negatively 
associated with firm performance. The authors explain that operating a variety of 
different structures may result in high transaction costs as well as increasing 
managerial complexity and performance may suffer as a result.  
Notwithstanding the above, high governance diversity provides more flexibility 
to the firm. Scholars note that it is important to match governance structure with each 
alliance so that it can achieve a balance between value creation and value appropriation 
(Lavie, 2007) and reduce transaction costs (Reuer and Arino, 2007). The firm can 
choose the governance structure to reflect different levels of commitment, integration 
and learning objectives (Kogut, 1988) as well as reducing uncertainty (Rothaermel 
and Deeds, 2004).  
The impact of greater governance diversity on performance is still a matter of 
debate. I argue that governance diversity can lead to better or worse performance 
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outcomes depending on the firm’s alliance strategy. Low governance diversity is easier 
to manage than high governance diversity, if there is a mechanism that allows 
managers to learn from previous alliances adopting similar governance structures. In 
a standalone strategy, managers only focus on one alliance at a time, and the interaction 
between alliances will be low. Hence, despite greater similarity in governance 
structures, the firm cannot fully leverage the learning that can be gained from similar 
alliance structures. For example, a firm with high governance diversity will have 
different types of agreements for non-equity alliances and different combinations of 
equity ownership. The management of these different contracts and ownership 
schemes can be costly.  With a standalone strategy, managers tend to negotiate terms 
and conditions relating to the focal alliance for each new alliance, and it is unlikely 
that managers can learn from previous agreements. If there is little learning between 
alliances, then transaction costs might actually increase rather than decrease given the 
duplication of resources in operating similar governance structures. Therefore, a 
standalone strategy will reduce the positive impact of low diversity on performance. 
In contrast, with a portfolio strategy, managers will encourage inter-firm 
learning in order to create synergies between alliances (Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005, 
Parise and Casher, 2003). For example, managers adopting a portfolio strategy may 
establish a central alliance function (Heimeriks, 2010, Ireland et al., 2002, Kale et al., 
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2001, Kale et al., 2002, Kale and Singh, 2007, Kale and Singh, 2009) which manages 
and controls all the alliances-related matters, such as knowledge and resource 
management (Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007). For example, a portfolio strategy 
enables managers to use a firm’s agreement repository to retrieve and re-use previous 
agreements, and many agreements may only require minor changes. This is likely to 
save on transaction costs. Similarly, a portfolio strategy may encourage a firm to 
establish common routines or share services between alliances when all alliances 
operate under similar structures (Sampson, 2005). The firm will be able to reap more 
benefits from prior experiences of working in similar governance structures in this 
way. Therefore, a portfolio strategy will enhance the positive effect of low diversity 
on performance. 
With regards to high governance diversity, the literature suggests that having a 
mix of both equity and non-equity structures can bring more managerial complexity 
but also more flexibility to the firm. I argue that managerial complexity can be reduced 
and the benefits of flexibility fully leveraged with a portfolio strategy rather than a 
standalone strategy. When governance diversity is high, different governance 
structures increase managerial complexity. Park and Ungson (2001) argue that 
managerial complexity can increase due to lack of coordination and integration among 
independent firms. Alliances can fail as a result. Given that a portfolio strategy 
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promotes a holistic view, managers are better able to coordinate among alliances. 
Managers can jointly evaluate the costs and benefits of different governance structures 
and better manage the complexity inherent in high governance diversity. This means 
that managerial complexity can be reduced. Therefore, a portfolio strategy will reduce 
the negative impact that high governance diversity can have on performance.  
Furthermore, high governance diversity, in principle, has the advantage of 
allowing the firm to balance different governance structures and spread the risk 
amongst all alliances. However, this is unlikely to occur when managers adopt a 
standalone strategy and only consider one alliance at a time. A standalone strategy 
encourages short-termism as it is more of a result-oriented strategy. Short-termism 
may create agency problems between alliance managers and the firm, as managers 
give priority to their own personal interests (Park and Ungson, 2001). If all managers 
only think about their personal interests and take up risky projects with a variety of 
governance structures in order to reap benefits more quickly, then the overall risk to 
the firm will increase. Consequently, the negative impact of high governance diversity 
on performance may be even greater.  
In contrast, a portfolio strategy is less likely to suffer from agency problems, 
because alliance managers tend to look at the overall effects of different alliances 
rather than personal benefits. A portfolio strategy motivates managers to think 
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holistically about all alliances. Managers using a portfolio strategy need to weigh up 
different governance structures that fit into each particular alliance as well as how they 
fit with overall firm benefits. A portfolio strategy brings about a better coordination of 
the alliances. Furthermore, managers are more likely to think of ways to reduce overall 
risk within the alliance network. For example, partners’ opportunistic behaviour is a 
common risk of alliances that needs to be minimised (Williamson, 1991). A portfolio 
strategy encourages firms to consider a variety of governance structures for 
minimising different levels of opportunistic behaviour.   
In sum, a portfolio strategy encourages managers to manage complexity, 
minimise risk and encourage learning. Therefore, I argue that a portfolio strategy will 
reduce the negative impact of high governance diversity on performance and enhance 
the positive impact of low governance diversity on performance. With a standalone 
strategy, managers are unlikely to learn from similar alliance structures due to lack of 
coordination. Complexity inherent in having multiple governance structures may be 
overlooked, and there is a greater likelihood of risk-taking behaviour. Therefore, I 
propose that a standalone strategy will increase the negative impact of high 
governance diversity and reduce the positive impact of low governance diversity on 
performance.  
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Alliance strategy will moderate the negative relationship 
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between high governance diversity and firm performance. A portfolio strategy 
will reduce the negative effect that high governance diversity can have on 
performance, whereas a standalone strategy will increase the negative effect of 






To test my hypotheses, I chose companies from China’s and Taiwan’s PCB 
(printed circuit board) industries and plastic rubber industries. These industries consist 
of manufacturing and contract manufacturing, equipment and machinery, materials, 
chemicals and accessories. Printed circuit boards are electronic components that are 
used in modern electronic goods and equipment. The majority of household appliances 
and electronic devices have PCBs as a key component to transfer electronic signals. 
Plastic rubber production can consist of a simple plastic bag to plastic moulding and 
injections. Plastic and rubber are used in every household as well as in many different 
industries. 
Industrial statistics show that that global PCB output in 2014 was US$60.15 
billion (WECC, 2015). Annual plastic rubber industrial facts data show that the 
industry turnover exceeds €350 billion in Europe alone (PlasticsEurope, 2015). A 
specialised industrial report suggests that PCB firms are going for partnership and 
strategic alliances in order to provide unique solutions and meet changing market 
demands and opportunities (Lucintel, 2015). Companies in the plastic rubber industry 
are often engaged in strategic alliances in order to have better control and flexibility 
in raw material supplies or sales channels. A recent example is AD Plastiks (Croatia) 
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and Henniges automotive (US), who formed strategic alliances to benefit from each 
other’s specialisation in 2014. Burkool S.A (Brazil) and Henniges (US) formed 
alliances to serve Brazilian and Argentinian markets in 2013 (Sweeney, 2015). 
Companies in the PCB industry often use strategic alliances to collaborate with 
partners for different activities within the value chain. Firms from both industries are 
likely to have diverse sets of alliances. Therefore, these industries provide a large 
research setting to investigate the relationship between alliance diversity and firm 
performance. In addition, these firms’ alliance diversity can be seen in their supply 
chain management. In order to better manage their supply and value chain, PCB and 
plastic rubber manufacturers collaborate with raw material manufacturers to supply 
materials and collaborate with their clients to develop new innovative products that 
suit the market.  
Also, I chose to study firms in the two industries based in China and Taiwan 
because these two markets are ranked first and third worldwide in PCB output value. 
These two markets account for 44.9% and 14% of global PCB output, respectively. 
Together, they represent 58.9% of total PCB output worldwide (WECC, 2015). At the 
same time, China is ranked the largest producer and accounts for 26% of global plastic 
materials (PlasticsEurope, 2015). These are sizeable industries, and alliances are 
common practice, hence it appears to be appropriate for investigating firm alliance 
220 
 
strategy and how this strategy moderates the relationship between alliance diversity 
and firm performance. 
3.3.2. Survey 
Data collection was by questionnaire in this study. The questionnaire was 
prepared in English first and translated into Chinese. It was then translated back into 
English to ensure accuracy and reliability (Brislin, 1970, Kreiser et al., 2002). I 
contacted five senior managers of different companies from the PCB industry and 
asked for their help to verify the survey contents. Then a pilot test of the questionnaire 
was run with another five senior managers from the industry to further verify that it is 
easy for them to understand, so I could ensure that the operational measures are 
appropriate for the study. If there were suggestions for improvement, I amended 
accordingly and incorporated them into the final survey for distribution. 
 
3.3.3. Data Collection 
To verify the appropriateness of respondents, I contacted each executive in the 
sample companies by phone or in person and asked if decisions regarding strategic 
alliances would be within his or her authority, and if they were willing to participate 
in this study. When executives confirmed they have the authority to make strategic 
alliance decisions and were willing to participate in the survey, they then received the 
survey instrument via email, post, online or in person. 
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Each qualified respondent received the questionnaire with a letter to introduce 
and explain the purpose of the study as well as promising confidentiality. In order to 
ensure the response rate, I sent follow-up emails or made follow-up calls to check they 
had received the survey. I also attempted to establish a time frame for the return of the 
survey with each respondent. 
Data were collected in 2016 using a random sample of 600 companies from the 
PCB and plastic rubber industries. For the PCB industry, I drew the sample from the 
directory for the PCB industry in Taiwan and China (TPCA, 2015). The directory 
comprises approximately 5,200 firms. I used random sampling to select every tenth 
firm in the list and sent out an invitation to 520 firms to participate in the study via e-
mail and post. Out of the 520 firms contacted, 380 accepted to participate. I then sent 
out the questionnaire via post and email to these firms, and hand delivered 
approximately one fourth of the sample. After two waves of mailing, numerous follow-
up calls, emails and company visits, I initially received 125 responses. Of these 
responses, three were not usable as these responses have too many un-answered 
questions. The useable surveys amounted to 122. 
For the plastic rubber industry, the companies were sampled from the exhibitors 
list of Plas2016 Taipei industry exhibition. This includes approximately 500 firms. 
During the Plas2016 industry exhibition, I randomly approached 220 firms out of the 
222 
 
total number exhibiting there and received 71 responses, but three of these responses 
were not usable.  
The usable data comprised 190 firms – 122 companies from the PCB industry 
and 68 companies from the plastic rubber industry. The overall response rate was 32% 
for PCB industry and 31% for Plastic rubber industry. On average, our respondents 
had 628 employees, and 65% of the firms had alliance function in the company with 
an average 21 alliances in the past five years. 
3.3.4. Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable for this study is firm performance. Previous alliance 
studies measure performance at alliance level, portfolio level or firm level, using 
objective measures or perceptual measures. For perceptual measures, scholars have 
used either actual performance or relative performance.  
Performance measure at alliance level 
At alliance level, Deeds and Rothaermel (2003) use a five-point Likert scale to 
measure three items of alliance performance: spill-over benefits, financial 
performance and overall alliance performance. The scale consists of descriptions on 
positive and negative spill-overs.1 The respondents were asked to rate the spill-over 
                                                     
1 “Positive spillover effects occur when knowledge that can be applied to profitably to other products 
is created during the alliance activities” and “Negative spillover effect is undesired transfer of a 
valuable skills or technology to an alliance partner” 
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effects of the present alliance, ranging from 1 ‘strongly negative’ to 5 ‘strong positive’. 
Financial performance of the alliance is based on respondents’ expectation, anchored 
by 1 ‘far better’ to 5 ‘far worse’. Respondents were asked to consider the most relevant 
financial performance, such as return on investment, burn rate and sales. Finally, the 
respondents were asked to rate their overall assessment of the alliance performance 
compared to their expectations, anchored by 1 ‘far better’ to 5 ‘far worse’.  
Zollo et al. (2002) also studied alliance level performance using perceptual 
measures on a five-point Likert scale. Firstly, respondents rated their level of 
satisfaction with the knowledge accumulated from participating in a particular alliance. 
Secondly, respondents indicated the extent to which the alliance creates new 
opportunities for the firm. Thirdly, respondents indicated the degree to which the 
alliance satisfied the partnering firm’s initial objectives. The three indicators are then 
standardised and summed up to construct a global measure of alliance performance.  
Hoetker and Mellewigt (2009)’s alliance performance measure is based on the 
degree to which the alliance achieves 13 different goals, ranging from firm-specific 
goals (e.g. cost reduction, risk reduction, time advantages) to industry-specific goals 
(e.g. access to network infrastructure, access to sales network, access to technical 
know-how). The final measure is the weighted average of the 13 items.  
Lavie et al. (2012) measure alliance performance using an eight-item scale 
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which refers to the extent to which an alliance (1) met its objectives, (2) increased 
revenue, (3) improved quality, (4) reduced time to market, (5) generated new 
customers, products or projects, (6) led to customer satisfaction, (7) received 
favourable recognition, and (8) could evolve into a long-term relationship. Items were 
measured with a seven-point Likert scale from 1 ‘strongly disagree’ to 7 ‘strongly 
agree’.  
Shu et al. (2014) measure alliance performance with a four-item Likert-type 
scale. Respondents are asked to rate the level of agreement with the following 
statements: (1) The collaborative relationship achieved the objective of return on 
investments, (2) The collaborative relationship achieved the objective of sales growth, 
(3) The collaborative relationship achieved the objective of market share increase, and 
(4) The collaborative relationship achieved the objective of net profits. With the 
anchor of 1 ‘strongly agree’ to 7 ‘strongly disagree’. 
Performance measure at portfolio level 
Schilke and Goerzen (2010) measured alliance portfolio performance by asking 
respondents to rate their level of satisfaction and goal fulfilment of the business unit’s 
R&D alliances. The statements were: (1) Overall, we are satisfied with the 
performance of our R&D alliances, (2) Generally, our R&D alliances satisfy our initial 
objectives, (3) We are satisfied with the knowledge accumulated from participating in 
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R&D alliances, and (4) Our R&D alliances have been profitable investments. 
In Duysters et al. (2012) and Heimeriks et al. (2015), alliance portfolio 
performance is operationalised as the percentage of alliance in which the firm’s goals 
are realised. More specifically, respondents assess their company’s overall alliance 
success rate in the firm’s portfolio where the initial goals were realised over the last 
five years. The question is, ‘What is your company’s overall success rate (i.e. 
percentage of strategic alliances where goals were realized) over the past 5 years?’ 
Respondents select the success rate from 1 for (0-20%), 2 for (21-40%), 3 for (41-
60%), 4 for (61-80%) and 5 for (81-100%). 
Heimeriks and Duysters (2007) present a similar measure of alliance portfolio 
performance based on percentage of alliance in which the original goals were realised 
However, the authors use three levels of performance – low (0-40%), average (41- 
60%) and high (61-100%) – to indicate the level of alliance portfolio performance. 
Kandemir et al. (2006) measure alliance network performance by capturing a 
firm’s perceived ability to achieve its objectives associated with its alliance network. 
However, the authors use a seven-point Likert scale to ascertain respondents’ 
satisfaction with: (1) The competitive strength of their alliance network, (2) The 
strength of their relationships with key alliance partners, and (3) The ability to manage 
crises and conflicts with their alliance partners.  
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Performance measure at firm level 
For firm level of performance, scholars have used self-report measures based on 
surveys as well as accounting-based, market-based and innovation output measures 
based on secondary data. Accounting-based measures include return on assets (ROA), 
return on sales (ROS), return on investment (ROI) and earnings (e.g. Terjesen et al., 
2011, Goerzen and Beamish, 2005, Lavie and Miller, 2008). Market-based measures 
are relevant to the stock market valuation (e.g. Wassmer and Dussauge, 2012, Lavie, 
2007). Innovation output measures mainly look at the number of patents granted and 
the number of products introduced to the markets, e.g. (De Leeuw et al., 2014, 
Duysters and Lokshin, 2011, Lahiri and Narayanan, 2013).  
Survey-based self-report measures are often related to the level of satisfaction 
with overall performance compared with competitors (Sarkar et al., 2009, Shu et al., 
2014, Schreiner et al., 2009, Kandemir et al., 2006). In Kandemir et al. (2006), 
respondents are asked to rate firm performance relative to competitors in terms of sales 
growth, market share and market development, from 1 ‘much worse’ to 5 ‘much better’. 
Sarkar et al. (2009) measure market/firm performance by asking respondents to 
rate, from 1 to 5 (‘much worse’ to ‘much better’), how well the firm performs relative 
to competitors for its market share, sales growth, market development and product 
development. This measure is adapted from Venkatraman and Ramanujam (1986). In 
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addition, as the sample studied has a number of public firms, Sarkar et al. (2009) test 
the validity of their measure by collecting three years of data on the public firms in 
their sample for commonly used performance measures (Return on Assets (ROA), 
Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Investment (ROI) and Sales Growth (SG)) 
using COMPUSTAT and correlating the average performance data with their 
perceptual measure of market/firm performance. The correlation between market/firm 
performance and average ROA, ROE, ROI and SG are all significant at p < 0.05. This 
highlights the validity of the perceptual measure.  
Schreiner et al. (2009) measure firm performance data by asking respondents to 
report how well their firm had performed during the last three years, relative to other 
direct competitors, in terms of sales growth, profitability, return on investment and 
ability to build customer loyalty. The respondents are asked to rate the level of firm 
performance compared with their key competitors on a seven-point Likert-type scale 
(ranging from ‘far better’ to ‘far worse’). The question is: ‘During the last three years, 
how well did your company perform relative to your direct competitors in terms of (1) 
Sales Growth, (2) Profitability, (3) Return on Investment, and (4) Building customer 
loyalty?’. 
Shu et al. (2014) use four items to measure firm performance on a seven-point 
Likert scale. Respondents are asked to rate their level of agreement for the following 
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statements: (1) Compared with our major competitors, our return on investments 
increased greatly, (2) Compared with our major competitors, our sales grew greatly, 
(3) Compared with our major competitors, our market share increased greatly, and (4) 
Compared with our major competitors, our net profit increased greatly. 
The choice of performance measure 
There are a number of reasons for the choice of performance measure. Firstly, I 
chose firm-level performance because I am interested in the study of the relationships 
between alliance diversity, alliance strategy and firm performance. I am not interested 
in alliance-level or portfolio-level performance for my study. Secondly, I chose to use 
self-reporting measures because the sample in my study consists of listed and non-
listed companies. Therefore, financial data is not available for all companies, and 
neither is adequate financial information on alliances readily available from secondary 
sources (Reuer, 2001, Hult et al., 2008). More importantly, many scholars suggest that 
top managers are highly knowledgeable about firm performance, and much of alliance 
research is based on managerial evaluation of performance (e.g. Heimeriks et al., 2014, 
Kale et al., 2002, Kale and Singh, 2007). In light of scale validity, Sarkar et al. (2009) 
demonstrate that their perceptual measure of firm performance is well correlated with 
financial data collected from COMPUSTAT. Thirdly, scholars suggest that using 
perceptual measures is more appropriate when comparing firms with different 
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business operations or firms with different attributes (Hult et al., 2008). In my sample, 
firms may engage in producing high technological PCBs (e.g. for the aviation industry 
and for advanced medical devices) or they may only produce low-end home appliance 
PCBs (e.g. for toasters or vacuum cleaners). The profit margin for the former group is 
normally higher than that of the latter group due to the nature of its product line. In 
this case, objective measures of performance are not comparable and can be 
misleading. Perceptual measures of performance related to competition can provide 
more comparable information, and control for industry effect (Judge and Douglas, 
1998). Fourthly, scholars suggest that comparisons with competitors can reveal 
important firm performance information (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003).  
Following Sarkar et al. (2009)’s performance measure, I asked respondents to 
rate the level of firm performance compared with their key competitors on a seven-
point Likert-type scale (ranging from ‘Far Better’ to ‘Far Worse’). The question is: 
‘How well does your company perform relative to your competitors in terms of (1) 
market share, (2) sales growth, (3) market development and (4) product development?’ 
3.3.5. Independent Variables 
The independent variables are the different kinds of alliance diversity. Alliance 
diversity is a multidimensional concept that may include a variety of alliance and 
partner attributes (Jiang et al., 2010, Wassmer, 2010, Lee et al., 2014). Scholars have 
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measured alliance diversity in different ways. The most frequently studied kinds of 
alliance diversity include functional, governance, industry, national, technology, 
organisational and partner diversity (Lee et al., 2014). I follow Jiang et al. (2010) and 
use the three main kinds of alliance diversity which are partner diversity, functional 
diversity and governance diversity. These three kinds of diversity are very relevant to 
alliance formation as well as to alliance strategy because they are concerned with who 
the partners are, what activities are performed in the partnership and how the alliance 
is managed. 
Partner diversity 
Scholars have measured partner diversity by studying nationality/geographic 
diversity (Jiang et al., 2010), partner attributes diversity (van Beers and Zand, 2014) 
and partner types (Terjesen et al., 2011). Scholars suggest that partners from different 
stages of the value chain may contribute to knowledge sharing and transfer differently. 
However, partnering with competitors may cause intensified competition (Jiang et al., 
2010, Lee et al., 2014). Partners from different geographical areas will bring different 
resources to the alliances (Doz and Hamel, 1998, Goerzen and Beamish, 2005). 
Therefore, in this study, I followed Terjesen et al. (2011), who include partner type and 
geographic diversity as the partner diversity variable. Partner types include suppliers, 
competitors and customers, because firms in the sample industries appear to be very 
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active in forming alliances from different stages of the value chain. Respondents were 
asked to specify the number of their firm’s alliances with (a) suppliers, (b) competitors 
and (c) customers. For geographic diversity, respondents were asked to report the 
number of their firm’s alliances which are (a) domestic and (b) international. 
Functional diversity 
Functional diversity is the variety of different functional purposes of partners 
such as marketing, R&D, manufacturing and distribution. Scholars suggest that 
functional diversity has a significant effect on performance (Jiang et al., 2010, van 
Beers and Zand, 2014). I asked respondents to specify the number of different 
functional alliances their firms are currently engaged in. The respondents were asked 
to report the number of alliances they have within each different function. The 
functional categories are Sales and Marketing, Research and Development, 
Manufacturing, Distribution, and Others.  
Governance diversity 
Governance diversity refers to the way in which an alliance is governed. This 
can be either equity alliance or non-equity alliance. Scholars suggest that governance 
diversity is negatively related to performance (Jiang et al., 2010). I asked respondents 
to specify the number of equity-based alliances and the number of non-equity based 
alliances their companies are currently involved in. The questions are: ‘(1) How many 
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of the alliances your firm is currently involved in are equity based?’, and ‘(2) How 
many of the alliances your firm is currently involved in are non-equity based?’  
The measure of diversity 
For the measure of diversity, I follow Jiang et al. (2010) using a Blau Index. The 
formula to calculate this index is: 
Diversity = 1 - ∑ Pi  
D represents degree of diversity, P is the proportion that belongs to a given 
category, and i is the number of different categories. For example, if a firm has five 
alliances with two domestic partners and three international partners, the geographic 
diversity would score 1 – [(2/5)2 + (3/5)2] = 0.48. Higher values indicate a greater 
degree of diversity. 
3.3.6. Moderating Variable 
The moderating variable is the firm’s alliance strategy. In this study, alliance 
strategies are distinguished as a standalone alliance strategy or a portfolio alliance 
strategy. To my knowledge, there are no published scales for standalone and portfolio 
strategies, because prior studies have not viewed alliance strategy based on the 
standalone versus portfolio distinction. The main reason for the lack of availability of 
tested scales is that, traditionally, alliance research has tended to focus on single 
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alliances. In recent years, some scholars have suggested a portfolio approach as an 
alternative way for firms to manage strategic alliances (Hoffmann, 2005, Hoffmann, 
2007, Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009). The majority of alliance studies treat the two types 
(standalone and portfolio) as two separate research areas, and scholars do not view 
them together as firm alliance strategy. Therefore, scholars have not created scales that 
might distinguish standalone from portfolio strategy. 
Other reasons for the lack of tested scales are the definitions and level of 
measurement used for the different strategies. Scholars tend to define standalone 
alliance with more consensus but define an alliance portfolio quite differently 
(Wassmer, 2010). For example, some scholars define an alliance portfolio as the 
aggregate of all strategic alliances of a focal firm (Bae and Gargiulo, 2004, George et 
al., 2001, Hoffmann, 2005, Hoffmann, 2007, Lavie, 2007, Lavie and Miller, 2008). 
Other scholars define it as all direct ties with partner firms (Baum et al., 2000, Ozcan 
and Eisenhardt, 2009, Rowley et al., 2000). Another group of scholars define the 
alliance portfolio as a focal firm’s accumulated alliance experience, both ongoing and 
in the past (Anand and Khanna, 2000, Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005, Kale et al., 2002, 
Reuer et al., 2002). Different definitions may cause difficulties in operationalising the 
variable. In addition, standalone and portfolio appear to have different levels of 
analysis. Therefore, scholars have not created a scale that combines the two levels of 
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analysis and measurement, or that reflects the managerial choice of firms’ alliance 
strategies. Furthermore, alliance portfolio research is still relatively new and scholars 
have yet not conceptualised alliance strategy as standalone and portfolio. 
For this study, I used DeVellis (2012) scale development guidelines to create a 
new scale of alliance strategy. Firstly, DeVellis (2012) suggests scholars define what 
the study needs to measure and to draw on literature to develop a suitable number of 
item scales. Therefore, as recommended by DeVellis (2012), I provided a definition 
of alliance strategy and used the literature to develop a three-item scale. Secondly, 
DeVellis (2012) suggests seeking out industry experts for clarification and verification 
of the items developed. I therefore contacted the senior managers of different 
companies in the target sample industry to carry out this task. Thirdly, DeVellis (2012) 
recommends that the scale should be reviewed by academic experts and scale length 
optimised. Fourthly, this initial measure will be tested by a second set of senior 
executives from the sample industry. Finally, items are modified, based on the 
feedback of the test with the second set of senior executives, to finalise the 
questionnaire.    
In the literature, scholars identify the motivations and benefits of forming 
strategic alliances, such as achieving long-term strategic goals, managing risk and 
uncertainty, and accessing resources for synergy creation and resource integration 
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(Ahuja, 2000b, Gulati, 2007, Hoffmann, 2007, Lavie, 2006, Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 
2009). These are the core strategic considerations for firm alliance strategy. Therefore, 
I developed this measure based on my definitions of alliances strategies, and taking 
account of the core strategic considerations suggested in the literature. The aim of this 
study is to examine the extent to which managers view alliances as standalone 
occurrences or as a portfolio. Therefore, I needed respondents to be able to distinguish 
between the two kinds of strategies. In doing so, it is important to highlight the 
opposing characteristics of the two strategies. At the same time, scholars often present 
portfolio perspective as a step up from the standalone perspective (Parise and Casher, 
2003). Therefore, standalone and portfolio strategies can be presented as a continuum, 
using an anchored Likert scale. The first item uses generic descriptions of the 
standalone strategy and portfolio strategy. The other two items are related to core 
strategic considerations for firm alliance strategy. 
In item 1, I developed two descriptive statements that are based on my 
definitions of the two strategies. Scholars have found that the use of descriptive 
paragraphs is an effective means of determining a firm’s strategy (James and Hatten, 
1995). Therefore, I used descriptive statements at both ends of the continuum to 
measure a firm’s alliance strategy. The statement for a standalone strategy is, ‘When 
we make alliance decisions, each alliance is considered as an independent entity and 
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there is a specific goal for each alliance independently from other alliances’. Portfolio 
strategy is described as ‘When we make alliance decisions, we take into account the 
strategic implications of all alliances that our company is engaged in, and we consider 
the interrelationships among alliances, including the possible synergies that can be 
created through the combination of the alliances’. The respondents were asked to rate 
which statement best describes their company’s alliance strategy on a continuum 
(ranging from 1 to 7). Firms that choose toward 1 are inclined to a standalone alliance 
strategy and firms that choose toward 7 are inclined to a portfolio alliance strategy. 
In item 2, I developed two descriptive statements on the importance of short-
term versus long-term outcomes during alliance formation. The idea is inspired by 
Ozcan and Eisenhardt (2009). The authors suggest that managers who are able to view 
their alliances in the context of their firm’s industry are likely to develop a high-
performing alliance portfolio. I interpret that these managers with a long-term 
perspective are more likely to take a portfolio strategy. I developed a scale of 1 to 7 
whereby 1 is, ‘we mainly consider a short-term outcome during alliance formation’, 
and 7 is, ‘we mainly consider a long-term alliance development goal during alliance 
formation’. I asked respondents to indicate the level of prioritisation for either 
orientation rather than importance, because respondents may feel that both short- and 
long-term outcomes are important when asked this question. By assessing how 
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managers perceive the level of prioritisation, I was able to gauge the tendency of a 
firm’s alliance strategy: managers adopting a standalone strategy tend towards short-
termism, whereas managers adopting a portfolio strategy are more concerned with 
long-term viability and development. 
For item 3, I drew on literature related to alliance risk and uncertainty. Strategic 
alliances allow firms to manage risk and uncertainty (Hoffmann, 2007, George et al., 
2001). Managers tend to have different risk propensities, and strategic choices are 
influenced by the risk preference of the decision makers (Hoffmann, 2007). I asked 
respondents how they manage alliance risk and uncertainty by using two descriptive 
statements. At one end of the continuum, the statement reads, ‘We manage risk and 
uncertainty of individual alliances in an independent manner’. At the other end of the 
continuum, the statement reads, ‘We manage risk and uncertainty of all alliances 
together in an integrated manner’. When managers do not view managing risk and 
uncertainty in an integrated manner, they are likely to adopt a standalone strategy, 
because a standalone strategy is less concerned with managing overall risk and 
uncertainty whereas a portfolio strategy encourages managers to consider the risk 
implications of different alliances together. Therefore, having a manager’s view on 
risk and uncertainty can indicate the tendency of choosing an alliance strategy. 
Each item reflects the core strategic considerations of forming alliances. These 
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statements indicate the tendency of managerial strategic consideration during alliance 
decision-making. At one end of the spectrum are those firms whose alliance strategy 
is to take holistic view on their alliances and have a long-term perspective into forming 
alliances, managing overall risk and uncertainty (Parise and Casher, 2003, Vapola et 
al., 2010, Vassolo et al., 2004, Hoffmann, 2007). These firms are likely to have a 
portfolio alliance strategy. At the other end of spectrum are firms whose alliance 
strategy is more on a standalone, ad hoc basis, is short-term result oriented, more 
focused on risk and uncertainty related to individual alliance and less concerned with 
the overall effects of alliances joining together. These firms are likely to have a 
standalone alliance strategy. Therefore, the three-item Likert scale for alliance strategy 
can tap into a firm’s alliance strategic orientation and is suitable for the measurement 
of alliance strategy.  
3.3.7. Control Variables 
In order to minimise alternative explanations and isolate the marginal effects of 
the different variables, I controlled for several characteristics of the focal firm and of 
its alliances as well as managerial characteristics. For the focal firm, I controlled for 
firm size, firm age, international activities, R&D orientation, past performance, two 
industrial effects and a country effect. For the characteristics of the alliances, I 
included alliance experience and alliance function. For managerial characteristics 
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control variables, I controlled for respondents’ age, education, tenure and functional 
background. These variables may have a confounding effect and influence on the 
diversity and performance relationship. 
Firm size 
Large firms will have more resources to establish alliances and may have more 
experience too, which may have a possible effect on firm performance (Brouthers et 
al., 2014). Therefore, I used total number of employees to control for the effect of firm 
size on firm performance. Firm size was measured as the number of full-time 
employees. 
Firm age 
Older firms may have more experience in forming alliances which could have 
an experiential effect on firm performance (Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005). Firm age 
was measured as the number of years since its founding until 2016. I asked respondents 
to provide the founding year of the firm.  
International activities  
Similar to Brouthers and Nakos (2005), I controlled for a firm’s export 
dependency because firms that are highly dependent on exports may impact 
performance differently to firms less dependent upon export sales. Therefore, it is 
included as a control variable. I followed Brouthers and Nakos (2005) and 
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operationalised it as the firm’s ratio of foreign sales to total sales. I asked respondents 
to report the ratio of their foreign sales to total sales.  
R&D orientation 
Gatignon and Xuereb (1997) define an R&D oriented firm as ‘a firm with the 
ability and the will to acquire a substantial technological background and to use it in 
the development of new products’. Scholars suggest that R&D orientation is related to 
firm performance outcomes (Cooper, 1984, Gatignon and Xuereb, 1997). It is likely 
that a firm with a high degree of R&D orientation may influence firm performance. 
Therefore, I followed Schilke and Goerzen (2010) by including R&D orientation as a 
control and using a single item to measure this variable. Respondents were asked to 
indicate the level of agreement with the statement on a seven-point scale, ranging from 
1 ‘strongly disagree’ to 7 ‘strongly agree’. The statement is: ‘In our company, we 
emphasise Research and Development activities’. 
Past performance 
Past performance may influence firm alliance strategy because a firm may take 
strategic action based on past performance in an attempt to improve firm performance. 
This means that past performance has a potential effect on a firm’s choice of alliance 
strategy and future performance. Previous studies control for past performance using 
different measurements and time frames (Baum and Wally, 2003, Wiklund and 
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Shepherd, 2003, Santhanam and Hartono, 2003, Andrevski et al., 2013). For example, 
Baum and Wally (2003) measure past performance with two types of firm performance: 
growth and profitability. Growth is measured with two items: (1) the percentage 
change in annual sales from 1996 to 2000, and (2) the percentage change in year-end 
employment from 1996 to 2000. Profit is measured with one item: the average annual 
‘pretax net profit percentage of assets’ for 1998, 1999, and 2000. Wiklund and 
Shepherd (2003) directly ask respondents to compare past performance with 
competitors in terms of net profit, sales growth, cash flow and growth of net worth. 
The items use a five-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 ‘much worse than its 
competitors’ to 5 ‘much better than its competitors’. Cronbach alpha is 0.76. 
Santhanam and Hartono (2003) take into account past performance, not through a 
control variable but by adjusting current performance. The authors measure financial 
performance in two categories: profit ratios and cost ratios. Profit ratios include return 
on sales, return on assets, operating income to assets, operating income to sales and 
operating income to employees. Cost ratios include: cost of goods sold to sales, selling 
and general administration expenses to sales and operating expenses to sales. Data are 
collected from a secondary data source (COMPUSTAT) for current and previous years. 
Past performance is controlled through adjusting current performance, by regressing 
prior year performance on current year performance. In alliance studies, Andrevski et 
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al. (2013) control for past performance using return on equity (ROE), and data are 
collected from a secondary source.  
Past performance based on financial data is relatively accessible. However, 
tested scales for past performance measurements are relatively limited. I followed 
Schreiner et al. (2009)’s performance measure because it is used in the context of 
alliance and it asks respondents to rate their firm’s performance compared to its 
competitors over a three-year time frame. This appears to be relevant for measuring a 
firm’s past performance. Schreiner et al. (2009)’s measure is similar to Wiklund and 
Shepherd (2003)’s measure of past performance, but the items are different. Wiklund 
and Shepherd (2003) consider net profit, sales growth, cash flow and growth of net 
worth, while Schreiner et al. (2009) consider sales growth, profitability, return on 
investment and building customer loyalty. The Cronbach alpha for Schreiner et al. 
(2009) is higher at 0.93, and Wiklund and Shepherd (2003) is at 0.76. Therefore, 
following Schreiner et al. (2009), I asked respondents to rate the level of firm 
performance compared with their competitors on a seven-point Likert-type scale 
(ranging from ‘Far Better’ to ‘Far Worse’). The question is: ‘During the last three 
years, how well did your company perform relative to your direct competitors in terms 




Industry effect 1& 2 
Strategic alliances in certain high technology industries may be more active than 
others (Hagedoorn, 2002). Also, alliances in some industries perform better than those 
in other industries owing to differences in industry structure (Krishnan et al., 2006). 
Hitt and Tyler (1991) found that industry affects the criteria used to make acquisitions. 
Many scholars have argued the importance of industry in determining the strategies 
employed by the firms (Hitt et al., 2000). Scholars suggest that it is important to 
include an industry effect as a control variable. I used Schilke and Cook (2013)’s 
opening question ‘Which of the following is your company’s primary industry sector?’, 
but provided a selection list based on the primary industry in my sample: 1 for 
Manufacturing and Contract Manufacturing, 2 for Equipment and Machinery, 3 for 
Materials, Chemicals and Accessories, and 4 Other, please specify. This was coded as 
dummy variables, 1 (One) for Manufacturing and Contract Manufacturing, 0 (Zero) 
for all other industries.  
In addition, another industrial control is included to distinguish companies from 
the PCB industry and companies from Plastic rubber industry. This was also coded as 





This effect is also coded as a dummy variable in order to distinguish the 
differences between firms from China and firms from Taiwan. Although they are 
similar and may be considered as the same country, managerial concepts and practices 
may be different. Institutional theory suggests that different countries may have 
different institutional distance as well as psychic distance (Brouthers, 2013b, 
Brouthers et al., 2008). China and Taiwan do have different legal and institutional 
practices. This is likely to have an impact on managerial strategic orientation; therefore, 
it is important to control for possible differences.   
Alliance experience 
Alliance experience is concerned with the extent to which a firm has been 
involved in strategic alliances (Schilke and Goerzen, 2010). It is likely that a firm more 
experienced in strategic alliances may have a better performance. It has the potential 
to influence the relationship between diversity and firm performance. Therefore, it is 
included as a control variable. Following Zollo et al. (2002) and Schilke and Goerzen 
(2010), where alliance experience is measured as the number of strategic alliances 
within the past five years, respondents were asked to indicate the number of strategic 





Alliance function is defined as ‘a position to manage or coordinate all alliance-
related activity in the firm’ (Kale et al., 2002). When a firm has an alliance function, 
this function manages all alliance-related operations. It may influence how the firm 
forms and manages its alliances, and potentially influence alliance strategy. Also, 
scholars have shown that firms with alliance functions achieve better performance 
results (Kale et al., 2002). Thus, alliance function can also influence firm performance. 
Therefore, alliance function has been included as a control variable. I followed Kale 
et al. (2002)’s definition and asked respondents to indicate whether their company has 
a formal, dedicated alliance function or department that is responsible for their firm’s 
alliances. 
Respondent’s age 
Executive’s age may influence strategic decision-making because it is related to 
risk propensity and a manager’s experience (Brouthers et al., 2000, Bantel and Jackson, 
1989, Hambrick and Mason, 1984, Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). Potentially, age may 
affect the moderating effect of alliance strategy because studies have shown that 
executives’ age is related to risk propensity and firm strategic choice (Brouthers et al., 
2000, Hitt and Tyler, 1991). Thus, it is likely to influence the choice of alliance 
strategy. Therefore, I included age as a control variable. I used the age measure of 
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Brouthers et al. (2000), whereby age is a continuous two-digit number reported by 
each respondent. 
Education 
I controlled for three education-related variables: educational level, major in 
business, and elite education, because educational backgrounds may influence 
managerial strategic orientation (Hitt and Tyler, 1991, Brouthers et al., 2000) and 
potentially influence firm alliance strategy. More highly educated managers may 
develop better cognitive abilities which affect how they formulate alliance strategy. 
Different education specialisations tend to have different decision rules developed 
through particular academic training, which may influence the choice of alliance 
strategy. Therefore, major in business is a control variable. In addition, managers with 
an elite education may have more valuable social capital (Cao et al., 2012), which may 
present more opportunities for alliance formation and influence their alliance strategy. 
For educational level, I followed Brouthers et al. (2000) and Bantel and Jackson (1989). 
Five categories were provided ranging from junior high school and below to doctorate 
degree (i.e. junior high school, high school, undergraduate degree, master’s degree and 
doctoral degree). The categories of educational levels have been changed to reflect the 
education systems in China and Taiwan. I asked respondents to select the education 
level attained from the following categories: 1 for Junior High School and Below, 2 
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for High School Education, 3 for Undergraduate degree, 4 for Master’s Degree and 5 
for Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.).  
For major in business, I included 10 categories to reflect the major areas of study 
in China and Taiwan. These categories were chosen from Bantel and Jackson (1989), 
Hitt and Tyler (1991) and Wiersema and Bantel (1992). The respondents were 
requested to choose from the following: 1 for Accounting/Finance, 2 for Sociology 
and Social Studies, 3 for Art and Design, 4 for Science, 5 for Law, 6 for IT and 
Computing, 7 for Business/Management/Marketing, 8 for Engineering, 9 for 
Language, and 10 for Other Fields (that respondents can specify). When coding, this 
variable is coded as a dummy variable, 0 (Zero) for Major in business such as 1 for 
Accounting/ Finance and 7 for Business/Management/Marketing, 1 (One) for all other 
categories. 
For elite education, I asked respondents to specify the education establishments 
they have attended for undergraduate and postgraduate studies in an open-ended 
question. When coding, I referred to the ranking of the respondent’s university in their 
country of education (See appendix A and B for China and Taiwan). If respondents 
are educated overseas, I checked with the university ranking in the corresponding 
countries. If overseas-educated executives graduated from the top 20 education 
institutions in their specific countries, they were considered as graduating from elite 
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universities. The variable was coded as 0 (Zero) if the respondent did not complete a 
formal degree or did not have any degree from an elite university. Coded for 1 (One) 
if the respondent had either an undergraduate degree or postgraduate degree from an 
elite university. 
Tenure 
I controlled for executive’s tenure. Tenure can be categorized into three types: 
positional tenure, firm tenure and industrial tenure. For this study, I used positional 
tenure as a control variable. Positional tenure is defined as the number of years a top 
executive has been employed in his or her current position. Positional tenure may 
influence strategic decision-making, because managers may build and obtain different 
firm knowledge and social capital in different stages of the tenure (Hambrick and 
Fukutomi, 1991). I followed Bantel and Jackson (1989), and asked respondents to 
specify the year he/she joined the current company and his/her current position. Tenure 
is thus a continuous measure. 
Functional background 
Executive functional background may influence managerial strategic choice 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984, Waller et al., 1995), and potentially influence the 
moderating effect of firm alliance strategy, because functional background influences 
how executives develop their knowledge, skills and strategic orientation (Herrmann 
249 
 
and Datta, 2006). Their functional background determines what particular skill set 
they have, which is likely to influence firm alliance strategy. For example, 
Geletkanycz and Black (2001) document that executives in the functional areas of 
finance, marketing, law and general management are most strongly related to strategic 
commitment to the status quo. This implies that these managers may be less willing to 
formulate new strategies and influence the choice of firm alliance strategy. Therefore, 
it has been included as a control variable. I drew on Bantel and Jackson (1989) for the 
opening question ‘The functional area in which you had the most experience?’ and 
followed Bunderson and Sutcliffe (2002) for the categories to select from, because 
their categories are more suited to my sample industry (i.e. sales or marketing, 
manufacturing, finance or accounting, personnel/HR, distribution or warehouse, R&D, 
equipment management, administrative support and general management). Functional 
background was coded as a dummy variable, 0 (Zero) for all other functional 
backgrounds (manufacturing, distribution or warehouse, R&D, equipment 
management, finance accounting, personnel/HR, administrative support and general 
management) and 1 (One) for output functional background (sales and marketing). 
3.3.8. Statistical Analysis 
Firstly, I analysed the data composition of the sample such as key statistics of 
the firm (e.g. firm size, international activities and alliance experience) and response 
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rate. Secondly, I tested for common methods variance, and reliability and validity 
statistically.  
Common methods variance 
As with all self-reported data, there is a potential for common method bias 
resulting from a single-respondent response (Chang et al., 2010, Podsakoff et al., 
2003). In order to prevent common method bias, I followed the suggestions from 
Chang et al. (2010) and Podsakoff et al. (2003). Firstly, through the design of the 
study’s procedure, Chang et al. (2010) suggest using different response formats to 
measure different variables when designing the questionnaire. For the dependent 
variable, a four-item seven-point Likert-type scale is used to measure firm 
performance. For the independent variables, I used a mixture of open-ended questions 
and listed choices for selection. These can prevent respondents choosing the same 
response pattern, which may affect the accuracy of data (Brouthers et al., 2000).  
Secondly, factor analysis was used, in which all items from each of the 
constructs load into an exploratory factor analysis to determine whether the majority 
of the variance between measures can be accounted for by one general factor (Chang 
et al., 2010). The logic behind this test is that if common method variance is a serious 
issue in the data, a single factor will emerge, or one general factor will account for 
most of the covariance in the dependent and independent variables (Podsakoff et al., 
251 
 
2003). If the model does not achieve an acceptable fit, then it should not have a single 
common method factor. This statistical test can increase the reliability of the data for 
interpretation (Brouthers et al., 2003). However, Chang et al. (2010) and Podsakoff et 
al. (2003) suggest that factor analysis is not sufficient to claim common method 
variance is not an issue. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) would be used to 
overcome the drawback of the one-factor test and further test potential common 
method bias among the variables in my survey (Podsakoff et al., 2003).  
Reliability and validity 
Before testing the hypotheses, I used factor analysis to evaluate the validity of 
the measures. The factor analysis can verify if the model fits satisfactory with the data. 
If the results show that all standardised item loadings are significantly greater than 
zero (p ≤0.01), positive and high in magnitude (≥0.65), they present evidence of 
convergent validity (Hair et al., 2010). 
 I also conducted further testing for firm performance, past performance and 
alliance strategy constructs using Cronbach’s alphas (α) and average variances 
extracted (AVE) for these multi-item constructs. The result is reported and presented 
in Table 3-2. If all three values for firm performance, past performance and alliance 
strategy exceed the recommended thresholds, i.e. (α) ≥ 0.7, (CR) ≥ 0.7 and (AVE) ≥ 
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0.5, then firm performance and the alliance strategy measures demonstrate adequate 
convergent validity and reliability (Bagozzi and Yi, 2012, Bagozzi and Yi, 1988). 
Hypotheses Testing 
For hypotheses H1 to H3, hierarchical regression analysis would be used to test 





3.4.1. Validity and Reliability 
Factor analysis and Cronbach’s alpha were used to examine validity and 
reliability on multi-item constructs. Average Variance Extracted (AVE) and 
Cronbach’s alpha are indicative of reliability and validity for each individual construct 
(Hair et al., 2010, Schilke and Goerzen, 2010). The AVE and Cronbach’s alpha for 
firm performance are 0.74 and 0.88, respectively. For past performance, AVE is 0.76 
and Cronbach’s alpha is 0.89. For alliance strategy, AVE is 0.76 and Cronbach’s alpha 
is 0.84 (See Table 3-2). The table shows that all items load onto their predicated 
variable significantly with acceptable AVE and Cronbach alpha.  
Table 3- 2: Factor analysis and Cronbach alpha 
 
Firm Performance
Currently, how well is your company performing relative to your






During the last 3 years, how well did your company perform
relative to your direct competitors in terms of?
1. Sales growth
2. Profitability
3. Return on Investment
4. Building customer loyalty
Alliance Strategy
When we make alliance decisions, each alliance is considered as
an independent entity and there is a specific goal for each alliance
independently from other alliances VERSUS When we make
alliance decisions, we take into account the strategic implications of
all alliances that our company is engaged in, and we consider the
inter-relationships among alliances, including the possible synergies
that can be created through the combination of the alliances
We mainly consider short-term outcome during alliance formation
VERSUS We mainly consider long-term alliance development goal
during alliance formation
We manage risk and uncertainty of individual alliances in an
independent manner VERSUS We manage risk and uncertainty of
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In addition, correlation analysis was conducted. I checked the correlations 
between variables. The majority of inter-item correlations between those variables are 
all relatively low, generally falling between 0.0 and 0.6. There is one exception which 
has correlation values exceeding 0.6 – that is the correlation between performance and 
past performance (r = 0.726). This is not a concern, as the correlation occurs between 
control and dependent variable, which is acceptable. As summarised in Table 3-2, the 
majority of inter-item correlations between those variables are relatively low, at low 
to moderate levels. This is one indication that the variables are unidimensional, and 
that there exists, as a result, good validity which does not threaten discriminant validity. 
Furthermore, I examined the variance inflation factors (VIF) in our regression 
tests (See Table 3-3) and found that all VIF scores were less than 2.5, indicating a low 
probability of collinearity.  
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Table 3- 3: Correlation matrix with means and standard deviations 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Mean 19.358 26.032 627.503 44.676 6.005 0.653 21.332 18.968 0.295 0.642 0.942 0.000 0.000 0.347 0.416 0.000 0.358 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.090 -0.020 0.066
Standard Deviation 3.535 15.748 1931.820 25.842 0.892 0.477 19.972 3.627 0.457 0.481 0.234 1.000 1.000 0.477 0.494 1.000 0.481 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.966 0.903 1.095
1 Firm Performance 1
2 Firm Age .176
* 1
3 Firm Size .036 .337
** 1




5 RD Orientation .428
** .137 -.034 .067 1












8 Past Performance .726
**
.172
* .054 .115 .406
** .120 .022 1




** -.015 .100 1








11 Country effect .041 .140 .019 .231
**
.229
** .103 .105 .069 .012 -.185
* 1






* .045 -.059 .263
** .127 .197
** 1
13 Educational Level -.037 -.086 .031 .079 -.194




14 Major in business .022 -.037 .000 .066 .126 .114 .021 .145
* -.132 -.124 .086 -.085 .095 1
15 Elite Education -.039 -.047 .180
* .137 -.233
** .077 .079 -.032 .110 .251
** -.065 .003 .517
** -.055 1
16 Tenure -.002 .110 .019 -.036 .197




** -.046 -.019 1
17 Output Functional background .136 -.063 -.057 .037 .026 -.193
** -.064 .110 -.097 .122 -.003 -.264
** .071 .078 -.028 -.223
** 1





** .014 .118 -.177
*
.206
** .114 -.010 .076 -.017 -.069 -.034 1
19 Functional Diversity .153
*
.161














20 Governance Diversity .021 -.145
* .071 .193
** -.007 -.028 .093 -.021 .017 .238
** -.065 -.029 .137 -.037 .176
* -.060 .051 .005 -.074 1
21 Alliance Strategy .239








** .049 .046 .078 -.010 .083 .130 .077 .091 -.020 .066 1
22 Partner Diversity X Alliance Strategy .103 -.092 .071 -.075 -.129 -.097 -.105 -.024 .000 .107 -.175
* -.040 .035 -.043 -.005 -.083 .051 -.219
** -.094 -.109 .027 1
23 Functional Diversity X Alliance Strategy .004 .021 -.053 -.142 -.088 -.088 -.065 -.114 .082 .069 -.089 .027 -.051 -.059 -.031 .076 .022 -.100 .095 -.115 .067 .392
** 1
24 Governane Diversity X Alliance Strategy .056 -.026 .047 .116 -.101 -.083 -.188
** .023 -.063 .011 -.005 -.144
*
.200
** -.012 .024 -.073 .055 -.096 -.095 .231
** .129 .073 -.076 1
Correlation Matrix
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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3.4.2. Hypotheses Testing 
I used hierarchical regression to test my hypotheses. The first regression model 
includes the sixteen control variables only – firm age, firm size, international sales, 
RD orientation, alliance function, alliance number, past performance, two industrial 
effects and country effect, followed by managerial characteristics of executive age, 
educational level, major in business, elite education, tenure and output functional 
background. The second model adds alliance diversities as the independent variables 
– partner, functional and governance diversities. The third model includes all the main 
effects. I included controls, independent variables and the moderating variable – 
alliance strategy. Firm performance was the dependent variable in the three models. 
Models 4, 5 and 6 examine the moderating influence of alliance strategy 
between alliance diversities and firm performance. For each of these models, I 
compared the increase in explanatory power to the main effect (Model 3). The results 
are shown in Table 3-3. In each of these models, one interaction term (alliance strategy 
by one of alliance diversities) was entered after the base model. By entering each 
interaction term after the base model singularly allows one to see the changes in R2 
are relevant to a particular interaction. Thus, any significant improvements in R2 are 




Model 1 includes all control variables only and is significant with F-statistic of 
15.386 at a significant level of (p < 0.01). Six control variables were significantly 
related to firm performance. The six control variables were: RD orientation (p < 0.01), 
alliance function (p < 0.1), past performance (p < 0.01), age (p < 0.1), major in 
business (p < 0.05) and output functional background (p < 0.05). The control variables 
in Model 1 accounted for 58.7% (p < 0.01) of variance in firm performance. 
In Model 2, I added the independent variables. The three different diversities as 
independent variables accounted for an increase of significant 2.4% of the variance in 
firm performance in R2 compared to Model 1. F-statistic is significant at (p < 0.01). 
Model 2 shows that the results of control variables are similar to Model 1, except for 
some changes in significant level, RD orientation from (p < 0.01) to (p < 0.05), alliance 
function from (p < 0.1) to (p < 0.05) and major in business from (p < 0.05) to (p < 0.1). 
For the independent variables, Model 2 shows that partner diversity (p < 0.01) and 
functional diversity (p < 0.05) are significant predictors of firm performance. However, 
governance diversity is not statistically significant. 
Model 3 tested the direct main effects of control variables, independent 
variables and the moderator. The result shows a small R2 change of 0.01 compared to 
Model 2, although F-statistics was significant (p < 0.01), R2 change was not 
significant as the moderating variable – alliance strategy was not significant. Model 3 
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shows that the six control variables were significantly related to firm performance as 
in Model 2. The six control variables were: RD orientation (p < 0.05), alliance function 
(p < 0.05), past performance (p < 0.01), age (p < 0.1), major in business (p < 0.1) and 
output functional background (p < 0.05). For the independent variable, partner 
diversity (p < 0.01) and functional diversity (p < 0.05) were significantly related to 
firm performance, but not governance diversity. The moderator of alliance strategy is 
not significant at the base model. 
Model 4 examined the interaction between partner diversity and alliance 
strategy, related to hypothesis (H1), indicating a moderating effect of alliance strategy. 
Model 4 shows that the interaction term was significant at (p < 0.01) and coefficient 
was positive at 0.485. The R2 change was 0.015, which is significant, and F-statistic 
was significant at (p < 0.01). The results of the control variables are similar to Model 
3 except for RD orientation (p < 0.01), with an increase in significance level. For 
independent variables, all three diversities were significantly related to firm 
performance. Compared to Model 3, partner diversity was at significant level of (p < 
0.05) instead of (p < 0.01), functional diversity was at significant level of (p < 0.1) 
instead of (p < 0.05), and governance diversity becomes significant at (p < 0.1). 
In Model 5, I added the interaction term of functional diversity and alliance 
strategy. The interaction term was not significant. The R2 change was 0.005, which is 
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not significant. F-statistics was significant (p < 0.01). The results of control variables 
were the same as Model 3. The results of independent variables were also similar to 
model 3 except for small p value changes for partner diversity from (p < 0.01) to (p < 
0.05), and functional diversity from (p < 0.05) to (p < 0.1). Governance diversity was 
not significant. 
In Model 6, I added the interaction term of governance diversity and alliance 
strategy. The interactions term was not significant. R2 change was 0.002, which is not 
significant. F-statistic was statistically significant (p < 0.01). The control variables and 
independent variables had similar results to Model 3 except for age, which had an 
increase in significance level from (p < 0.1) to (p < 0.05).  
In order to demonstrate whether the nature of significant hypotheses was as 
specified, a graphical presentation of the interaction term is shown in Figure 3-1. 
Figure 3-1 illustrates that the moderator of alliance strategy impacts on the relationship 
between partner diversity and firm performance. More specifically, when partner 
diversity increases, managers with orientations toward a portfolio strategy result in 
high performance. In contrast, managers with orientations toward a standalone 
strategy suffer from low performance; thus, as hypothesis H1 suggested, alliance 
strategy moderates the relationship between partner diversity and firm performance. 




Figure 3 - 1: Interaction effect of alliance strategy between partner diversity and firm 
performance 
 
3.4.3.  Robustness Test 
 In my sample, 65% of firms had a dedicated alliance function in place. Previous 
studies suggest that firms investing in a dedicated alliance function can capture prior 
alliance knowledge and experiences, re-combine with existing know-how and re-use 
for future alliances. As a result, the dedicated alliance function can enhance a firm’s 
alliance capability and success (Kale et al., 2002, Kale and Singh, 2009, Schreiner et 
al., 2009, Kale and Singh, 2007). If firms have a dedicated alliance function, they may 
have more experiences in their alliance operations, and this is likely to impact on firm 
performance. Kale and Singh (2009) highlight that firms with a dedicated alliance 
function which manages firms’ alliance operations and coordinates their alliance 
activities enjoy a high alliance success rate of 70% compared to firms without a 
dedicated function (with a success rate of 40%). However, my data did not show if 
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firms taking a portfolio strategy are likely to have a dedicated alliance function.  
If a dedicated function is so beneficial to firms’ alliance activities, can this 
function explain the conflicting results between alliance diversities and firm 
performance relationships? The question is: Can firms only have alliance function 
without alliance strategy? Would alliance function moderate between alliance 
diversities and firm performance? To address these questions, I conducted further 
regression analysis to see if alliance function can substitute for alliance strategy. The 
correlation between alliance strategy and alliance function is 0.256 in my data. These 
are not closely related. Initially, alliance function was a control variable, and alliance 
strategy was the moderating variable in the original regression analysis. I conducted 
this robustness test by substituting alliance function for alliance strategy to see if there 
is any impact on the relationships between alliance diversities and firm performance. 
The first regression model includes the 16 control variables – firm age, firm size, 
international sales, RD orientation, alliance number, past performance, two industrial 
effects, country effect and managerial characteristics of age, educational level, major 
in business, elite education, tenure, output functional background and alliance strategy. 
The second model adds alliance diversities as the independent variables – partner, 
functional and governance diversities. The third model includes all the main effects. I 
included controls, independent variables, and alliance function as the moderating 
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variable instead of alliance strategy. Firm performance was the dependent variable in 
the three models. 
Models 4, 5 and 6 examine the moderating influence of alliance strategy 
between alliance diversities and firm performance. For each of these models, I 
compared the increase in explanatory power to the main effect (Model 3). The results 
of each model are shown in Table 3-5. 
Model 1 includes all control variables only and is significant, with F-statistic of 
15.036 at a significant level of (p < 0.01). Five control variables were significantly 
related to firm performance. There were slight changes in significance levels 
compared to the original regression results in Table 3-4. RD orientation (p < 0.01) and 
past performance (p < 0.01) were the same. Age was at significant level of (p < 0.05) 
instead of (p < 0.1), major in business (p < 0.1) instead of (p < 0.05), and output 
functional background (p < 0.1) instead of (p < 0.05). Alliance strategy was not 
significant. The control variables in Model 1 accounted for 58.2% (p < 0.01) of 
variance in firm performance and the original regression R2 was 58.7% (p< 0.01).  
In Model 2, I added the independent variables. The three different diversities as 
independent variables accounted for an increase of significant 2% of the variance in 
firm performance in R2 compared to Model 1. F-statistic was significant at (p < 0.01). 
Model 2 shows that the results of control variables were similar to Model 1, except for 
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some changes in significant level of RD orientation from (p < 0.01) to (p < 0.05), and 
output functional background from (p < 0.1) to (p < 0.05). Major in business is no 
longer significant. For the independent variables, Model 2 shows that partner diversity 
(p < 0.05) and functional diversity (p < 0.05) were significant predictors of firm 
performance. In the original regression analysis, Model 2 shows that partner diversity 
was significant at (p < 0.01), functional diversity was significant at (p < 0.05) and 
governance diversity was not statistically significant. 
Model 3 tested the direct main effects of control variables, independent 
variables and the moderator – alliance function. The results show a small R2 change 
of 0.011 compared to Model 2. F-statistic was significant (p < 0.01). Model 3 shows 
that the five control variables were similar to Model 2, but compared to Model 2 there 
are some changes in the statistical significance level. The five control variables show 
that RD orientation and past performance were the same at (p < 0.05) and (p < 0.01) 
respectively. Age was significant at (p < 0.1) instead of (p < 0.05), major in business 
became significant at (p < 0.1), and output functional background was the same at (p 
< 0.05). For the independent variable, partner diversity was significant at (p < 0.01) 
instead of (p < 0.05), functional diversity was the same at (p < 0.05), and governance 
diversity was not significant – the same as Model 2. The moderating variable – alliance 
function – was significant at (p < 0.05). 
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The base model has a similarly significant control and independent variables 
compared to the original base model in Table 3-4, except for the moderating variable 
– alliance function – which was significant at (p < 0.05), but the moderating variable 
of alliance strategy was not significant in the original model in Table 3-4. 
Model 4 examined the interaction of partner diversity and alliance function. 
Model 4 shows that the interaction term was not significant. F-statistic was significant 
at (p < 0.01). The results of the control variables were the same as Model 3. For 
independent variables, partner diversity was significant at (p < 0.05) instead of (p < 
0.01), functional diversity was the same at (p < 0.05), and governance diversity was 
not significant – the same as Model 3. The moderating variable – alliance function – 
was significant at (p < 0.05). 
In Model 5, I added the interaction term of functional diversity and alliance 
function. The interaction term was not significant. The R2 change was 0.002, which 
was not significant. F-statistic was significant (p < 0.01). The results of the control 
variables were the same as Model 3. The results of independent variables show only 
partner diversity was significant at (p < 0.01). Both functional diversity and 
governance diversity were not significant. The moderating variable – alliance function 
– was significant at (p < 0.05). 
In Model 6, I added the interaction term of governance diversity and alliance 
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function. The interaction term was not significant. F-statistic was statistically 
significant (p < 0.01). The control variables and independent variables had similar 
results to Model 3. The moderating variable – alliance function – was significant at (p 
< 0.05).  
The results of original regression analysis and robustness test are summarised 
and shown in Table 3-6. 
 This robustness test shows that alliance function cannot substitute for alliance 
strategy. Alliance function is important in firms’ alliance activities and is related to 
firm performance, but it does not impact on the relationships between alliance 
diversities and firm performance. Alliance strategy is important for managing alliance 
diversities. Particularly, when partner diversity changes, executives with different 
alliance strategies – either standalone or portfolio – will result in different performance 
outcomes. When partner diversity increases, the adoption of a portfolio strategy by 
executives results in high performance, and executives adopting standalone strategy 
suffer from low performance. Therefore, as Hypothesis 1 suggested, alliance strategy 
moderates the relationship between partner diversity and firm performance, but 












Control Variables B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig
Firm age 0.011 0.013 0.396 0.007 0.013 0.591 0.006 0.013 0.625 0.011 0.013 0.400 0.006 0.013 0.650 0.005 0.013 0.673
Firm size 0.000 0.000 0.831 0.000 0.000 0.850 0.000 0.000 0.786 0.000 0.000 0.968 0.000 0.000 0.713 0.000 0.000 0.893
International sales -0.006 0.008 0.478 -0.007 0.008 0.340 -0.008 0.008 0.311 -0.008 0.008 0.300 -0.007 0.008 0.345 -0.009 0.008 0.271
RD orientation 0.646 *** 0.239 0.008 0.592 ** 0.240 0.014 0.583 ** 0.240 0.016 0.613 *** 0.237 0.010 0.616 ** 0.241 0.011 0.603 ** 0.241 0.013
Alliance Function 0.719 * 0.414 0.084 0.980 ** 0.419 0.021 0.920 ** 0.429 0.033 0.952 ** 0.422 0.025 0.969 ** 0.429 0.025 0.931 ** 0.429 0.031
Alliance Number -0.014 0.011 0.200 -0.014 0.011 0.197 -0.013 0.011 0.222 -0.014 0.011 0.208 -0.014 0.011 0.204 -0.010 0.011 0.380
Past performance 0.643 *** 0.055 0.000 0.639 *** 0.054 0.000 0.632 *** 0.055 0.000 0.631 *** 0.054 0.000 0.641 *** 0.055 0.000 0.633 *** 0.055 0.000
Industry effect 1 -0.122 0.505 0.809 -0.080 0.509 0.875 -0.158 0.523 0.763 -0.086 0.515 0.868 -0.194 0.522 0.710 -0.181 0.524 0.730
Industry effect 2 -0.628 0.505 0.216 -0.726 0.544 0.184 -0.760 0.547 0.167 -0.838 0.539 0.122 -0.786 0.545 0.151 -0.655 0.557 0.242
Country effect -0.910 0.804 0.260 -0.716 0.796 0.370 -0.730 0.798 0.361 -0.500 0.789 0.528 -0.638 0.797 0.424 -0.766 0.799 0.339
Age 0.403 * 0.229 0.080 0.424 * 0.225 0.062 0.438 * 0.227 0.055 0.393 * 0.224 0.080 0.435 * 0.226 0.056 0.452 ** 0.227 0.048
Level of education -0.037 0.222 0.867 -0.092 0.220 0.676 -0.108 0.222 0.626 -0.110 0.218 0.614 -0.093 0.221 0.677 -0.160 0.228 0.483
Major in business -0.788 ** 0.382 0.041 -0.667 * 0.377 0.079 -0.653 * 0.378 0.086 -0.635 * 0.372 0.090 -0.669 * 0.377 0.078 -0.634 * 0.379 0.096
Elite education 0.322 0.443 0.469 0.319 0.435 0.465 0.324 0.436 0.459 0.374 0.429 0.384 0.327 0.434 0.452 0.382 0.440 0.387
Tenure -0.277 0.219 0.207 -0.288 0.215 0.183 -0.310 0.218 0.157 -0.247 0.216 0.254 -0.327 0.218 0.135 -0.316 0.218 0.149
Output Functional background 0.809 ** 0.401 0.045 0.986 ** 0.397 0.014 0.963 ** 0.399 0.017 0.937 ** 0.392 0.018 0.920 ** 0.398 0.022 0.959 ** 0.399 0.017
Independent variables
Partner Diversity -0.532 *** 0.202 0.009 -0.542 *** 0.203 0.008 -0.443 ** 0.203 0.031 -0.506 ** 0.204 0.014 -0.536 *** 0.203 0.009
Functional Diversity 0.416 ** 0.208 0.047 0.426 ** 0.209 0.043 0.398 * 0.205 0.054 0.364 * 0.212 0.087 0.437 ** 0.209 0.038
Governance Diversity 0.265 0.189 0.163 0.260 0.190 0.172 0.339 * 0.189 0.075 0.288 0.190 0.131 0.206 0.197 0.297
Moderator
Alliance Strategy 0.134 0.202 0.507 0.084 0.199 0.674 0.098 0.202 0.627 0.106 0.203 0.602
Interactions
Partner Diversity X Alliance Strategy 0.485 *** 0.185 0.009
Functional Diversity X Alliance Strategy 0.301 0.199 0.132
Governance Diversity X Alliance strategy 0.176 0.177 0.322








* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 (Main Effect) Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Firm Performance Firm Performance Firm Performance Firm Performance Firm Performance Firm Performance
3.529 0.443 6.885 2.290 0.987
15.386*** 14.082*** 13.356*** 13.491*** 12.926*** 12.766***
0.549 0.568 0.567 0.581 0.570 0.567
0.587 0.611 0.612 0.628 0.618 0.615
1.117-1.977 1.135-2.394 1.139-2.415 1.139-2.422 1.135-2.417 1.152-2.476
0.024 0.001 0.015 0.005 0.002
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 Table 3- 5: Regression results for substituting alliance strategy for alliance function  
Dependent Variable
Control Variables B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig
Firm age .011 .013 .388 .008 .013 .560 .006 .013 .625 .006 .013 .652 .007 .013 .574 .006 .013 .623
Firm size .000 .000 .903 .000 .000 .937 .000 .000 .786 .000 .000 .792 .000 .000 .761 .000 .000 .799
International sales -.004 .008 .582 -.005 .008 .486 -.008 .008 .311 -.008 .008 .312 -.008 .008 .320 -.008 .008 .320
RD orientation .639 *** .241 .009 .573 ** .243 .020 .583 ** .240 .016 .581 ** .241 .017 .584 ** .241 .016 .578 ** .241 .018
Alliance Number -.009 .011 .378 -.008 .011 .434 -.013 .011 .222 -.013 .011 .228 -.015 .011 .179 -.014 .011 .216
Past performance .641 *** .056 .000 .638 *** .056 .000 .632 *** .055 .000 .633 *** .055 .000 .633 *** .055 .000 .633 *** .055 .000
Industry effect 1 -.059 .516 .909 -.059 .527 .912 -.158 .523 .763 -.170 .530 .748 -.142 .524 .786 -.136 .528 .797
Industry effect 2 -.663 .512 .197 -.689 .552 .213 -.760 .547 .167 -.752 .551 .174 -.787 .548 .153 -.775 .550 .161
Country effect -.912 .810 .262 -.779 .806 .335 -.730 .798 .361 -.733 .800 .361 -.751 .798 .348 -.774 .810 .341
Age .062 ** .031 .048 .066 ** .031 .034 .059 * .031 .055 .059 * .031 .055 .060 * .031 .051 .059 * .031 .057
Level of education -.050 .347 .885 -.146 .346 .673 -.167 .343 .626 -.172 .345 .619 -.143 .344 .677 -.173 .344 .616
Major in business -.687 * .381 .073 -.538 .378 .157 -.653 * .378 .086 -.652 * .379 .087 -.644 * .378 .091 -.663 * .380 .083
Elite education .325 .447 .467 .332 .441 .452 .324 .436 .459 .322 .437 .462 .348 .437 .427 .309 .439 .483
Tenure -.328 .221 .141 -.351 .220 .112 -.310 .218 .157 -.312 .219 .156 -.333 .219 .131 -.304 .220 .169
Output Functional background .663 * .397 .097 .787 ** .394 .048 .963 ** .399 .017 .964 ** .400 .017 .911 ** .403 .025 .959 ** .400 .018
Alliance Strategy .051 .062 .414 .069 .061 .262 .041 .062 .507 .042 .062 .505 .045 .062 .473 .042 .062 .500
Independent variables
Partner Diversity -2.566 ** 1.143 .026 -3.085 *** 1.156 .008 -2.969 ** 1.368 .031 -3.049 *** 1.157 .009 -3.043 *** 1.165 .010
Functional Diversity 2.082 ** 1.004 .040 2.026 ** .993 .043 2.059 ** 1.018 .045 1.078 1.402 .443 2.003 ** .998 .046
Governance Diversity 1.682 1.457 .250 1.988 1.449 .172 1.970 1.458 .178 1.942 1.450 .182 1.519 1.985 .445
Moderator
Alliance Function .920 ** .429 .033 .921 ** .430 .034 .933 ** .429 .031 .918 ** .430 .034
Interactions
Partner Diversity X Alliance Function -.063 .393 .874
Functional Diversity X Alliance Function .347 .362 .339
Governance Diversity X Alliance Function .124 .357 .729








* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Model 6
Firm Performance Firm Performance Firm Performance Firm Performance Firm Performance Firm Performance
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 (Main Effect) Model 4 Model 5
0.120
15.036*** 13.530*** 13.356*** 12.648*** 12.758*** 12.659***
2.884 4.599 0.025 0.919
0.564
0.582 0.602 0.612 0.613 0.615 0.613
0.543 0.557 0.567 0.564 0.566
1.144-2.431
0.020 0.011 0.000 0.002 0.000
1.094-2.009 1.116-2.406 1.139-2.415 1.139-2.433 1.139-2.460
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Table 3- 6:Results comparison between original test and robustness test 
 
F-statistics (sig) 15.386** 14.082*** 13.356*** 13.491*** 12.926*** 12.766*** 15.036*** 13.530*** 13.356*** 12.648*** 12.758*** 12.659***
Adjusted R Square 0.549 0.568 0.567 0.581 0.570 0.567 0.543 0.557 0.567 0.564 0.566 0.564
Hypotheses Mode 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model5 Model 6
H1_Partner diversity X Alliance strategy p < 0.01
H2_Functional diversity X Alliance strategy 0.132
H3_Governance diversity X Alliance strategy 0.322
H1_Partner diversity X Alliance function 0.874
H2_Functional diversity X Alliance function 0.339
H3_Governance diversity X Alliance function 0.729
Alliance Strategy 0.507 0.674 0.627 0.602
Alliance Function p < 0.05 p < 0.05 p < 0.05 p < 0.05
RD Orientation p < 0.01 p < 0.05 p < 0.05 p < 0.05 p < 0.05 p < 0.05 p < 0.01 p < 0.05 p < 0.05 p < 0.05 p < 0.05 p < 0.05
Alliance function/Alliance Strategy p < 0.05 p < 0.05 p < 0.05 p < 0.05 p < 0.05 p < 0.05
Past performance p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01
Age p < 0.1 p < 0.1 p < 0.1 p < 0.1 p < 0.1 p < 0.05 p < 0.05 p < 0.05 p < 0.05 p < 0.1 p < 0.1 p < 0.1
Major in busines p < 0.05 p < 0.1 p < 0.1 p < 0.1 p < 0.1 p < 0.1 p < 0.1 p < 0.1 p < 0.1 p < 0.1 p < 0.1
Output functional background p < 0.05 p < 0.05 p < 0.05 p < 0.05 p < 0.05 p < 0.05 p < 0.1 p < 0.05 p < 0.05 p < 0.05 p < 0.05 p < 0.05
Partner p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.05 p < 0.05 p < 0.01 p < 0.05 p < 0.01 p < 0.05 p < 0.01 p < 0.01
Functional p < 0.05 p < 0.05 p < 0.05 p < 0.05 p < 0.05 p < 0.05 p < 0.05 p < 0.05 0.443 p < 0.05
Governance 0.163 0.172 0.075* 0.131 0.297 0.250 0.172 0.178 0.182 0.445
Significant Independent Variables
Original Test Robustness Test






Although many studies have explored the relationship between diversity and 
firm performance such as (Goerzen, 2007, Jiang et al., 2010), an area that has not been 
fully analysed in the literature is the moderating effect of alliance strategy on the 
relationship between alliance diversity and firm performance. Scholars have noted that 
strategic alliances are an important source of firms’ resources (Barney, 1991) in which 
access and integration are crucial for the success of firm outcomes. Alliance diversity 
reflects firm’s accessibility to needed resources and alliance strategy facilitates the re-
configuration and integration of these resources.  
This study provides initial evidence that alliance strategy is important for 
partner diversity and firm performance. I found empirical evidence to support my 
analysis that the moderating influence of alliance strategy had a significant impact on 
partner diversity, and, as a result, on firm performance. Despite the notion of partner 
diversity providing firms with more opportunities and resources which enable to 
achieve better firm performance (Jiang et al., 2010). I found that differences in 
strategic orientation of alliance strategy influenced how opportunities and resources 
were managed and re-combined, and hence it can result in different performance 
outcomes. More specifically, The highly statistical significant moderating effect of 
alliance strategy between partner diversity and firm performance indicates that 
alliance strategy is important for alliance operations, and the potential benefits of 
diverse partners require alliance strategy to integrate resources. The implications are 
clear: firms forming alliances that take a standalone approach to managing their 
partner diversity tend to have an adverse effect on firm performance compared to firms 
taking a portfolio alliance strategy. 
While prior literature has suggested that firms’ operating alliances with either a 
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focused international alliance network or a diverse network tend to have better 
performance than those firms that are in between (Goerzen, 2007), other scholars note 
that high level of diversity in firms’ alliances can negatively impact firm performance 
(Faems et al., 2010, Goerzen, 2007, Koka and Prescott, 2008, Vasudeva and Anand, 
2011). My finding provides a different insight to the previous research. Taking a 
strategic perspective, I find that alliance strategic orientation can help to better 
understand the relationship between diversity and firm performance. 
In contrast, in the two other hypotheses (H2) and (H3), I did not find significant 
results. For Hypothesis 2 (H2), I hypothesised that alliance strategy moderates the 
relationship between functional diversity and firm performance. The result did not 
show such effect statistically. There may be a few reasons why alliance strategy is not 
a significant moderating influence. First, firms in the PCB and plastic rubber industries 
appear to be more concerned about who their alliances partners are; whether the 
collaborations are the same functions or cross functions becomes a secondary 
consideration. When the decision to form strategic alliances has been made, it does 
not matter with which functions they form alliances. Firms believe that all 
different/relevant functions shall be involved. When I asked the diversity questions in 
the survey, they were hesitant to report the ratio of alliances in each function. Second, 
senior executives may know in the big picture what each alliance is, but tend to have 
less idea about what functions are involved. Therefore, these two reasons may give 
such a result which is different from my expectations. 
For Hypothesis 3 (H3), I hypothesised that alliance strategy moderates the 
relationship between governance diversity and firm performance. In my survey data, 
76.8% of the firms had a zero score on the governance diversity index, and this may 
distort the result, as firms in the two industries tend to use non-equity alliances. They 
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tend to have alliances with suppliers, customers and manufacturer partners. These 
partners often have a long-established relationship; normally they do not need to have 
equity alliances to work together. Also, some respondents said this was considered 
confidential information, and they tended not give the true answers. 
Despite the problem with Hypotheses H2 and H3, in this study, I make two 
important contributions to the strategic management studies as well as alliance 
research. The first and unique contribution to the literature is that alliance strategic 
orientation does influence the relationship between partner diversity and firm 
performance. Building on strategic perspective, I developed and tested theories to 
explain how strategic orientation in alliance strategy can achieve better firm 
performance while they form their alliances. I found that firms with a high level of 
partner diversity benefit from taking a portfolio strategy because these firms can obtain 
and integrate resources effectively, resulting in better firm performance. Firms with a 
high level of partner diversity would not gain benefits from taking a standalone 
strategy because they tend to lack the ability to integrate synergies, and, as a result, 
they tend to have sub-optimal firm performance. 
The second contribution is that my empirical results help to clarify the 
conflicting results of alliance diversity on firm performance. I confirm with previous 
studies that alliance diversities are related to firm performance, namely – partner 
diversity, functional diversity and governance diversity (Brouthers et al., 2009, 
Brouthers et al., 2014, De Leeuw et al., 2014, Duysters et al., 2012, Hagedoorn and 
Schakenraad, 1994, Jiang et al., 2010). In theory, my study provides an important 
insight that partner diversity as direct effect has a negative coefficient from the 
regression analysis. This implies that high diversity may not be a good thing but that 




 Although this study provides valuable insights about alliance diversity, 
alliance strategy and firm performance, it suffers from a number of limitations. First, 
I tested my theories based on two industries from Taiwan and China. I do not know if 
my finding is generalizable to firms in other industries, or in other countries – 
especially western countries such as the US and UK. In addition, the sample firms had 
quite strong experiences on strategic alliances, and so my result may not be 
generalizable to firms with less strategic alliance experiences. 
Second, my sample contains both large and small firms. Future studies may 
consider to include only large firms or just SMEs to see if they may behave differently 
to determine if my findings are generalizable to these different sizes of firms. 
Third, although common methods variance indicates this is not a problem with 
my study, future studies could improve on the data collection techniques I used. In my 
study, only perceptual measures of alliance strategy, past performance and firm 
performance were used. Perceptual measures may be biased and reflect a desired state 
rather than an actual scenario (Brouthers et al., 2003). Future research efforts may 
consider to evaluate secondary data on the collections of firm alliances to validate firm 
alliance strategy. For past performance and firm performance measures, financial data 
from secondary sources can be used for triangulation. 
Fourth, we collected the data on the tendency of choosing alliance strategy after 
the choice was made. The responses may be an adjusted perception (Brouthers et al., 
2003, Brouthers et al., 2000). Future research may consider a longitudinal study, and, 
using improved measures, could clarify how alliance strategic orientation was formed, 
and also the process to formulate its alliance strategy. 
Fifth, response bias may be present. One cultural difference is that Chinese 
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executives – or the Chinese in general – tend to avoid extreme response options, or 
exaggerate in their answers. Krosnick (1999) suggests that avoiding extreme answers 
in a survey may present a response bias. Future research may consider to design the 
questionnaire differently to overcome this issue. 
Finally, future research may consider extending the range and measure of the 
managerial characteristics in the control variables. This may help to identify other 
personal factors that have an influence on the tendency of alliance strategy. Additional 
factors may include socio-economic background such as income, cultural/ethnicity 
and religion, because these factors may influence one’s attitudes, beliefs and 
behaviour. 
Implications 
My study confirms that alliance strategy is important for alliance operations, 
especially for firms with a high number of different partners. This is a key implication 
for senior executives who are in charge of alliance operations. Executives need to 
understand their own strategic orientations and their firm’s alliance composition in 
order to adopt or adjust for a suitable alliance strategy. Hence, firms can benefit from 
the choice of alliance strategies to manage firms’ alliance diversities and result in 
better firm performance.  
Executives may understand that alliance diversities and firm performance are 
related, but they may not understand well that different diversities can impact 
differently on firm performance. Executives need to be aware that not all types of 
diversities are good. Partner and functional diversities are strongly related to firm 
performance but not governance diversity. If firms have too many different types of 
alliance governance structures, such as equity sharing, arm’s length deals and joint 
ventures, it would create high transaction costs. It is imperative that executives have a 
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clear understanding of firms’ alliance diversities so that this can enhance firm 
performance. 
Most importantly, my study suggests that the choice of an alliance strategy plays 
a significant role for firms’ alliance operations, especially for firms with a high partner 
diversity. Firms with a high partner diversity, managers need take a more holistic view 
about their alliance operation. Taking a portfolio strategy is likely to result in high 
performance. However, taking a standalone strategy may not gain benefit from a high 
partner diversity. Hence, firms have diverse partners, executives need to adjust their 
own strategic orientation more toward a portfolio strategy. Firms can enjoy the greater 
benefits from diverse partners in their alliances and result in better firm performance. 
Conclusion  
In sum, my study makes several important contributions. By exploring the 
impact of alliance strategy between alliance diversity and firm performance, I add 
valuable insights about how alliance strategy can be adopted by firms to mitigate the 
drawbacks of high alliance diversity and improve firm performance. I add to existing 
knowledge by investigating the moderating effect between alliance diversity and firm 
performance, noting that alliance strategy can lead to enhanced firm performance for 
firms with a high partner diversity. Thus, I advance strategic and alliance research by 
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IV. DO ALLIANCE STRATEGY AND ALLIANCE CAPABILITY 
CONTRIBUTE TO FIRM PERFORMANCE?  
4.1. Introduction 
Strategic alliances have become an important part of firms’ competitive and 
growth strategies, and are an important source of competitive advantage (Ireland et al., 
2002, Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007). Strategic alliance is defined as voluntary 
corporate arrangements between firms that involve the sharing of knowledge, 
resources and capabilities, with the intent of developing processes, products or 
services (Gulati, 1998). Firms expand their number of alliances in order to meet their 
changing strategic needs (Hoffmann, 2007, Parise and Casher, 2003). Studies show 
that strategic alliances allow firms to access critical resources and capabilities in order 
to achieve corporate objectives such as entering into new markets, complementary 
assets for new product development as well as gaining legitimacy (Brouthers et al., 
2014, Pisano, 1990, Shan et al., 1994, Baum et al., 2000). 
Scholars have shown that alliance performance is very different among firms 
(Anand and Khanna, 2000, Kale et al., 2002, Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007). Some 
firms seem to be very effective in alliance operations and are able to use alliances to 
achieve a better performance, while others seem to suffer from high failure rates that 
can be detrimental to firm performance (Greve et al., 2010, Park and Ungson, 2001). 
Superior performance depends on firm strategy and its resource reconfiguration (Miles 
and Snow, 1984). 
In this paper, I suggest that firm performance is contingent on the type of 
alliance strategy adopted. The way managers organise alliances can differ depending 
on whether they perceive each alliance independently or all alliances together. A 
standalone alliance strategy is when firms treat each strategic alliance as a standalone 
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occurrence. Each alliance has a specific objective which firms intend to achieve from 
the collaboration. For example, firms form marketing alliances with the objective of 
entering into a new market; forming such alliances enables firms to overcome resource 
deficiencies as they can utilise a partner’s marketing knowledge and marketing 
channel resources. The pooling of such marketing resources enables firms to build 
competitive advantage (Brouthers et al., 2014, Ireland et al., 2002, Nakos and 
Brouthers, 2008, Nakos et al., 2014, Rothaermel, 2001a, Rothaermel, 2001b). 
Alternatively, firms can take into account the strategic implications across the 
entire set of alliances in their alliance portfolio (Hoffmann, 2005, Hoffmann, 2007, 
Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009). This can be referred to as a portfolio alliance strategy. 
Scholars have recommended that firms should consider all alliances together to gain 
synergistic effects and potentially better performance (Cui and O'Connor, 2012, De 
Leeuw et al., 2014, Duysters et al., 2012, Hoffmann, 2005, Hoffmann, 2007, Jiang et 
al., 2010, Parise and Casher, 2003, Sarkar et al., 2009, Vassolo et al., 2004). However, 
these scholars do not compare the performance outcomes of companies that adopt 
portfolio strategy with companies that adopt standalone strategy. To date, it is unclear 
whether different alliance strategies will affect firm performance differently. 
How well a firm implements its strategy depends on its resources and 
capabilities (Miles and Snow, 1984). The resource-based view suggests that firm 
performance is contingent on firm resources (Barney, 1991, Hitt et al., 2000, Ray et 
al., 2004). Firm resources can be separated into resources and capabilities. Resources 
can be traded and may not be specific to a firm. Capabilities are embedded and are 
therefore not easily transferred; they are firm-specific. A firm’s capabilities are the 
special type of firm resources that are required to deploy other firm resources through 
organisational processes to create a desired outcome (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993, 
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Makadok, 2001). A firm’s capabilities are unique, resource-based advantages that 
meet the valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable (VRIN) criteria, and bring 
advantages over competitors, leading to superior performance (Barney, 1991).  
Firms’ abilities to create and deploy alliance resources and assets may vary. 
They may create and capture value differently and contribute to firm performance 
differently (Anand and Khanna, 2000, Gulati, 1998, Kale et al., 2002). Alliances are 
viewed as a critical strategic option to gain access to partners’ resources (Das and Teng, 
2000, Park et al., 2004). Alliance capabilities enable firms to better utilise alliance 
opportunities and resources and manage their alliances better. Scholars have 
emphasised the importance of alliance capabilities for explaining performance 
differences among firms (Anand and Khanna, 2000). Particularly, scholars have 
suggested that alliance capabilities influence alliance success; this appears to have a 
deterministic effect on firm performance (Anand and Khanna, 2000, Heimeriks and 
Duysters, 2007, Kale et al., 2002, Kale and Singh, 2009, Lavie et al., 2012, Sampson, 
2005, Sarkar et al., 2009, Schilke and Goerzen, 2010, Schreiner et al., 2009, 
Swaminathan and Moorman, 2009, Zollo et al., 2002). In general, a firm’s alliance 
strategies can define that firm’s intentions regarding its alliance operations and 
objectives. A firm’s alliance capabilities determine the effectiveness of the strategies. 
Scholars have studied alliance capabilities for individual alliances (Doz, 1996, 
Dyer and Singh, 1998) and for an entire portfolio of alliances (Heimeriks and Duysters, 
2007, Hoffmann, 2007, Sarkar et al., 2009). Kale and Singh (2009), in their Academy 
of Management Perspective article, distinguish the capabilities necessary to manage 
alliances as a portfolio from the capabilities to manage single alliances. This 
distinction is confirmed in an alliance capabilities review article by Wang and 
Rajagopalan (2015). Alliance capabilities relating to individual or single alliances are 
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defined as the ability to search, negotiate, manage and terminate an individual alliance 
(Kale and Singh, 2009, Schreiner et al., 2009, Simonin, 1997, Wang and Rajagopalan, 
2015). Alliance capabilities related to a firm’s entire set of alliances are defined as the 
ability to initiate and manage a portfolio of alliances. It focuses on a firm’s ability to 
develop and coordinate all alliances that the firm has (Hoffmann, 2007, Sarkar et al., 
2009, Wang and Rajagopalan, 2015).  
Some scholars have demonstrated that individual or single alliance capabilities 
positively influence firm or alliance performance (Anand and Khanna, 2000, Kale et 
al., 2002, Kale and Singh, 2009, Sampson, 2005, Schreiner et al., 2009, Swaminathan 
and Moorman, 2009, Zollo et al., 2002), while other studies that used partner-specific 
experience as a proxy for alliance capability produced mixed results on performance 
outcomes (Goerzen, 2007, Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005, Zollo et al., 2002). 
Interestingly, two recent studies have suggested that smaller entrepreneurial firms may 
not gain positive performance outcomes (Diestre and Rajagopalan, 2012, Katila et al., 
2008).  
Some scholars have found portfolio alliance capabilities positively affect firm 
alliance and portfolio performance (Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007, Lavie et al., 2012, 
Sarkar et al., 2009, Schilke and Goerzen, 2010), but other studies have conceptualised 
portfolio alliance capabilities, as the number of alliances in a firm’s portfolio seems to 
have different results, such as a positive influence on entering new alliances and an 
insignificant impact on new product development (Gulati, 1999a, Rothaermel and 
Deeds, 2006).  
Despite the proliferation of studies on alliances and alliance capabilities, there 
are no studies that link alliance strategy with alliance capability to examine firm 
performance. The effect of alliance strategy on firm performance and its joint effect 
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with alliance capabilities on firm performance are not clear from the current literature. 
I argue that the success of managing a firm’s alliances not only relates to a firm’s 
alliance strategy but also to its alliance capabilities. Without alliance capabilities, 
firms may not be able to fully extract the benefits from their alliances and may be 
unable to manage their alliance operations well; this will have an impact on firm 
performance.  
 More specifically, I propose that individual-alliance capabilities and portfolio-
alliance capabilities mediate the relationship between a firm’s alliance strategy (i.e. 
standalone or portfolio) and its performance. A mediator is defined as a variable that 
explains the relationship between a predictor and an outcome (Baron and Kenny, 1986, 
Frazier et al., 2004). It is the mechanism through which a predictor influences an 
outcome variable (Baron and Kenny, 1986). Individual-alliance and portfolio-alliance 
capabilities have distinctive importance in terms of managing a firm’s alliances. Thus, 
they are likely to have an impact on performance.  
If a firm uses a standalone alliance strategy, it may benefit from individual-
alliance capabilities. Individual-alliance capabilities relate to a firm’s ability to search, 
negotiate, manage and terminate an alliance. Individual alliances develop at different 
stages of a firm’s alliance life cycle, i.e. formation, design and post-formation (Doz, 
1996, Gulati, 1998). Firms possessing these capabilities are able to overcome issues 
that may arise at each stage of the life cycle. For example, firms need to search for 
suitable partners and negotiate governance structures and contract terms in order to 
ensure the success of an alliance. (Brouthers et al., 1995, Dyer and Singh, 1998, Gulati 
and Singh, 1998, Hitt et al., 2000, Reuer and Arino, 2007). Subsequently, at the post-
formation stage, firms need to manage their alliances in terms of coordinating tasks, 
knowledge and resource sharing, resolving conflicts and sometimes terminating 
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alliances when required (Doz, 1996, Kale and Singh, 2007, Kale and Singh, 2009, 
Mohr and Spekman, 1994, Schilke and Goerzen, 2010, Schreiner et al., 2009, Simonin, 
1997, Wang and Rajagopalan, 2015). Having individual-alliance capabilities enables 
firms to better manage their individual alliances so that they may better utilise their 
specific alliance resources. If a firm can recombine its own resources with those of a 
partner, these resources can become idiosyncratic resources which are unique to the 
firm and may lead to a competitive advantage, which may, as a result, contribute to 
better firm performance.  
If a firm uses a portfolio alliance strategy, both levels of alliance capabilities are 
important because, in addition to the benefits of individual-alliance capabilities, firms 
need to coordinate among alliances. Two important alliance portfolio capabilities at 
portfolio level have been identified as partnering proactiveness (Sarkar et al., 2009) 
and portfolio coordination (Schilke and Goerzen, 2010). Partnering proactiveness is 
related to the ability to initiate and manage a portfolio of alliances; this is a crucial 
capability for achieving a valuable and optimal alliance portfolio combination 
(Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007, Hoffmann, 2005, Hoffmann, 2007, Lavie et al., 2012, 
Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009, Sarkar et al., 2009, Schilke and Goerzen, 2010). Portfolio 
coordination is related to the ability to coordinate among synergistic or conflicting 
alliances; this enables a firm to better allocate its limited resources and extract 
synergistic effects, hence it is likely to increase the success of an alliance portfolio 
(Hoffmann, 2005, Hoffmann, 2007, Schilke and Goerzen, 2010). The key distinction 
between the two levels of alliance capabilities is that at the portfolio level, 
coordination among alliances is an important capability that enables firms to better 
manage their alliance resource pool. This is likely to enhance a firm’s competitive 
advantages (Ireland et al., 2002), hence it may lead to better performance.  
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In sum, I hypothesise that the relationship between alliance strategy and firm 
performance is mediated by the presence of alliance capabilities. I suggest that 
standalone strategy leads to individual alliance capabilities, which then lead to a better 
performance. I also suggest that portfolio strategy leads to both individual and 
portfolio alliance capabilities, which then lead to a better performance. Firms choosing 
standalone strategy, if they possess individual alliance capabilities, are likely to 
perform better than firms without the capabilities. In firms adopting portfolio strategy, 
if they have both individual and portfolio alliance capabilities, they are likely to 
perform better than firms without both capabilities. This is because these firms have 
the key firm-specific capabilities which meet the Value, Rarity, Imitability, 
Organisation (VRIO) principles of the resource-based view. 
Firms that taking a portfolio strategy, both levels of alliance capabilities are 
important because firms not only need to manage each individual alliance but also the 
entire portfolio of alliances. Individual-alliance capabilities (i.e. abilities to search, 
negotiate and terminate an alliance) enable firms to manage through the life cycle of 
each individual alliances. Portfolio-alliance capabilities enable firms to establish an 
optimal combination of alliances and coordinate among these alliances (i.e. partnering 
proactiveness and portfolio coordination). Hence, both levels of alliance capabilities 
help firms to implement a portfolio alliance strategy. In contrast, Firms that taking a 
standalone strategy, individual-alliance capabilities are important because these 
capabilities enable firms to better manage their individual alliances by selecting 
suitable partners, negotiating appropriate governance structure and overcoming issues 
related each individual alliance. Hence, the individual-alliance capabilities help to 
implement standalone strategy. 
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Furthermore, a firm’s chosen alliance strategy aligns with its alliance 
capabilities. This is likely to lead to a positive impact on firm performance. For 
example, when firms use standalone strategies but only possess portfolio alliance 
capabilities, this may not lead to a better firm performance. Standalone strategy does 
not coordinate among alliances, and each alliance is formed on an individual basis. 
The portfolio alliance capabilities coordinate among alliances and create synergies 
among alliances. If firms adopt a standalone strategy, the portfolio alliance capabilities 
will be redundant and of no benefit to the firm. This may result little or no effect on 
firm performance.  
Alternatively, when firms use portfolio strategies, they only possess individual 
alliance capabilities. This may lead to some performance impact, but it will not be as 
significant as firms that possess both individual and portfolio alliance capabilities. 
This is because a portfolio of alliances consists of many individual alliances. When 
firms adopt portfolio strategies, they need to manage individual alliances as well as 
the entire portfolio and both levels of alliance capabilities are required. These firms 
are likely to perform better than those only possessing a single level of alliance 
capabilities and those without both levels of capabilities, because they are not only 
aligning alliance capabilities with alliance strategy but also applying the portfolio 
capabilities to benefit from the synergistic effects of different alliances. 
This research makes two important contributions. Firstly, I contribute to alliance 
capability theory and alliance literature by developing and testing alliance capabilities 
as a mediator between firm alliance strategy (standalone and portfolio) and 
performance. Prior studies discuss alliance capabilities and examine these as an 
important variable in determining alliance success (e.g. Anand and Khanna, 2000, 
Kale and Singh, 2009, Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007). These studies have shown that 
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alliance capabilities impact performance and alliance outcomes because alliance 
capabilities influence a firm’s ability to create and capture value. Other studies have 
shown that the alliance capabilities and performance relationship tended to be 
moderated by alliance experience or a structural element of a firm’s dedicated alliance 
function (e.g. Rothaermel and Deeds, 2006). Scholars also have found that firm size 
and market dynamism moderate the effects of alliance capabilities on financial 
performance (e.g. Sarkar et al., 2009, Schilke, 2014). A previous study suggested that 
alliance capabilities act as a mediator between experience and alliance performance 
(e.g. Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007). It is still not clear how alliance capabilities 
contribute to firm performance. According to the resource-based view, differences in 
performance between firms can be explained by the unique resource pool. If firms do 
not have alliance capabilities in their resource pool, they lack the important capabilities 
to implement their alliance strategy. This is likely to have an impact on firm 
performance and implies that different alliance strategies can lead to the development 
of required alliance capabilities, which then leads to better or worse firm performance. 
This differs from previous studies. In my study, alliance capabilities are investigated 
as mediators that enhance firms’ alliance strategy. As a result, this leads to better firm 
performance. Hence, this is an important contribution to the strategy and alliance 
capabilities literature.  
My second contribution is that I identified different alliance strategies will 
require different sets of alliance capabilities to achieve better firm performance. I 
specified that a standalone strategy requires individual-alliance capabilities and a 
portfolio strategy requires both individual-alliance capabilities and portfolio-alliance 
capabilities because the two strategies operate alliance operations differently. This is 
important because firms can assess if they possess an appropriate level of alliance 
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capabilities to implement their chosen strategy. In doing so, the required level of 
alliance capabilities can be acquired in line with firms’ alliance strategies. Scholars 
recognise that the ability to capture value is likely to differ with different alliance 
strategies, i.e. standalone vs. portfolio (Lavie, 2007). However, I have not seen any 
studies that bring the alliance strategy and alliance capabilities together; rather, 
previous studies tended to investigate the standalone and the portfolio strategy 
separately, or simply did not distinguish the differences between the two (Hoffmann, 
2007, Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009). Scholars also tend to address different levels of 
alliance capabilities separately (Sarkar et al., 2009, Schilke and Goerzen, 2010). My 
research clearly distinguishes between the two different levels of alliance capabilities 
and how they benefit and help to implement different alliance strategies. I address how 
alliance strategies lead to alliance capabilities and the effect of alliance capabilities 
leads to better or worse firm performance. I argue that different levels of alliance 
capabilities are likely to contribute to performance differently, and that firms that align 
their alliance strategy with the correct levels of alliance capabilities are likely to have 
better performance. Otherwise, performance may be suboptimal. 
In the following section, I discuss the literature and hypotheses underlying my 
analysis, and illustrate the theoretical model of firms’ alliance strategy and the impact 
of alliance capability between alliance strategy and firm performance. I will then 
discuss the research design before presenting my empirical results. The final section 
concludes by discussing the managerial and theoretical implications of this research.  
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4.2. Theory and Hypotheses 
Firms enter alliances in order to overcome resource deficiencies and extend their 
competitive advantage (Ireland et al., 2002). The resource-based view suggests that 
firms with valuable unique resources can gain competitive advantage (Barney, 1991, 
Peteraf, 1993). Strategic alliances allow firms to obtain external resources through 
interorganisational partnership (Lin et al., 2009). Through alliances, firms can 
strengthen their competitive advantage by recombining and reconfiguring resources 
and capabilities obtained from their alliance partners. Thus, alliances enable firms to 
develop unique resource bundles that can contribute to firm performance.  
The way firms manage alliance resources may differ based on the firm’s alliance 
strategy. Previous studies suggest that viewing alliances as a series of standalone 
operations or as a portfolio of interconnected projects may have different resource 
implications (Parise and Casher, 2003, Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009). According to the 
resource-based view, different resources may influence performance differently 
(Barney, 1991). There is no study that investigates the performance implications of 
adopting different alliance strategies. We do not know how different the impact on 
performance may be when firms adopt either a standalone alliance strategy or a 
portfolio alliance strategy. I argue that adopting a portfolio alliance strategy is more 
likely to generate superior performance than adopting a standalone alliance strategy.  
The resource-based view further suggests that firms need capabilities to manage 
their resources (Peteraf, 1993). According to Barney (1991), valuable and rare 
resources provide the basis for value creation. Value is more sustainable when such 
resources are also inimitable and non-substitutable. However, merely possessing 
unique resources does not guarantee the development of competitive advantages or 
the creation of value (Priem and Butler, 2001). In order to realise value creation, firms 
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must accumulate, combine and exploit resources (Grant, 1991, Sirmon and Hitt, 2003). 
Scholars have argued that firms need certain capabilities for alliance management 
(Kale and Singh, 2009, Lavie et al., 2007, Sarkar et al., 2009). For example, 
Rothaermel and Deeds (2006) suggest that upstream alliances require the largest 
amount of high-technology venture’s alliance management capability, downstream 
alliances demand the least amount and horizontal alliances a moderate amount. 
Alliance capabilities influence how firms can create value from strategic alliances and 
how they differ between firms (Anand and Khanna, 2000).  
Alliance capability has been studied from different angles. Ireland et al. (2002) 
describe alliance capability as the ability to select partners, manage resources and build 
a long-term relationship with partners. Hoang and Rothaermel (2005) use prior 
alliance experience to study alliance capability. Heimeriks and Duysters (2007) and 
Kale and Singh (2007) note that alliance capabilities are firms’ ability to capture, learn 
and reconfigure knowledge and resources obtained from strategic alliances, and, 
sometimes, re-use in ongoing and future alliances. The authors suggest that alliance 
capabilities are developed through alliance functions, for example, a dedicated alliance 
department in charge of all matters relating to alliance operation, as well as through 
various alliance procedures and guidelines such as those relating to partner evaluation 
or contract writing. Sarkar et al. (2009) refer to alliance capabilities as process 
capabilities, or, the ability to manage alliance activities relating to alliance formation, 
relationship management and coordination of knowledge flows between partners. 
From a resource-based perspective, differences in alliance capabilities across 
firms can explain differences in firm performance (Sarkar et al., 2009). Overall, 
scholars tend to agree that the greater the alliance capabilities the better the alliance 
performance and firm performance (Schilke and Goerzen, 2010, Sarkar et al., 2009, 
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Kale and Singh, 2009). However, studies on alliance capabilities do not compare the 
impact of different kinds of alliance capabilities on performance. There is little 
understanding on whether different capabilities, in particular, capabilities related to 
managing alliances as a portfolio and those related to managing alliances as 
independent projects – will influence performance differently. Anand and Khanna 
(2000) clearly establish the existence of differences in ‘alliance capabilities’ across 
firms, and suggest that more work is needed to explore the organisational determinants 
of alliance capabilities. This paper attempts to address this gap by looking at the 
relationship between a firm’s alliance strategy, alliance capabilities and firm 
performance. I argue that firms with a standalone strategy need to develop capabilities 
that allow them to manage each individual alliance successfully. For example, alliance 
formation, design and post-formation (Gulati and Singh, 1998, Kale and Singh, 2009, 
Wang and Rajagopalan, 2015) are examples of capabilities that are related to managing 
single alliances. In addition, firms with a portfolio strategy need to know how to 
configure their collections of alliances (Hoffmann, 2007) and coordinate among 
alliances (Sarkar et al., 2009). I argue that the extent to which firms have the right 
capabilities to implement their alliance strategy will determine firm performance. 
4.2.1. Alliance Strategy 
Alliance strategy refers to the strategy that firms adopt to establish and manage 
their alliances. Managers may choose a standalone or portfolio strategy for managing 
multiple alliances. Prior studies on alliance have either studied single alliance or 
alliance as a portfolio, but not the two together (Brouthers et al., 2014, Ireland et al., 
2002, Nakos and Brouthers, 2008, Nakos et al., 2014, Rothaermel, 2001a, Rothaermel, 
2001b, Hoffmann, 2007, Parise and Casher, 2003, Wassmer, 2010). There is no 
empirical research that distinguishes how a firms’ tendency to adopt one of these two 
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alliance strategies may affect firm performance. Through their descriptions of a 
portfolio approach to managing alliances, scholars have implied that a portfolio 
approach is likely to bring better performance results than a standalone approach 
(Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009, Hoffmann, 2007, Parise and Casher, 2003, Wassmer, 
2010). 
With a standalone strategy, firms consider each single alliance as a standalone 
occurrence and each alliance is managed independently. Standalone strategy enables 
firms to access heterogeneous resources from its alliance partners. However, resources 
obtained from different alliances may not be integrated, because managers with a 
standalone strategy do not view the overall effects of all alliances together. When 
managers opt for standalone strategy, inefficient or redundant configurations may 
develop (Vassolo et al., 2004). Firms adopting a standalone strategy may not re-
configure or re-combine similar resources found in different alliances. This may 
prevent them from realising the possible synergistic effects of different alliances (Cui 
and O'Connor, 2012). Furthermore, considering one alliance at a time can create 
conflicts to overall corporate strategy (Parise and Casher, 2003, Hoffmann, 2007). 
With a portfolio strategy, firms take a holistic view of their alliances to achieve 
overall corporate objectives (Hoffmann, 2007). Scholars suggest that firms managing 
their alliances as a portfolio can better utilise synergistic effects between alliances as 
well as manage risk and uncertainty (Hoffmann, 2007, Parise and Casher, 2003, 
Hoffmann, 2005, Vassolo et al., 2004, Vapola et al., 2010). Firms often have multiple 
alliances to achieve multiple goals. A portfolio strategy enables them to 
simultaneously achieve multiple goals with better coordination and effectively resolve 
conflicts so that greater overall benefits are obtained (George et al., 2001, Hoffmann, 
2007). Managers need to understand the impact that alliances have on each other and 
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the coordination of resources among them. 
Scholars believe that firms can improve performance when they optimise the 
combination of alliances as a whole (Cui and O'Connor, 2012, De Leeuw et al., 2014, 
Duysters et al., 2012, Hoffmann, 2005, Jiang et al., 2010, Parise and Casher, 2003, 
Sarkar et al., 2009, Vassolo et al., 2004). A portfolio strategy is more likely to 
positively impact performance compared to a standalone strategy for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, when firms form their alliances independently from each other, they 
will only consider one alliance at a time. Each alliance would only focus on achieving 
its own objective rather than on coordinating the goals of independent alliances 
(Goerzen and Beamish, 2005). It is also possible that redundant and competing 
alliances may be formed (Ahuja, 2000a, Baum et al., 2000, Schilling and Phelps, 2007). 
For example, the product manager within a firm may enter an alliance for product 
development; at the same time, the marketing manager of the same firm may also enter 
into an alliance for another product development. Redundancy in alliance projects and 
resource wastage may occur because the two managers would not communicate about 
their respective alliance when the firm is adopting a standalone alliance strategy. This 
is likely to waste firm resources and be detrimental to firm performance. A portfolio 
alliance strategy allows the optimisation of alliance combinations and better 
coordination among alliances (Hoffmann, 2007, Parise and Casher, 2003, Ozcan and 
Eisenhardt, 2009). This enables firms to minimise redundant alliances.  
Secondly, conflicts are likely to arise between alliances (Arikan and Shenkar, 
2013, Li et al., 2008). For example, a firm can simultaneously operate two marketing 
alliances; one can be for new market development, and another can be for launching 
a new product into an existing market. Both of these alliances may require the focal 
firm to provide marketing resources. When these marketing resources are limited, 
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alliances will compete for them and conflicts may occur as a result (Amaldoss et al., 
2000). A standalone strategy does not encourage a conscious effort to minimise the 
conflict caused by resource competition amongst alliances. As each alliance is formed 
and operated independently from one another in a standalone strategy, there is no 
effort to reduce the number of alliances that require similar resources. A standalone 
strategy allows multiple alliances with similar resource requirements to exist. 
Therefore, inter-alliance competition for resources is more likely to occur. In contrast, 
a portfolio strategy allows firms to minimise conflicts among alliances because 
managers are encouraged to think about how different alliances fit into the overall 
portfolio (Hoffmann, 2007).   
Thirdly, alliances can create opportunities for learning (Doz, 1996). I argue that 
a portfolio strategy encourages firms to leverage learning opportunities across 
alliances and within alliances, while a standalone strategy only encourages learning 
within alliances. Although alliance resources can be potentially internalised and 
utilised for other alliances, when a firm adopts a standalone strategy, managers are 
only focused on the current alliance and may not develop management mechanisms 
within the firm to deploy these resources to other alliances. In contrast, firms adopting 
a portfolio strategy are likely to internalise and reconfigure the complementary 
resources for other alliances to use, because a portfolio strategy encourages firms to 
consider the interrelationship between different alliances. In particular, firms adopting 
a portfolio strategy may establish a central alliance function (Heimeriks, 2010, Ireland 
et al., 2002, Kale et al., 2001, Kale et al., 2002, Kale and Singh, 2007, Kale and Singh, 
2009), which manages and controls all the alliance related matters such as knowledge 
and resource management (Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007). Through this centralised 
function, knowledge would be more easily shared and re-used. A portfolio strategy 
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may encourage a firm to establish common guidelines and best practice for alliance 
management (Heimeriks et al., 2009). By learning from previous alliances and 
developing guidelines and best practice, the firm will be able to reap more benefits 
from unified alliance management and thereby enhance firm performance. 
Fourthly, firms are more likely to create additional resources if there is a 
conscious effort to develop synergy between different alliances (Vassolo et al., 2004). 
A standalone strategy would not encourage developing synergy among alliances. It is 
likely that each alliance only aims to achieve its set goals. There would be no other 
objective beyond the alliance objective. A portfolio strategy encourages inter-firm 
learning in order to create synergies between alliances (Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005, 
Parise and Casher, 2003). Each alliance within the portfolio would be able to access 
complementary resources from other alliances (Baum et al., 2000, Silverman and 
Baum, 2002), and managers would be more likely to create idiosyncratic resources 
from different partners. For example, Research and Development (R&D) 
technological resources can often be shared and adapted into different R&D projects. 
A portfolio strategy enables managers to evaluate firms’ existing R&D resource stocks 
from different alliances and find ways to reconfigure them into new R&D projects. 
This is likely to save on R&D development costs and improve firm performance.  
Therefore, firms that follow a standalone strategy and firms that follow a 
portfolio alliance strategy manage alliance resources differently. Compared to a 
standalone alliance strategy, a portfolio alliance strategy allows firms to create 
additional resources because the portfolio strategy will consider potential synergies 
between alliances.  Therefore, I hypothesise that:  
Hypothesis 1 (H1): A portfolio strategy is likely to lead to better firm 
performance than a standalone strategy. 
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4.2.2. Alliance Capabilities 
Alliances often fail (Kale et al., 2001, Park and Ungson, 2001), even if each 
partner contributes resources and competencies. This can be due to a lack of alliance 
capabilities to reconfigure and manage the resources that the focal firm and its partners 
contribute to achieve the alliance objective (Kale and Singh, 2009). When a firm does 
not have suitable capabilities to manage its resources, it may not be able to create value 
from these resources, and firm performance may be affected. This implies that the 
relationship between alliance strategy and firm performance is also contingent on the 
capabilities the firm possesses. The firm requires certain capabilities to better manage 
this mix of resources and competencies.  
A number of studies discuss structural and procedural dimensions of alliance 
capabilities and how they impact performance. For example, the link between alliance 
capability and performance has long been recognised in the literature. These studies 
note that firms with alliance functions (e.g. a dedicated alliance department which is 
in charge of all matters relating to alliance operation), procedures and different alliance 
tools (e.g. partner evaluation procedures, guidelines) tend to have a better performance 
than those without (Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007, Kale et al., 2002, Kale and Singh, 
2007). Cui and O'Connor (2012) demonstrate that the presence of a dedicated alliance 
management function positively interacts with portfolio resource diversity to affect 
firm innovation.  
Scholars have also studied how management and process dimensions of alliance 
capabilities relate to performance. Kale et al. (2002) suggest that firms that invest in a 
capability at managing alliances are able to enhance the probability of success – both 
in the short term (generating a positive stock response) and in the long term (meeting 
the alliance objectives). Sarkar et al. (2009) found that partnering proactiveness, 
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relational governance and portfolio coordination enhances the overall value of a firm’s 
alliance portfolio. This is reflected in the positive and significant relationship between 
alliance portfolio capital and firm performance. Schilke and Goerzen (2010) show a 
significant and positive relationship between alliance management capability and 
alliance portfolio performance. Schreiner et al. (2009) show that alliance management 
capability is positively related to firm performance. Simonin (1997) found that the 
greater the capabilities in partner search, negotiation, management and exiting, the 
higher the levels of tangible and intangible benefits obtained from a collaboration. 
Finally, there is a large number of studies that investigate alliance capabilities 
from a learning perspective. Accumulated alliance experiences and learning help to 
improve firm performance (Anand and Khanna, 2000, Deeds and Hill, 1996, Hoang 
and Rothaermel, 2005, Powell et al., 1996, Zollo et al., 2002). Gulati et al. (2009) 
demonstrate that partner-specific experience improves alliance performance and that 
it is important for building relational capabilities (Dyer and Singh, 1998, Gulati and 
Sytch, 2007). However, some scholars find that partner-specific experience can have 
a negative impact on joint project success and may decrease alliance performance  
(Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005).  
Overall, scholars tend to agree that the greater the alliance capabilities the better 
the alliance and the firm performance. However, we know little about whether 
different strategies require different capabilities and the extent to which different 
strategies and capabilities can impact on performance. Managing a portfolio of 
alliances is not the same as managing individual alliances (Kale and Singh, 2009, 
Schreiner et al., 2009). Furthermore, Wang and Rajagopalan (2015) argue that 
individual-alliance capability differs from portfolio-alliance capability. Individual-
alliance capability is needed to manage individual alliances. It helps managers to 
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develop skills in managing the life cycle of an alliance. Portfolio-alliance capability 
helps managers to develop skills in managing a holistic set of alliances (Heimeriks and 
Duysters, 2007). I suggest that firms use different strategies to manage their alliances. 
Firms following a standalone alliance strategy are likely to benefit from individual-
alliance capabilities. Firms following a portfolio alliance strategy are likely to benefit 
from both individual-alliance and portfolio-alliance capabilities. 
4.2.2.1. Individual-alliance Capabilities 
Previous research provides a broad debate about the capability that a firm 
potentially requires to succeed in any individual alliance. Simonin (1997) suggests that 
a firm’s collaborative know-how of partner search, negotiation, management and 
termination are the relevant capabilities for managing an individual alliance. The 
author specifically explains collaborative know-how in terms of a single alliance with 
a beginning and an end. For example, before a firm enters into an alliance, it needs to 
identify and capture partnership opportunities then negotiate the terms of the 
agreement. Once an alliance is formed, the firm needs to monitor and manage 
resources and tasks between partners. When the alliance has fulfilled its objective, the 
firm needs to know how and when to terminate the alliance. Schreiner et al. (2009) 
suggest that coordination, communication and bonding are key capabilities in 
managing a given alliance, particularly relevant to the post-formation stage of an 
alliance.  
In my study, individual-alliance capabilities are essential skills to effectively 
manage different phases in the life cycle of any individual alliance (Gulati, 1998). An 
individual alliance consists of the formation phase, the design phase and the post-
formation phase (Doz, 1996, Schreiner et al., 2009). Firms need suitable capability to 
effectively manage each phase of an alliance. At formation phase, researchers suggest 
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that a firm’s success in any individual alliance depends upon having a suitable alliance 
partner (Gulati, 1999a, Hitt et al., 2000, Sarkar et al., 2001a). Scholars have shown the 
importance of partner selection and highlighted that different criteria may be involved 
when choosing an alliance partner (Hitt et al., 2000, Shah and Swaminathan, 2008). 
The ability to select a suitable partner is an important capability to have when forming 
an alliance, because it can affect the resource mix of the alliance and the compatibility 
of the partners. This capability can influence the short-term and long-term viability of 
the alliance (Simonin, 1997) depending on how well a firm accurately evaluates its 
potential partners.  
In addition, Shah and Swaminathan (2008) show that partner characteristics can 
influence alliance performance. They suggest that complementarity, commitment and 
compatibility are important for the success of the alliance. For example, if a partner 
provides complementary resources and capability, but the managerial style and culture 
are different from the focal firm, then this can create conflict. If the partner is lacking 
commitment to the alliance, then this can potentially cause the alliance to fail. 
According to Shah and Swaminathan (2008) and Kale and Singh (2009), managers 
must have the ability to identify firms that are compatible working partners, have 
sufficient willingness to commit needed resources to the alliance, and bring resource 
complementarity to the focal firm. This implies that firm needs the capability to 
proactively seek appropriate alliance partners in order to ensure greater alliance 
success. 
A number of scholars have discussed the importance of finding the right partner 
as an essential alliance management capability and use different terms such as partner 
searching (Simonin, 1997), alliance scanning (Kandemir et al., 2006), and alliance 
proactiveness (Sarkar et al., 2009, Schilke and Goerzen, 2010). In this study, I will 
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follow Sarkar et al. (2009) and Schilke and Goerzen (2010) to name the capability to 
search for the right partner as alliance proactiveness. I identify this capability as 
individual-alliance capability because the firm needs to proactively search alliance 
partners for each individual alliance to meet the firm’s overall objectives. 
At design and post-formation phases, scholars have highlighted that for a firm 
to succeed in any given alliance, it needs to design or choose an appropriate alliance 
structure and contractual terms (Gulati and Singh, 1998, Oxley, 1997, Reuer and Arino, 
2007). In particular, alliance transformation is the capability to adapt an alliance 
agreement according to unforeseen circumstances (Schilke and Goerzen, 2010). For 
example, the negotiation of how to share the research outcome occurs at the beginning 
as part of alliance formation. However, R&D by nature has uncertain research 
outcomes. Firms need to have the ability to evaluate the sharing of R&D outcome in 
flexible ways and renegotiate the terms of the alliance agreement. The changes in a 
firm’s environment can also cause contractual agreements to become obsolete. A firm 
may have manufacturing partners that help the firm in its manufacturing process. The 
firm may need to transform the manufacturing partnership due to changing market 
demand for new product lines. The firm must be able to gauge how and when to 
transform the alliance in order to prevent the loss of market opportunities. I identify 
Schilke and Goerzen (2010)’s alliance transformation as an individual-alliance 
capability, through which firms anticipate and prepare for the changes occurring 
within each individual alliance. 
Another essential individual-alliance capability is interorganisational learning. 
Scholars suggest that the success of an individual alliance rests on how a firm manages 
an alliance after formation, in particular, sharing knowledge, and utilising and 
integrating know-how and information (Anand and Khanna, 2000, Deeds and Hill, 
306 
 
1996, Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005, Powell et al., 1996, Zollo et al., 2002). I identify 
this capability as individual-alliance capability because knowledge, know-how and 
valuable information are derived from individual alliances. Managing an ongoing 
alliance requires the capability to transfer resources and knowledge (Simonin, 1997). 
Without the capability to absorb new knowledge from partners and integrate it within 
its existing knowledge repository, this can significantly affect the success or failure of 
an alliance. As a result, a firm may not be able to advance in developing innovations 
and may also impact on firm performance. 
Based on the resource-based view, companies need the right capability for their 
strategies. A standalone strategy is focused on individual alliances and requires 
individual-alliance capabilities for firms to manage throughout the life cycle of an 
alliance. Without individual-alliance capabilities, a firm’s individual alliances may be 
less successful and firm performance may suffer as a result. Therefore, I propose that 
a firm’s individual-alliance capabilities may mediate the relationship between 
standalone alliance strategy and firm performance. Similarly, with a portfolio strategy, 
firms are more likely to succeed if they possess individual-alliance capability, because 
they need to build their collection of alliances. Individual-alliances capabilities can 
assist in managing each individual alliance within their overall portfolio. Therefore, I 
hypothesise that the firm’s individual-alliance capability may also mediate the 
relationship between a portfolio alliance strategy and firm performance. The 
hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Individual-alliance capability mediates the relationship 
between alliance strategy (whether a standalone strategy or a portfolio strategy) 
and firm performance.  
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4.2.2.2. Portfolio-alliance Capabilities 
Portfolio-alliance capabilities refer to a firm’s ability to initiate and manage a 
portfolio of alliances (Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007, Wang and Rajagopalan, 2015). 
Based on this broad definition, previous research outlines capabilities necessary to 
manage each alliance within the portfolio as well as the entire portfolio itself. In other 
words, they do not tease out capabilities that are specific to a portfolio strategy from 
those that form the basis of alliance management in general. For the purpose of my 
study, I adopt a narrower definition of portfolio-alliance capabilities. I refer to 
portfolio-alliance capabilities as firm’s capability to manage the relationships between 
alliances. I consider the ability to manage each alliance within a portfolio as 
individual-alliance capabilities. 
An important portfolio-alliance capability is inter-organisational coordination, 
because it is concerned with coordinating activities with alliance partners within a 
portfolio, synchronising the work with alliance partners. Firms need to have the ability 
to manage tasks, interdependence and operational processes between partners (Schilke, 
2014, Schreiner et al., 2009). Inter-organisational coordination takes into account the 
interaction and activities among the focal firm and alliance partners. It requires 
managers to have long-term and holistic strategic thinking in relation to firms’ 
strategic direction. For example, a firm may need to set up a number of explorative or 
exploitative alliances (Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006, March, 1991) to develop a 
complete value chain. For explorative alliances, firms often engage with R&D partners 
to develop innovative technologies. These partners tend to be from upstream of the 
value chain. For exploitative alliances, firms often engage alliances for 
commercialising new products. These partners tend to be from downstream of the 
value chain. The ability to coordinate the activities of partners from different stages of 
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value chain and link them together forming a value chain is important for the 
implementation of a portfolio alliance strategy.  
Another essential portfolio-alliance capability is alliance portfolio coordination 
(Kandemir et al., 2006, Sarkar et al., 2009, Schilke and Goerzen, 2010). Alliance 
portfolio coordination is the ability to integrate and synchronise activities, knowledge 
and resources across alliances in a portfolio (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2006, Sarkar et 
al., 2009, Schilke, 2014, Schilke and Goerzen, 2010). Alliance portfolio coordination 
is an important capability for firms wishing to pursue a portfolio alliance strategy 
because it emphasises resource coordination between alliances, which enables firms 
to better utilise partners’ resources. More specifically, alliance portfolio coordination 
emphasises synergy creation and interdependency management in order to achieve a 
firm’s overall objective and minimize conflicts. Although each alliance may have a 
different purpose such as new product developments, marketing channel alliances or 
logistic distribution alliances, they are all part of the overall strategic objective of the 
alliance portfolio. 
Through alliance portfolio coordination, alliances become integrated and 
resources can be reconfigured into collective assets (Sarkar et al., 2009). Engaging in 
portfolio coordination allows firms to leverage resources across different partners as 
well as across the entire portfolio (Gomes-Casseres, 1996). For example, a firm may 
enter into an alliance with partner A to develop new technology A1, and partner B to 
develop new technology B1. It is possible that in the course of developing the 
respective technologies, these alliances may make new additional discoveries that can 
be combined to develop a new technology C1. In this case, alliance portfolio 
coordination capabilities would bring A1 and B1 together to further develop 
technology C1 and enhance the probability of the additional discoveries to be 
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leveraged by the company. Another example is that a firm may form an alliance with 
partner A to develop market A and partner B to develop market B. It is possible that 
different markets would have different demands and requirements. Firms with alliance 
portfolio coordination capabilities would share market knowledge obtained from 
market A and market B with other marketing alliances in the portfolio. Firms can 
recombine different market knowledge as input to new product development and are 
more likely to better serve other new target markets as well. Through portfolio 
coordination, firms are able to recombine new discoveries and accumulated 
knowledge obtained from partners into new market opportunities or even new product 
innovations. In doing so, they can create greater value for the firm as well as for the 
alliance portfolio (Parise and Casher, 2003). In addition, alliance portfolio 
coordination capabilities are likely to enhance partnership relations as well as increase 
the competitiveness of the overall network of alliances. 
Firms engaging in multiple alliances simultaneously and managing them as a 
portfolio will require portfolio-alliance capabilities in addition to the individual-
alliance capabilities. A portfolio strategy takes account of strategic implications across 
all alliances of the firm. Portfolio-alliance capabilities such as inter-organisational 
coordination and alliance portfolio coordination can assist in the implementation of 
portfolio alliance strategy. Therefore, I expect portfolio-alliance capabilities to 
mediate a firm’s portfolio alliance strategy and firm performance. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Portfolio-alliance capability mediates the relationship 






In order to test my hypotheses, I have chosen a sample of Chinese and 
Taiwanese companies from the printed circuit board (PCB) industry and rubber plastic 
industry. Industrial statistics show that global PCB output in 2014 was US$60.15 
billion (WECC, 2015). PCB firms’ output in China and Taiwan are ranked first and 
third in worldwide output and represent 58.9% of total PCB global output (WECC, 
2015). The outputs of China and Taiwan are 44.9% and 14% of global output, 
respectively. For the plastic rubber industry, China is ranked the largest producer and 
account for 26% of global of plastic materials (PlasticsEurope, 2015). These two 
industries are suitable for my study not only because they are relatively large industries, 
but also PCB firms often enter into partnership and strategic alliances as a way to 
provide unique business solutions for the changing market environment (Lucintel, 
2015) while firms in the plastic rubber industry often establish strategic alliances to 
enter into new markets or secure raw materials (Sweeney, 2015) .  
Given that companies in the two industries are actively forming strategic 
alliances as common practices, they provide an appropriate research setting to 
investigate the impact of alliance strategy on firm performance and the impact of 
alliance capabilities join with alliance strategy on firm performance. More specifically, 
to understand if alliance capabilities play a mediating role between alliance strategy 
and firm performance. 
The sample consists of manufacturing and contract manufacturer, equipment 
and machinery providers, raw materials, chemicals and accessories providers and 




Data were collected through a survey instrument. The survey was prepared 
through a back translation process in which the survey is prepared in English first and 
translated into Chinese. It is then translated back into English to ensure the accuracy 
and reliability of the questions (Brislin, 1970). The survey was also verified by five 
senior managers in the PCB industry and amended accordingly. I also conducted a 
small pilot run with another five managers from the industry to ascertain if the survey 
questions and items were easy for them to understand. If further amendments were 
required, they were incorporated into the final survey. 
4.3.3. Data Collection 
Data were collected in 2016 using a random sample of 600 companies from the 
PCB and plastic rubber industries. For the PCB industry, I drew the sample from the 
directory of the PCB industries in Taiwan and China (TPCA, 2015). The directory 
comprises approximately 5200 firms. I used random sampling to select every tenth 
firm in the list and sent out an invitation to 520 firms to participate in the study via e-
mail and post. Out of the 520 firms contacted, 380 accepted to participate. I then sent 
out the questionnaire via post and email to these firms, and hand-delivered 
approximately one fourth of the sample. After two waves of mailing, numerous follow-
up calls, emails and company visits, I initially received 125 responses. Of these 
responses, three were not usable as these responses have too many un-answered 
questions. The useable surveys amounted to 122, equivalent to 32% of the 380 sample. 
For the plastic rubber industry, the companies were sampled from the exhibitors 
list of Plas2016 Taipei industry exhibition. This includes approximately 500 firms. 
During the Plas2016 industry exhibition, I randomly approached 220 firms out of the 
total number exhibiting there and received 68 usable responses, equivalent to 31%.  
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To ensure the suitability of respondents, each executive in the sample companies 
were contacted by phone or in person. This process was used to identify the correct 
decision-makers for strategic alliances and explain the purpose of the study, and at the 
same time, request their participation in the study. When executives indicated that 
strategic alliance decisions were within their authority and they were willing to 
participate in the study, I would then send them the survey via email, post, online or 
in person. 
Each qualified respondent would receive the survey with a letter of introduction 
which explained the purpose of the study and promised confidentiality for his/her 
participation. To follow up with survey progression, I sent emails and made phone 
calls to remind respondents as well as establishing a collection timeline for the survey. 
4.3.4. Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable of this study is firm performance. The scale is borrowed 
from existing literature. Previous alliance studies measure performance at alliance 
level, portfolio level or firm level, using objective measures or perceptual measures. 
For perceptual measures, scholars have used either actual performance or relative 
performance.  
Performance measure at alliance level 
At alliance level, Deeds and Rothaermel (2003) measure three items of alliance 
performance: spillover benefits, financial performance and overall alliance 
performance. Zollo et al. (2002) also use perceptual measures for alliance level 
performance. Respondents are asked to: (1) rate their level of satisfaction with the 
knowledge accumulated from participating in a particular alliance, (2) indicate the 
extent to which the alliance created new opportunities for the firm, (3) indicate the 
degree to which the alliance satisfied the partnering firm’s initial objectives. Then 
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three indicators are standardised and summed up to construct a global measure of 
alliance performance.  
Hoetker and Mellewigt (2009)’s alliance performance measure is based on the 
degree to which the alliance achieves 13 different goals, ranging from firm-specific 
goals (e.g. cost reduction, risk reduction, time advantages) to industry-specific goals 
(e.g. access to network infrastructure, access to sales network, access to technical 
know-how). The final measure is the weighted average of the 13 items. Lavie et al. 
(2012) measure alliance performance using an eight-item scale, which refer to the 
extent to which an alliance (1) met its objectives, (2) increased revenue, (3) improved 
quality, (4) reduced time to market, (5) generated new customers, products or projects, 
(6) led to customer satisfaction, (7) received favourable recognition, and (8) could 
evolve into a long-term relationship. 
Shu et al. (2014) measure alliance performance with a four-item Likert-type 
scale. Respondents are asked to rate the level of agreement with the following 
statements: (1) The collaborative relationship achieved the objective of return on 
investments, (2) The collaborative relationship achieved the objective of sales growth, 
(3) The collaborative relationship achieved the objective of market share increase, and 
(4) The collaborative relationship achieved the objective of net profits. 
Performance measure at portfolio level 
Schilke and Goerzen (2010) measure alliance portfolio performance by asking 
respondents to rate their level of satisfaction and goal fulfillment of the business unit’s 
R&D alliances. The statements are: (1) Overall, we are satisfied with the performance 
of our R&D alliances, (2) Generally, our R&D alliances satisfy our initial objectives, 
(3) We are satisfied with the knowledge accumulated from participating in R&D 
alliances, and (4) Our R&D alliances have been profitable investments. 
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In Duysters et al. (2012) and Heimeriks et al. (2015), alliance portfolio 
performance is operationalised as the percentage of alliance in which the firm’s goals 
are realised. More specifically, respondents assess their company’s overall alliance 
success rate in the firm’s portfolio where the initial goals were realised over the last 
five years. The question is, ‘What is your company’s overall success rate (i.e. 
percentage of strategic alliances where goals were realised) over the past five years?’. 
Respondents select the success rate from 1 for (0-20%), 2 for (21-40%), 3 for (41-
60%), 4 for (61-80%) and 5 for (81-100%). 
Heimeriks and Duysters (2007) present a similar measure of alliance portfolio 
performance based on the percentage of alliances in which the original goals were 
realised. However, the authors use three levels of performance – low (0-40%), average 
(41 to 60%) and high (61-100%) – to indicate the level of alliance portfolio 
performance. 
Kandemir et al. (2006) measure alliance network performance by capturing a 
firm’s perceived ability to achieve its objectives associated with its alliance network. 
Respondents are asked to report their level of satisfaction with the following items: (1) 
The competitive strength of your alliance network, (2) The strength of your 
relationships with key alliance partners, and (3) The ability to manage crisis and 
conflicts with your alliance partners. 
Performance measure at firm level 
For firm level of performance, scholars have used self-report measures based on 
surveys, as well as accounting-based, market-based and innovation output measures 
based on secondary data. Accounting-based measures include return on assets (ROA), 
return on sales (ROS), return on investment (ROI) and earnings (e.g. Goerzen and 
Beamish, 2005, Lavie and Miller, 2008, Terjesen et al., 2011). Market-based measures 
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are relevant to the stock market valuation (e.g. Lavie, 2007, Wassmer and Dussauge, 
2012). Innovation output measures mainly look at the number of patents granted and 
the number of products introduced to the markets (e.g. De Leeuw et al., 2014, Duysters 
and Lokshin, 2011, Lahiri and Narayanan, 2013).  
Survey-based self-report measures are often related to the level of satisfaction 
with overall performance compared with competitors (Kandemir et al., 2006, Sarkar 
et al., 2009, Shu et al., 2014, Schreiner et al., 2009). In Kandemir et al. (2006), 
respondents were asked to rate firm performance relative to competitors in terms of 
sales growth, market share and market development, from 1 ‘much worse’ to 5 ‘much 
better’. 
Sarkar et al. (2009) measure market/firm performance by asking respondents to 
rate from 1 to 5 (‘ Much Worse’ to ‘Much Better’), how well the firm performs 
relative to competitors for its market share, sales growth, market development and 
product development. This measure is adapted from Venkatraman and Ramanujam 
(1986). In addition, as the sample studied has a number of public firms, Sarkar et al. 
(2009) test the validity of their measure by collecting three years of data on the public 
firms in their sample for commonly used performance measures (return on assets 
(ROA), return on equity (ROE) and return on investment (ROI) and sales growth (SG)) 
using COMPUSTAT, then correlating the average performance data with their 
perceptual measure of market/firm performance. The correlation between market/firm 
performance and average ROA, ROE, ROI and SG are all significant at p < 0.05. This 
highlights the validity of the perceptual measure.  
Schreiner et al. (2009) measure firm performance data by asking respondents to 
report how well their firm had performed during the last three years, relative to other 
direct competitors, in terms of sales growth, profitability, return on investment and 
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ability to build customer loyalty. The respondents were asked to rate the level of firm 
performance compared with their key competitors on a seven-point Likert type scale 
(ranging from ‘Far Better’ to ‘Far Worse’). The question is: ‘During the last three 
years, how well did your company perform relative to your direct competitors in terms 
of (1) Sales growth, (2) Profitability, (3) Return on investment, and (4) Building 
customer loyalty’. 
Shu et al. (2014) use four items to measure firm performance on a seven-point 
Likert scale. Respondents were asked to rate their level of agreement for the following 
statements: (1) Compared with our major competitors, our return on investments 
increased greatly, (2) Compared with our major competitors, our sales grew greatly, 
(3) Compared with our major competitors, our market share increased greatly, and (4) 
Compared with our major competitors, our net profit increased greatly. 
The choice of performance measure 
There are a number of reasons for the choice of performance measure. Firstly, I 
chose firm level performance because I am interested in studying the relationships 
between alliance strategy, alliance capability and firm performance. I am not interested 
in alliance level or portfolio level performance for my study. Secondly, I chose to use 
self-report measures because the sample in my study consists of listed and non-listed 
companies. Therefore, financial data are not available for all companies, and adequate 
financial information on alliances is also not readily available from secondary sources 
(Reuer, 2001, Hult et al., 2008). More importantly, many scholars suggest that top 
managers are highly knowledgeable about firm performance and much of alliance 
research is based on managerial evaluation of performance (e.g. Heimeriks et al., 2014, 
Kale et al., 2002, Kale and Singh, 2007). In light of scale validity, Sarkar et al. (2009) 
demonstrate that their perceptual measure of firm performance is well correlated with 
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financial data collected from COMPUSTAT. Thirdly, scholars suggest that using 
perceptual measures is more appropriate when comparing firms with different 
business operations or firms with different attributes (Hult et al., 2008). In my sample, 
firms may engage in producing highly technological PCBs or plastic materials (e.g. 
for the aviation industry and in advanced medical devices). In contrast, they may only 
produce low-end home appliance PCBs (e.g. for toasters or vacuum cleaners) or 
simply just household plastic chairs. The profit margin for the former group is 
normally higher than that of the latter group, due to the nature of their product lines. 
In this case, objective measures of performance are not comparable and can be 
misleading. Perceptual measures of performance related to competition can provide 
more comparable information, and control for industry effect (Judge and Douglas, 
1998). Finally, scholars suggest that comparisons with competitors can reveal 
important firm performance information (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003).  
Following Sarkar et al. (2009)’s performance measure, I asked respondents to 
rate the level of firm performance compared with their key competitors on a seven-
point Likert-type scale (ranging from ‘Far Better’ to ‘Far Worse’). The question is: 
‘How well does your company perform relative to your competitors in terms of (1) 
market share, (2) sales growth, (3) market development, and (4) product 
development?’. 
4.3.5. Independent Variable 
Alliance strategy can be either a standalone strategy or a portfolio strategy. 
Standalone alliance strategy is when all alliances are treated as standalone occurrences; 
each alliance is independent from other alliances and each alliance has its own specific 
goals. Portfolio alliance strategy is when managers take into account the strategic 
implications across all alliances and the portfolio strategy reflects on overall corporate 
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strategy (Hoffmann, 2007). 
To my knowledge, there are no published scales for standalone and portfolio 
strategies, as previous studies have not measured alliance strategy based on the 
standalone versus portfolio distinction. There are two main reasons that contribute to 
the lack of availability of tested scales. Firstly, alliance research has traditionally 
focused on single alliances, although some scholars have suggested a portfolio 
approach as an alternative way to manage strategic alliances (Hoffmann, 2005, 
Hoffmann, 2007, Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009). In previous studies, scholars are 
mainly concerned with the formation, governance, evolution and performance of 
single alliances. For alliance portfolio research, scholars are mainly focused on 
emergence, configuration and management of an alliance portfolio (Wassmer, 2010). 
Alliance strategies (standalone and portfolio) are treated as two separated research 
areas and scholars do not view them together as firm alliance strategy. Therefore, 
scholars have not created scales that might distinguish standalone strategy from 
portfolio strategy. 
Secondly, scholars tend to agree on what a standalone alliance is but have 
different views on the definition of an alliance portfolio (Wassmer, 2010). Scholars 
tend to agree that a standalone alliance is an agreement between firms in which firms 
exchange resources and aim for sharing – or co-development of – products, 
technologies or services (Gulati, 1998). In contrast, scholars define alliance portfolio 
in a number of different ways. For example, some scholars define an alliance portfolio 
as the aggregate of all strategic alliances of a focal firm (Bae and Gargiulo, 2004, 
George et al., 2001, Hoffmann, 2005, Hoffmann, 2007, Lavie, 2007, Lavie and Miller, 
2008). Others define it as all direct ties with partner firms (Baum et al., 2000, Ozcan 
and Eisenhardt, 2009, Rowley et al., 2000). Another group of scholars define alliance 
319 
 
portfolio as a focal firm’s accumulated alliance experience from both ongoing and past 
alliances (Anand and Khanna, 2000, Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005, Kale et al., 2002, 
Reuer et al., 2002). In sum, different definitions for standalone alliance and portfolio 
alliance has led scholars to measure either at the alliance level or the portfolio level. 
Scholars have not created a scale that combines the two concepts. Overall, alliance 
portfolio research is still burgeoning, and scholars have not conceptualised alliance 
strategy as standalone and portfolio. 
For this study, I create a new scale of alliance strategy. DeVellis (2012) suggests 
scholars define what the study aims to measure, and develop scales based on literature. 
As recommended by DeVellis (2012), I define alliance strategy and draw on the 
literature to develop a five-item scale. DeVellis (2012) then suggests seeking out 
industry experts for clarification and verification on the items developed. I therefore 
contacted senior managers of different companies in the target sample industry to carry 
out this task. DeVellis (2012) further recommends that the scale should be reviewed 
by academic experts and scale length optimised, then tested. I therefore contacted a 
second set of senior executives from the sample industry to test the survey for pilot-
test. Finally, DeVellis (2012) recommends modifying items based on the feedback of 
the test with the second set of executives to finalise the questionnaire.    
From the literature, scholars identify the motivations and benefits of forming 
strategic alliances, such as achieving long-term strategic goals, managing risk and 
uncertainty, accessing resources for synergy creation, and resource integration (Ahuja, 
2000b, Gulati, 2007, Hoffmann, 2007, Lavie, 2006, Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009). 
These are the core strategic considerations for firm alliance strategy. Therefore, I 
developed this measure based on my definitions of alliance strategies and on the core 
strategic considerations suggested in the literature. The aim of this study is to see the 
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extent to which managers view alliances as standalone occurrences or as a portfolio of 
alliances. Therefore, I needed respondents to be able to distinguish the two kinds of 
strategies. It is important to highlight unique characteristics of these two strategies. At 
the same time, scholars often present portfolio perspective as a step up from the 
standalone perspective (Parise and Casher, 2003). Therefore, standalone and portfolio 
strategies can be presented as a continuum. I use strategic descriptions of the two 
strategies at both ends of the continuum in order to gauge the intended alliance strategy, 
using an anchored Likert scale. The first item uses generic descriptions of the 
standalone strategy and portfolio strategy. The other two items are related to core 
strategic considerations for firm alliance strategy. Three items are used to measure the 
firm’s tendency towards either standalone or portfolio alliance strategy. 
In item 1, I developed two descriptive statements that are based on my definitions 
of the two strategies. Scholars have found that the use of descriptive paragraphs is an 
effective means of determining a firm’s strategy (James and Hatten, 1995). Therefore, 
I used descriptive statements at both ends of the continuum to measure a firm’s 
alliance strategy. The statement for a standalone strategy is ‘When we make alliance 
decisions, each alliance is considered as an independent entity and there is a specific 
goal for each alliance independent from other alliances’. Portfolio strategy is described 
as ‘When we make alliance decisions, we take into account the strategic implications 
of all alliances that our company is engaged in, and we consider the interrelationships 
among alliances, including the possible synergies that can be created through the 
combination of the alliances’. The respondents were asked to rate which statement 
best describes their company’s alliance strategy on a continuum (ranging from 1 to 7). 
Firms that choose towards 1 are inclined to a standalone alliance strategy and firms 
that choose towards 7 are inclined to a portfolio alliance strategy.  
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In item 2, I developed two descriptive statements on the importance of short-term 
versus long-term outcomes during alliance formation. The idea is inspired by Ozcan 
and Eisenhardt (2009). The authors suggest that managers who are able to view their 
alliances in the context of the firm’s industry are likely to develop a high-performing 
alliance portfolio. Managers focused on the firm’s industry are likely to be concerned 
with the growth opportunities, future trends and development. This implies that they 
need to plan for a longer time horizon. I interpret that these managers with a long-term 
perspective are more likely to take a portfolio strategy. I developed a scale of 1 to 7 
whereby 1 is ‘We mainly consider short-term outcome during alliance formation’, and 
7 is ‘We mainly consider long-term alliance development goals during alliance 
formation’. I asked respondents to indicate the level of prioritisation for either 
orientations rather than importance, because respondents may feel that both short- and 
long-term outcomes are important when asked this question. By assessing how 
managers perceive the level of prioritisation, I can gauge the tendency of firm’s 
alliance strategy: managers adopting a standalone strategy tend towards short-termism, 
whereas managers adopting a portfolio strategy are more concerned with long-term 
viability and development. 
For item 3, I drew on literature related to alliance risk and uncertainty. Strategic 
alliances allow firms to manage risk and uncertainty (Hoffmann, 2007, George et al., 
2001). Managers tend to have different risk propensity, and strategic choices are 
influenced by the risk preference of the decision-makers (Hoffmann, 2007). I asked 
respondents how they manage alliance risk and uncertainty by using two descriptive 
statements. At one end of the continuum, the statement reads, ‘We manage risk and 
uncertainty of individual alliances in an independent manner’. On the other end of the 
continuum, the statement reads, ‘We manage risk and uncertainty of all alliances 
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together in an integrated manner’. When managers do not view managing risk and 
uncertainty in an integrated manner, they are likely to adopt a standalone strategy, 
because this strategy is less concerned with managing overall risk and uncertainty 
whereas a portfolio strategy encourages managers to consider the risk implications of 
different alliances combined. Therefore, having the managerial view on risk and 
uncertainty can indicate the tendency of choosing an alliance strategy. 
Each item reflects the core strategic considerations of forming alliances. These 
statements indicate the tendency of managerial strategic consideration during alliance 
decision-making. At one end of the spectrum are those firms whose alliance strategy 
is to take a holistic view on their alliances, have a long-term perspective into forming 
alliances, managing overall risk and uncertainty (Hoffmann, 2007, Parise and Casher, 
2003, Vapola et al., 2010, Vassolo et al., 2004). These firms are likely to have a 
portfolio alliance strategy. At the other end of spectrum are firms whose alliance 
strategy is more standalone, ad hoc basis, short-term result oriented, more focused on 
risk and uncertainty related to individual alliance and less concerned with overall 
effect of alliances join together. These firms are likely to have a standalone alliance 
strategy. Therefore, the three-item Likert scale for alliances strategy can tap into a 
firm’s alliance strategic orientation and is suitable for the measurement of alliance 
strategy.  
4.3.6. Mediating Variable 
The mediating variable for this study is alliance capability. In particular, I argue 
that firms need different capabilities to manage alliances either as individual alliances 
or as a portfolio of alliances. Managing a portfolio of alliances is not the same as 
managing individual alliances (Kale and Singh, 2009, Schreiner et al., 2009). In a 
recent alliance capabilities review paper, Wang and Rajagopalan (2015) suggest that 
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individual-alliance capability differs from portfolio-alliance capability. However, they 
do not elaborate on the specific differences between the two kinds of alliance 
capabilities. For the purpose of my research, individual-alliance capability is the 
capability needed to manage individual alliances. It is related to skills in managing the 
life cycle of an alliance. Portfolio-alliance capability is concerned with firm’s ability 
to initiate and manage a portfolio of alliances (Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007, Wang 
and Rajagopalan, 2015). In general, most alliance capability studies do not seek to 
distinguish individual-alliance capability or portfolio-alliance capability. Table 3-1 
shows the key studies that use alliance capability measures.  
Overall, scholars develop items to measure different dimensions or aspects of 
alliance management capabilities relevant to their context of the studies. Some focus 
on single alliance management in general and use measures that are more related to 
single alliance rather than a portfolio of alliances (e.g. Schreiner et al., 2009, Simonin, 
1997). Others purport to focus on portfolio management capability (e.g. Kandemir et 
al., 2006, Sarkar et al., 2009, Schilke and Goerzen, 2010). However, the measures of 
portfolio-alliance capability may also include capability related to managing single 
alliances. This is because scholars do not clearly distinguish individual-alliance 
capability and portfolio-alliance capability. In Table 4-1, I list the items used in each 
of the key alliance capability studies, then categorize these items into individual-
alliance capability and portfolio-alliance capability. The last two columns indicate the 
items that I classify as either individual-alliance capability or portfolio-alliance 
capability, based on my definitions and my hypotheses.   
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Table 4 - 1: Measures used in key alliance capabilities studies 
 
Dimensions Items              CR=0.82,  1= not at all, 4 = moderate, 7= great deal of expertise   Individual Portfolio
1 Partner selection 
2 Partner identification 
3 Understanding strategic implications of collaborating 
1 Estimate assets value and future cash flow 
2 Tax aspect 
3 Closing the deal 
4 Legal aspect 
5 Negotiation 
1 Building trust with the partner 
2 Managing alliance-parent company relations 
3 Conflict resolution 
4 Logistic and resource transfer 
5 Renegotiating initial agreements with partner 
6 Staffing 
7 Cross-cultural training 
8 Technological assessment 
1 Knowledge-skills acquisition 
2 Knowledge-skills safeguarding 
1 Profit and capital repatriation 
2 Exiting from the alliance 
1 =strongly disagree to 7= strongly agree
1
For coordinating partner-related activities, we have established internal processes
(e.g., for marketing, project coordination) within our company.

2
For the cooperation with partner P, we have established cross-company processes,
meaning reaching across company boundaries.

3 Within our company, we meet regularly to adapt our working procedures to partner P 
4
Within our company, we have adjusted our incentive systems (bonus, goal agreement)
to serve the goals of the partnership with partner P.

1
On any given occasion, we can explain the win-win situation of the cooperation to
partner P (e.g., win-win at invitation to bid).

2 We try to achieve an instant link of certain customer needs to our name in partner P. 
3 We make an effort to let partner P know exactly our market positioning. 
4




When organizational changes occur, we always inform partner P about the new
contact persons in our company.

1 Even in difficult situations, we signal readiness for discussion toward partner P. 
2 We stand by partner P’s side even in difficult situations 
3 We listen attentively when partner P explains problems to us. 
4
We care about the concerns of partner P even if we do not expect any advantages to
arise for us in the short term.

5 During conversations we feel intuitively what partner P actually wants 
6
When discussing points of disagreement, we always try to see partner P’s point of
view.

 1 Strongly disagree to 7 strongly agree
1 We actively monitor our environment to identify partnership opportunities. 
2
We routinely gather information about prospective partners in various forums (e.g.
trade shows, industry convention, databases, publications, internet, etc.…)

3 We are alert to market developments that create potential alliance opportunities 
1 Our activities across different alliances are well coordinated 
2 We systematically coordinate our strategies across different alliances 
3 We have processes to systematically transfer knowledge across alliance partners 
1
We conduct periodic reviews of our alliances to understand what we are doing right
and where we are going wrong

2 We periodically collect and analyze field experiences from our alliances 
3 We modify our alliance related procedures as we learn from experience 



















Simonin (1997) AM  Corporate collaboration Know-how    
Schrenier et al., (2009)  SMJ    Alliance Management Capability
Coordination











 Sarkar et al., (2009) OS    Portfolio Management Capability
Dimensions Items                            1= strongly disagree to 7 strongly agree Individual Portfolio
1 We actively monitor our environment to identify partnership opportunities 
2
We routinely gather information about prospective partners in various forum (e.g.
trade shows, industry convention, databases, publications, internet, etc.…)

3 We are alert to market developments that create potential alliance opportunities 
4
We strive to preempt our competition by entering into alliances with key firms before
our competitors can

5 We often take the initiative in approaching firms with alliance proposals 
1
We consider our alliances as a portfolio that requires overall coordination and not as
independent, one-off arrangements **

2 Our activities across different alliances are well coordinated 
3 We systematically coordinate our strategies across different alliances 
4 We have processes to systematically transfer knowledge across alliance partners 
5
Managers from different departments meet periodically to examine how we can create
synergies across our alliances **

1 Staying together during adversity/challenge is very important in our relationships XX 
2 We endeavor to build relationships based on mutual trust and commitment 
3 We strive to be flexible and accommodate partners when problems/needs arise 
4




Information exchange with partners takes place frequently and informally, and not only
according to prespecified agreements XX

 ** items droped from the scale
1= strongly disagree to 7 strongly agree
1 We have the capability to learn from our R&D alliance partners. 
2








We can successfully integrate our existing knowledge with new information acquired
from our R&D alliance partners.

1 We strive to preempt our competition by entering into R&D alliance opportunities. 
2 We often take the initiative in approaching firms with R&D alliance proposals. 
3
Compared to our competitors, we are far more proactive and responsive in finding and
“going after” R&D partnerships.

4 We actively monitor our environment to identify R&D partnership opportunities. 
1




When an unexpected situation arises, we would rather modify an R&D alliance
agreement than insist on the original terms.

3
Flexibility, in response to a request for change, is characteristic of our R&D alliance
management process.

1 Our activities with R&D alliance partners are well coordinated. 
2 We ensure that our work is synchronized with the work of our R&D alliance partners. 
3 There is a great deal of interaction with our R&D alliance partners on most decisions. 
1
We ensure an appropriate coordination among the activities of our different R&D
alliances

2 We determine areas of synergy in our R&D alliance portfolio. 
3 We ensure that interdependencies between our R&D alliances are identified. 









































As shown in Table 4-1, Simonin (1997) and Schreiner et al. (2009) are two 
studies that provide measures for individual-alliance capability. Schreiner et al. 
(2009)’s measure includes coordination, communication and bonding dimensions of 
individual alliances. Simonin (1997)’s measure covers a wide range of capabilities 
from pre-formation (e.g. partner searching and negotiation) to post-formation (e.g. 
negotiation, knowledge and skills transfers and exit). Overall, Simonin (1997)’s 
measure is broader and covers more aspects of individual-alliance capability than 
Schreiner et al. (2009)’s measure. Simonin (1997) uses five areas of managerial 
expertise to gauge capabilities for managing individual alliances and develop items 
relevant to each area of expertise. These areas are: (1) partner searching know-how, 
including items on partner selection, partner identification, and understanding 
strategic implications of collaborating; (2) negotiation know-how, including 
estimating assets value and future cash flow, tax aspect, closing the deal, legal aspect 
and negotiations; (3) management know-how, including building trust with the partner, 
managing alliance-parent company relations, conflict resolution, logistics and 
resource transfer, renegotiating initial agreements with partner, staffing, cross-cultural 
training, and technological assessment; (4) knowledge and skills transfers, including 
knowledge-skills acquisition and knowledge-skills safeguarding, and (5) exiting skills, 
including profit and capital repatriation, and exiting from the alliance. Each item is 
measured on a seven-point Likert-type scale and anchored by (1= not at all, 4 = 
moderate, 7 = great deal of expertise). 
Based on my classification shown in Table 4-1, Kandemir et al. (2006), Sarkar 
et al. (2009), and Schilke and Goerzen (2010) all have both individual-alliance 
capability and portfolio-alliance capability in their alliance capability measure. 
Kandemir et al. (2006) measure alliance orientations, including alliance scanning, 
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alliance coordination and alliance learning. Alliance scanning measures the extent to 
which a firm proactively engages in scanning for partnering opportunities. This 
dimension is more relevant to individual-alliance capability. Alliance coordination 
assesses the extent to which a firm engages in coordinating among its network partners. 
Alliance learning measures the extent to which firms learn from experience. I classify 
Kandemir et al. (2006)’s alliance coordination and alliance learning measures as 
portfolio-alliance capability. 
Sarkar et al. (2009) measure alliance portfolio capability using three dimensions, 
including alliance proactiveness, relational governance and alliance portfolio 
coordination. Alliance proactiveness is similar to Simonin (1997)’s measure of partner 
searching and Kandemir et al. (2006)’s measure of alliance scanning, all of which are 
related to individual-alliance capability. Relational governance is similar to the 
‘management capability’ for individual-alliance capability in Simonin (1997)’s 
measure. Both the management dimension of Simonin (1997) and the relational 
governance dimension of Sarkar et al. (2009) are concerned with building a long-
lasting trust relationship with partners and with conflict resolution. Alliance portfolio 
coordination is the only dimension I classified as portfolio-alliance capability. This is 
similar to Kandemir et al. (2006)’s alliance coordination. 
Schilke and Goerzen (2010)’s measure of portfolio management capability 
includes interorganisational coordination, alliance portfolio coordination, 
interorganisational learning, alliance proactiveness and alliance transformation. These 
different dimensions include both individual-alliance and portfolio-alliance 
capabilities. The authors consider these five dimensions as portfolio management 
capability. However, I classify alliance proactiveness, alliance transformation and 
interorganisational learning as individual-alliance capabilities, because these items are 
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particularly important and relevant to individual alliances. For example, the items for 
measuring alliance proactiveness are concerned with managerial ability to identify 
partnerships and find suitable alliance opportunities. The items for measuring alliance 
transformation are relevant to the managerial ability required for pre-formation and 
post-formation for each individual alliance. The items for measuring 
interorganisational learning are important aspects for knowledge transfers throughout 
the life cycle of an individual alliance. Therefore, these three constructs are classified 
as individual-alliance capabilities.  
For interorganisational coordination and alliance portfolio coordination, both 
measures are relevant to portfolio-alliance capabilities in my study. For example, the 
measures of interorganisational coordination are concerned with the coordination and 
synchronisation with different alliance partners within an alliance portfolio. Alliance 
portfolio coordination is relevant to synergy and interdependencies among partners. 
Therefore, I classify Schilke and Goerzen (2010)’s portfolio management capabilities 
into individual-alliance capabilities and portfolio-alliance capabilities as show in Table 
4-1.  
From the review of these scales used in different studies, I used Schilke and 
Goerzen (2010)’s scale for measuring both individual-alliance capability and 
portfolio-alliance capability. This is because Schilke and Goerzen (2010)’s measure 
has more dimensions than Kandemir et al. (2006) and Sarkar et al. (2009) and provides 
a more complete measure for both individual-alliance and portfolio-alliance 
capabilities. However, Schilke and Goerzen (2010)’s measure only specify R&D 
alliances. For my study, I do not specify R&D alliances. Respondents were asked to 
indicate the level of agreement with the items for each dimension, on a scale of 1 
‘strongly disagree’ to 7 ‘strongly agree’. I asked respondents to assess the level of 
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agreement with each listed aspect of capability. When coding these variables, 
individual alliance capabilities, which include three dimensions – alliance 
proactiveness, alliance transformation and interorganizational learning – I calculated 
a total score that add up the measures of each dimension. Portfolio alliance capabilities 
which cover two dimensions – interorganisational coordination and portfolio alliance 
coordination – I also used a total score that adds up the measures of the two dimensions.  
4.3.7. Control Variable 
Several control variables are included in this study. Firstly, I controlled for the 
potential effects relevant to the characteristics of the firm such as firm size, firm age, 
international sales, R&D orientation, past performance, two different industry effects 
and country effect. Secondly, I controlled for the characteristics of alliances such as 
alliance experience and alliance function. Thirdly, I controlled for respondents’ 
characteristics such as age, educational level, major in business, elite education, tenure 
and functional background. These control variables may have a confounding effect 
and potentially influence the effect of alliance strategy on firm performance. 
Firm size 
Large firms will have more resources to establish alliances and may have more 
experience as well, which may also have a possible size effect on firm performance 
(Brouthers et al., 2014). Therefore, I used the total number of employees to control for 
the effect of firm size on firm performance. Firm size is measured as the number of 
full-time employees. 
Firm age 
Longer-established firms may have more experience in forming alliances and 
may exert an experiential effect on firm performance (Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005). 
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Firm age is measured as the number of years since its founding up until 2016. I asked 
respondents to provide the founding year of the firm.  
International sales 
Similar to (Brouthers and Nakos, 2005), I controlled for a firm’s export 
dependency, which was measured as a percentage of a firm’s international sales to a 
firm's total sales, because firms that depend highly on exports may impact 
performance differently compared to firms less dependent upon export sales. 
Therefore, it is included as a control variable. I follow Brouthers and Nakos (2005) 
and operationalised it as the firm’s ratio of foreign sales to total sales. I asked 
respondents to report the ratio of their foreign sales to total sales.  
R&D orientation 
Gatignon and Xuereb (1997) defined R&D oriented firm as ‘a firm with the 
ability and the will to acquire a substantial technological background and to use it in 
the development of new products’. Scholars suggest that R&D orientation is related to 
firm performance outcomes (Cooper, 1984, Gatignon and Xuereb, 1997). It is likely 
that a firm with a high degree of R&D orientation may influence firm performance. 
Therefore, I followed Schilke and Goerzen (2010) by including R&D orientation as a 
control and using a single item to measure this variable. Respondents were asked to 
indicate the level of agreement with the statement on a seven-point scale, ranging from 
1 (‘Strongly Disagree’) to 7 (‘Strongly Agree’). The statement is: ‘In our company, we 
emphasise Research and Development activities’. 
Past performance 
Past performance may influence firm alliance strategy because a firm may take 
strategic action based on past performance in an attempt to improve firm performance. 
This means that past performance has a potential effect on a firm’s choice of alliance 
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strategy and future performance. Previous studies control for past performance using 
different measures and timeframes (Baum and Wally, 2003, Wiklund and Shepherd, 
2003, Santhanam and Hartono, 2003, Andrevski et al., 2013). For example, Baum and 
Wally (2003) measure past performance with two types of firm performance: growth 
and profitability. Growth is measured with two items: (1) the percentage change in 
annual sales from 1996 to 2000 and, (2) the percentage change in year-end 
employment from 1996 to 2000. Profit is measured with one item: the average annual 
‘pretax net profit percentage of assets’ for 1998, 1999, and 2000. Wiklund and 
Shepherd (2003) directly ask respondents to compare past performance with 
competitors in terms of net profit, sales growth, cash flow and growth of net worth. 
The items use a five-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 ‘Much worse than its 
competitors’ to 5 ‘Much better than its competitors’. Cronbach alpha is 0.76. 
Santhanam and Hartono (2003) take into account past performance not through a 
control variable, but by adjusting for current performance. The authors measure 
financial performance in two categories: profit ratios and cost ratios. Profit ratios 
include return on sales, return on assets, operating income to assets, operating income 
to sales and operating income to employees. Cost ratios include cost of goods sold to 
sales, selling and general administration expenses to sales and operating expenses to 
sales. Data are collected from a secondary data source (COMPUSTAT) for current and 
previous years. Past performance is controlled through adjusting current performance, 
and by regressing prior year performance on current year performance. In alliance 
studies, Andrevski et al. (2013) control for past performance using return on equity 
(ROE) and data are collected from a secondary source.  
Past performance based on financial data is relatively accessible. However, 
tested scales for past performance measures are relatively limited. I followed Schreiner 
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et al. (2009)’s performance measure because it is used in the context of alliance and it 
asks respondents to rate their firm’s performance compared to its competitors over a 
three-year timeframe. This appears to be relevant for measuring a firm’s past 
performance. Schreiner et al. (2009)’s measure is similar to Wiklund and Shepherd 
(2003)’s measure of past performance, but the items are different. Wiklund and 
Shepherd (2003) consider net profit, sales growth, cash flow and growth of net worth, 
while Schreiner et al. (2009) consider sales growth, profitability, return on investment, 
building customer loyalty. The Cronbach alpha for Schreiner et al. (2009) is higher at 
0.93 and Wiklund and Shepherd (2003) is at 0.76. Therefore, following Schreiner et 
al. (2009), I asked respondents to rate the level of firm performance compared with 
their competitors on a seven-point Likert-type scale (ranging from ‘Far Better’ to ‘Far 
Worse’). The question is: ‘During the last three years, how well did your company 
perform relative to your direct competitors in terms of (1) sales growth, (2) 
profitability (3) return on investment (4) building customer loyalty?’. 
Industry effect 1 & 2 
Strategic alliances in certain high technology industries may be more active than 
others (Hagedoorn, 2002). Also, alliances in some industries perform better than those 
in others owing to differences in industry structure (Krishnan et al., 2006). Hitt and 
Tyler (1991) found that industry affects the criteria used to make acquisitions. Many 
scholars have argued the importance of industry in determining the strategies 
employed by the firms (Hitt et al., 2000). Scholars suggest that it is important to 
include an industry effect as a control variable. I used Schilke and Cook (2013)’s 
opening question ‘Which of the following is your company’s primary industry sector?’ 
but provide a selection list based on the primary industry in my sample: 1 for 
manufacturing and contract manufacturing, 2 for equipment and machinery, 3 for 
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materials, chemicals and Accessories, 4 others, please specify. I used dummy variables. 
Manufacturing and contract manufacturing serves as the base relative to which the 
effects of the other dummies (equipment and machinery; materials, chemicals and 
accessories; others) are measured.  
In addition, another industrial control has been included to distinguish 
companies from the PCB industry and companies from plastic rubber industry. This is 
also coded as a dummy variable. 
Country effect 
This effect is also coded as a dummy variable in order to distinguish the 
differences between firms from China and firms from Taiwan. Although they are 
similar and may be considered as the same country, managerial concepts and practices 
may be different. Institutional theory suggests that different countries may have 
different institutional distance as well as psychic distance (Brouthers, 2013b, 
Brouthers et al., 2008). China and Taiwan do have different legal and institutional 
practices. This is likely to have impact on managerial strategic orientation; therefore, 
it is important to control for possible difference. 
Alliance experience 
Alliance experience is concerned with the extent to which a firm has been 
involved in strategic alliances (Schilke and Goerzen, 2010). It is likely that a firm more 
experienced in strategic alliances may have a better firm performance. It may 
potentially influence the relationship between diversity and firm performance. 
Therefore, it is included as a control variable. Following Zollo et al. (2002) and Schilke 
and Goerzen (2010), where alliance experience is measured as the number of strategic 
alliances within the past five years, respondents were asked to indicate the number of 




Alliance function is defined as ‘a position to manage or coordinate all alliance-
related activity in the firm’ (Kale et al., 2002). When a firm has an alliance function, 
this function directs all alliance-related operations. It may influence how a firm forms 
and manages its alliances, and potentially influences alliance strategy. Also, scholars 
have shown that firms with alliance functions achieve better performance results (Kale 
et al., 2002). Thus, alliance function can also influence firm performance. Therefore, 
alliance function is included as a control variable. I followed Kale et al. (2002)’s 
definition and asked respondents to indicate whether their company has a formal, 
dedicated alliance function or department that has responsibility for the firm’s 
alliances. 
Respondent’s age 
Executives’ age may influence strategic decision-making because it is related to 
risk propensity and a manager’s experience (Brouthers et al., 2000, Bantel and Jackson, 
1989, Hambrick and Mason, 1984, Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). Potentially, age may 
affect the moderating effect of alliance strategy because studies have shown that 
executives’ age is related to risk propensity and firm strategic choice (Brouthers et al., 
2000, Hitt and Tyler, 1991). Thus, it is likely to influence the choice of alliance 
strategy. Therefore, I included age as a control variable. I used the age measure of 
Brouthers et al. (2000), whereby age is a continuous two-digit number reported by 
each respondent.  
Education 
I controlled for three education related variables: level of education, major in 
business and elite education, because educational background may influence 
managerial strategic orientation (Hitt and Tyler, 1991, Brouthers et al., 2000) and 
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potentially influence firm alliance strategy. More highly educated managers may 
develop better cognitive abilities, which affects how they formulate alliance strategy. 
Different education specialisation tends to have different decision-making rules 
developed through particular academic training, and may influence the choice of 
alliance strategy. Therefore, I controlled for executives with major in business. In 
addition, managers with an elite education may have more valuable social capital (Cao 
et al., 2012) which has the potential to present more opportunities for alliance 
formation and also influence their alliance strategy. For level of education, I followed 
Brouthers et al. (2000) and Bantel and Jackson (1989), providing five categories 
ranging from high school to doctorate. (i.e. junior high school, high school, 
undergraduate degree, masters degree and doctoral degree). The categories of 
educational levels have been changed to reflect the education systems in China and 
Taiwan. I asked respondents to select the education level attained from the following 
categories: 1 for junior high school and below, 2 for high school education, 3 for 
undergraduate degree, 4 for master’s degree and 5 for doctor of philosophy (Ph. D).  
For type of education, I included 10 categories to reflect the major areas of study 
in China and Taiwan. These categories are chosen from Bantel and Jackson (1989), 
Hitt and Tyler (1991) and Wiersema and Bantel (1992). The respondents are requested 
to choose from the following selections: 1 for accounting/finance, 2 for 
business/management/marketing, 3 for science, 4 for engineering, 5 for IT and 
computing, 6 for law, 7 for language, 8 for art and design, 9 sociology and social 
studies and 10 for other fields that respondents can specify. When coding, this variable 
is coded as a dummy variable, 0 (Zero) for major in business such as 1 for 




For elite education, I asked respondents to specify the education establishments 
they have attended for undergraduate and postgraduate studies in an open-ended 
question. When coding, I referred to the ranking of the respondent’s university in their 
country of education (See appendix A and B for China and Taiwan). If respondents 
were educated overseas, I checked with the university ranking in the corresponding 
countries. If overseas educated executives graduated from the top 20 education 
institutes in the specific countries, they were considered as graduating from elite 
universities. The variable is coded as 0 (Zero) if the respondent did not complete a 
formal degree or did not have any degree from an elite university. Coded for 1 (One) 
if the respondent had either an undergraduate degree or post graduate degree from an 
elite university.  
Tenure 
I controlled for executive’s tenure. Tenure can be categorised into three types: 
positional tenure, firm tenure and industrial tenure. For this study, I used positional 
tenure as a control variable. Positional tenure is defined as the number of years a top 
executive has been employed in his or her current position. Positional tenure may 
influence strategic decision-making because managers may build and obtain different 
firm knowledge and social capital in different stages of the tenure (Hambrick and 
Fukutomi, 1991). I followed Bantel and Jackson (1989), and asked respondents to 
specify the year he/she joined the current company and his/her current position. Tenure 
is thus a continuous measure. 
Functional background 
Executive functional background may influence managerial strategic choice 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984, Waller et al., 1995), and potentially influence the 
moderating effect of firm alliance strategy because functional background influences 
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how executives develop their knowledge, skills and strategic orientation (Herrmann 
and Datta, 2006). Their functional background determines what particular skill set 
they have, which is likely to influence firm alliance strategy. For example, 
Geletkanycz and Black (2001) document that executives in the functional areas of 
finance, marketing, law and general management are most strongly related to strategic 
commitment to the status quo. This implies that these managers may be less willing to 
formulate new strategy and influence the choice of firm alliance strategy. Therefore, 
it has been included as a control variable. I draw on Bantel and Jackson (1989) for the 
opening question ‘The functional area in which you had the most experience?’ and 
follow Bunderson and Sutcliffe (2002) for the categories to select from, because their 
categories are more suited to my sample industry (i.e. sales or marketing, 
manufacturing, finance or accounting, personnel/HR, distribution or warehouse, R&D, 
equipment management, administrative support, and general management). When 
coding, Functional background is coded as a dummy variable, 0 (Zero) for all other 
functional backgrounds (manufacturing, distribution or warehouse, R&D, equipment 
management, finance accounting, personnel/HR, administrative support and general 
management) and 1 (One) for output functional background (sales and marketing). 
4.3.8. Statistical Analysis 
Firstly, I described the data composition of the sample such as key statistics of 
the firm (e.g. firm size, percentage spread of the different industries). Secondly, I 
tested for common methods variance, and reliability and validity statistically.  
Common methods variance 
As with all self-reported data, there is a potential for common method bias 
resulting from single-respondent response (Chang et al., 2010, Podsakoff et al., 2003). 
In order to prevent common method bias, I followed the suggestions from Chang et al. 
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(2010) and Podsakoff et al. (2003). Firstly, through the design of the study’s procedure, 
Chang et al. (2010) suggest using different response formats to measure different 
variables when designing the questionnaire. For dependent variables, a four-item 
seven-point Likert-type scale was used to measure firm performance. For the 
independent variables, I used a mixture of open-ended questions and listed choices for 
selection. These can prevent respondents choosing the same response pattern, which 
may affect the accuracy of data (Brouthers et al., 2000).  
Secondly, through statistical tests, factor analysis was used in which all items 
from each of the constructs load into an exploratory factor analysis to determine 
whether the majority of the variance between measures can be accounted for by one 
general factor (Chang et al., 2010). The logic behind this test is that if common method 
variance is a serious issue in the data, a single factor will emerge or one general factor 
will account for most of the covariance in the dependent and independent variables 
(Podsakoff et al., 2003). If the model does not achieve an acceptable fit, then it should 
not have a single common method factor. This statistical test can increase the 
reliability of the data for interpretation (Brouthers et al., 2003). However, Chang et al. 
(2010) and Podsakoff et al. (2003) suggest that Harman’s one-factor test is not 
sufficient to claim that common method variance is not an issue. Confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) was used to overcome the drawback of the one-factor test and further 
test potential common method bias among variables in my survey (Podsakoff et al., 
2003). All items of the survey were loaded to a common method factor, and if the fit 
indexes for the data were not an acceptable fit, this would suggest that common 
method variance is less likely to influence the observed relationship among variables 




Reliability and validity 
Before testing the hypotheses, I used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to 
evaluate the validity of the measures. The CFA measurement will be reported to see 
if the model fits with the data satisfactorily. If the results show that all standardised 
item loadings are significantly greater than zero (p ≤0.01), positive, and high in 
magnitude (≥0.65), they provide evidence of convergent validity (Hair et al., 2009). 
 I also conducted further testing for individual-alliance capability, portfolio-
alliance capability, alliance strategy and firm performance constructs using 
Cronbach’s  alphas (α) and average variances extracted (AVE) for these multi-item 
constructs. The result is reported and presented in Table 4-2. If all values for each 
construct exceed the recommended thresholds i.e. (α) ≥ 0.7 and (AVE) ≥ 0.5, then 
these measures demonstrate adequate convergent validity and reliability (Bagozzi and 
Yi, 2012, Bagozzi and Yi, 1988). 
Hypotheses Testing 
To test for my Hypotheses H1 to H3, I used the process procedure (Hayes, 2013) 
in the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). This allows for testing a 
direct relation between alliance strategy and firm performance (H1) as well as 
examining the impact of the indirect relationship for one independent variable on the 
relationship between another independent and dependent variable (H2 and H3) 
(Preacher et al., 2007). 
4.4. Results 
4.4.1. Validity and Reliability 
I first conducted analysis for each measurement construct. Cronbach alpha, 
composite reliability (CR) and average variance extracted (AVE) are indicative of 
reliability and validity of each individual construct. Convergent validity was indicated 
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by the fact that all standardised loadings were above 0.68 and significant (p < 0.01). 
The standardised loading for reflective indicator was ideal at 0.7 (Hair, 2009). 
Composite reliabilities ranged from 0.74 to 0.92, which are above the benchmark of 
0.7 (Fornell and Larcker, 1981, Hair, 2009). The average variance extracted (AVE) 
measures the amount of variance captured by a construct’s measure relative to 
measurement error. All constructs achieved recommended levels of 0.5 (Fornell and 
Larcker, 1981, Hair, 2009). The results for each construct are reported in Table 4-2. 
Discriminant validity analysis was firstly conducted with a more rigorous test 
based on Fornell and Larcker (1981), to compare the average variance extracted values 
with the squared correlation for each of the constructs (Hair, 2009). The average 
variance extracted estimates should be greater than the squared correlation estimate 
between the latent variable and all other latent variables. Alternatively, the square root 
of every average variance extracted for each construct is greater than the specific 
correlations with any of the other constructs. The result of discriminant validity is 
shown in Table 4-3. Discriminant validity is shown when each measurement item 
correlates weakly with all other constructs except for the one to which it is 
theoretically associated. The two mediating variables – individual-alliance 
capabilities and portfolio-alliance capabilities – were marginally less by 0.01 of the 
square root of the AVE. 
Secondly, correlation analysis was conducted. The majority of inter-item 
correlations between variables were all relatively low, generally falling between 0.02 
and 0.7. There were a few exceptions which had correlation values exceeding 0.6, one 
of which was the correlation between a control variable and a dependent variable, i.e. 
past performance and firm performance. This shall not be a concern, as the correlation 
occurs between control and dependent variable is acceptable. Also, the correlation 
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between the two moderating variables – individual-alliance capabilities and portfolio-
alliance capabilities, were at 0.778 – that is higher than the recommended value of 0.7 
(Hair, 2009). However, these two mediating variables were not included in the same 
regression for my mediating analysis. The descriptive statistics and correlations are 
summarised in Table 4-4; the majority of inter-item correlations between those 
variables are relatively low, at low to moderate levels. This is one indication that the 
variables are unidimensional and that there exists, as a result, good validity which does 
not threaten discriminant validity.  
Thirdly, the variance inflation factors (VIF) were examined, because the result 
of correlation analysis showed a slightly higher correlation between the two mediating 
variables – individual-alliance capabilities and portfolio-alliance capabilities, which 
may be a concern for multicollinearity. I found that all VIF scores were less than the 
recommended values between 3 to 5 (Hair, 2009), indicating a low probability of 











During the last 3 years, how well did your company perform relative to your direct
competitors in terms of?1. Sal s g owth
2. Profitability
3. Return on Investment
4. Building customer loyalty
Firm Performance






When we make alliance decisions, each alliance is considered as an independent entity and
there is a specific goal for each alliance independently from other alliances VERSUS
When we make alliance decisions, we take into account the strategic implications of all
alliances that our company is engaged in, and we consider the inter-relationships among
alliances, including the possible synergies that can be created through the combination of
the alliances
We mainly consider short-term outcome during alliance formation VERSUS We mainly
consider long-term alliance development goal during alliance formation
We manage risk and uncertainty of individual alliances in an independent manner
VERSUS We manage risk and uncertainty of all alliances together in an integrated manner
Alliance Proactiveness
We strive to preempt our competition by entering into alliance opportunities
We often take the initiative in approaching firms with alliance proposals
Compared to our competitors, we are far more proactive and responsive in finding and
“going after” partnershipsWe actively monitor our environment to identify partnership opportunities
Alliance Transformation
We are willing to put aside contractual terms to improve the outcomes of our alliances
When an unexpected situation arises, we would rather modify an alliance agreement than
insist on the original termsFlexibility, in respons  to a request for change, is characteristics of our alliance
management processInter-organizational Learning
We have the capability to learn from our alliance partners
We have the managerial competence to absorb new knowledge from our alliance partners
We have adequate routines to analyze the information obtained from our alliance partners
We can successfully integrate our existing knowledge with new information acquired from
our alliance partnersInter-organizational Cooridnation
Our activities with alliance partners are well coordinated
We ensure that our work is synchronized with the work of our alliance partners
There is a great deal of interaction with our alliance partners on most decisions
Portfolio Coordination
We ensure an appropriate coordination among the activities of our different alliances
We determine areas of synergy in our alliance portfolio
We ensure that interdependencies between our alliances are identified
We determine if there are overlaps between our different alliances
I often play on-line games
I like to play on-line games















































































1 2 3 4 5
Performance 0.82
Past Performance 0.73 0.81
Alliance Strategy 0.24 0.28 0.81
Individual Alliance Capabilities 0.83 0.63 0.35 0.77
Portfolio Alliance Capabilities 0.85 0.65 0.37 0.78 0.77
The diagonal items - the square root of average variance extracted.
The off diagonal items - the square correlation between construct
Discriminant Validity of Constructs
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Table 4 - 4: Correlation matrix 
 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
1 Firm Performance 1
2 Alliance Strategy .239
** 1















6 Firm Size .036 -.002 .057 .067 .337
** 1











** .137 -.034 .067 1



























* .054 .115 .406
** .120 .022 1









** -.015 .100 1
13 Industry effect 2 -.067 .260








14 Country effect .041 .049 .107 .043 .140 .019 .231
**
.229
** .103 .105 .069 .012 -.185
* 1






* .045 -.059 .263
** .127 .197
** 1
16 Educational Level -.037 .078 -.039 .001 -.086 .031 .079 -.194




17 Major in business .022 -.010 .125 .012 -.037 .000 .066 .126 .114 .021 .145
* -.132 -.124 .086 -.085 .095 1
18 Elite Education -.039 .083 .021 -.008 -.047 .180
* .137 -.233
** .077 .079 -.032 .110 .251
** -.065 .003 .517
** -.055 1
19 Tenure -.002 .130 .025 .027 .110 .019 -.036 .197




** -.046 -.019 1
20 Output Functional background .136 .077 .036 .110 -.063 -.057 .037 .026 -.193
** -.064 .110 -.097 .122 -.003 -.264
** .071 .078 -.028 -.223
** 1




** .089 .096 -.034 -.105 .214
** 1
Mean 19.358 14.363 51.255 34.324 26.032 627.503 44.676 6.005 0.653 21.332 18.968 0.295 0.642 0.942 0.000 0.000 0.347 0.416 0.000 0.358 5.084
Standard Deviation 3.535 3.247 6.415 3.938 15.748 1931.820 25.842 0.892 0.477 19.972 3.627 0.457 0.481 0.234 1.000 1.000 0.477 0.494 1.000 0.481 3.617
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).




Table 4 - 5: Test for multicollinearity 
  
In order to examine construct validity of measures used in this study, a series of 
confirmatory factor analyses were conducted. First, I tested alliance capabilities 
construct as a second-order construct (Bagozzi, 1994), and this construct contains five 
dimensions – alliance proactiveness, alliance transformation, interorganisational 
learning, inter-organisational coordination and portfolio coordination as Model 1. The 
standardised loadings of alliance capability for its respective dimensions were 0.89, 
0.84, 0.76, 0.73 and 0.92 (p < 0.01). The model fit of the second-order construct 
indicates a good overall fit: 2 /df =1.76, Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 0.96, 
Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) =0.89, Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) = 0.95, Root Mean 
Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = 0.06. The main criteria of assessing model 
fit indices exceed minimum value, except for GFI which is less than 0.9 threshold. 
Second, I tested the second-order construct for alliance capabilities as two 
factors – individual-alliance capabilities and portfolio-alliance capabilities as Model 
2. Individual-alliance capabilities consist of alliance proactiveness, alliance 
Tolerance VIF
Controls Firm Age .751 1.331
Firm Size .675 1.483
International Sales .739 1.353
RD Orientation .622 1.608
Alliance Function .738 1.355
Alliance number .636 1.571
Past Performance .478 2.094
Industry effect 1 .540 1.853
Industry effect 2 .494 2.024
Country effect .842 1.188
Zage .565 1.770
Educational Level .593 1.688
Major in business .875 1.143
Elite Education .598 1.672
Tenure .623 1.605
Independent variable Alliance Strategy .686 1.459
Mediators Individual Capabilities .295 3.386
Portfolio Capabilities .301 3.327
Variable Name
Collinearity Statistics
Note: Firm performance is the dependent variable
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transformation and interorganisational learning. Portfolio-capabilities consist of 
interorganisational coordination and portfolio coordination. The standardised loadings 
of individual-alliance capabilities for its respective dimensions were 0.89, 0.85 and 
0.76 (p < 0.01). The standardised loadings of portfolio-alliance capabilities for its 
respective dimensions were 0.73 and 0.93 (p< 0.01). The model fit of the second-order 
two-factor construct indicates a good overall fit: 2 /df =1.77, Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI) = 0.96, Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = 0.89, Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) = 0.95, 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = 0.06. GFI is the only index 
below 0.9 threshold; this is the same as the one-factor construct of alliance capabilities. 
All other indices are within a satisfactory value above 0.9. The RMSEA proved 
satisfactory since values at or below 0.05 indicate a good fit and values at or below 
0.08 indicate an adequate fit (Steiger, 1990).  
4.4.2. Common Variance Test with Marker Variable 
Lindell and Whitney (2001) suggest that the best way to address common 
method variance is to include a scale that is theoretically unrelated to other scale in 
the survey. In my survey, a three-item marker variable was included between survey 
questions. To test common variance bias, I first checked the Cronbach alpha, 
composite reliability and AVE of the marker variable and these indicators were all 
within the specified level as shown in Table 4-2. Also, it is important to check the 
discriminant validity of the marker variable. The marker variable should have a non-
significant or low correlations with the other variables in the study (Lindell and 
Whitney, 2001, Williams et al., 2010). I found the correlations between the marker 
variable with the other variables were mostly low and non-significant (See Table 4-4). 
This supports the discriminant validity of the marker variable. 
In addition, Lindell and Whitney (2001) suggest to examine the significance of 
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correlations between the relevant predictors and the dependent variable when common 
method variance is controlled. The authors use mathematic equations to calculate the 
changes in correlations after CMV is controlled. I applied the mathematical formulae 
to my dataset and found that the variables had significant correlations with the 
dependent variables before CMV is controlled, they remain significant after CMV 
adjusted. Therefore, I can conclude that the correlations of relevant independent 
variables with dependent variable cannot be accounted for by common method 
variance as relevant variables still retain their significance. 
4.4.3. Hypotheses Testing 
To test my hypotheses, I used process procedure (Hayes, 2013) in SPSS. Process 
is a software add-on for SPSS and uses an ordinary least squares regression based 
analytic framework to calculate direct and indirect effects for mediating analysis 
(Hayes, 2013). I used this approach to test for mediation rather than Baron and 
Kenny’s (1986) approach, because Baron and Kenny (1986) do not directly estimate 
indirect effect but infer indirect effects from a set of hypothesis tests (Preacher and 
Hayes, 2008). Baron and Kenny’s approach (1986) for mediation requires the 
independent variable is related to both the dependent and the hypothesised mediator 
variable, and when the mediator variable is controlled for in a regression analysis, the 
relationship between independent and dependent variables becomes non-significant; 
it is full mediation or if the relationship between independent and dependent variable 
is substantially reduced, then it is partial mediation. A number of scholars have 
commented on Baron and Kenny’s approach and suggested that indirect effect shall 
be quantified (Hayes, 2013) and total effect of independent variable should not be a 




Therefore, I chose the process procedure (Hayes, 2013) in SPSS to test my 
hypotheses. In a mediation model, the effect of an independent variable on dependent 
variable can be partitioned into two parts: 1) the direct effect of independent variable 
on dependent variable and 2) the indirect effect of independent variable on dependent 
variable via the mediator. Combined, the direct and indirect effect of independent 
variable on dependent variable is known as the total effect. I calculated a simple 
mediation model to directly estimate the indirect effect. The indirect effect is estimated 
as the product term of a and b (See Figure 4-1, 4-2 and 4-3). The product term of a and 
b together with the direct effect of c’, these sum up to the total effect of the independent 
variables on the dependent variable. Also, I applied a bootstrapping method to 
calculate indirect effect with the general recommendation of N=10000 resamples 
(Hayes, 2013). For mediation analysis, mediation is occurred when the strength of the 
relationship between independent variable and dependent variable is reduced by 
including the mediator. In other words, c’ is smaller than c, where c is the effect of the 
independent variable when moderating effect is not included in the model. When c’ < 
c, it is a partial mediation. When c’ = 0, it is a perfect mediation. Alternatively, if a*b 
(the indirect effect) is statistically significant, mediation has occurred. Figure 4-1, 4-2 
and 4-3 illustrate the mediation path analysis of each mediation model. 
Three separate mediation models were used to test my hypotheses. Each model 
consists of 16 control variables, alliance strategy as independent variable and firm 
performance as dependent variable, and the mediators are different in each model. The 
mediators are Alliance Capabilities (AC) in Model A, Individual-Alliance Capabilities 
(IAC) in Model B and Portfolio-Alliance Capabilities (PAC) in Model C. As 
recommended by (Hayes, 2013, Guendelman et al., 2011), the model coefficients, 
direct, indirect and total effects were reported in un-standardised form. The model 
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summary of each model is reported in Table 4-6, 4-7 and 4-8. 
Model A (Table 4-6) shows a significant R2 of 85%, and F-statistic was 
significant (p < 0.01). The independent variable of alliance strategy and the mediating 
variable of alliance capabilities are both significant at (p < 0.01). For the control 
variable, five of the control variables are significant: alliance number (p < 0.05), past 
performance (p < 0.01), industry effect 2 (p < 0.1), major in business (p < 0.01) and 
output functional background (p < 0.05).  
Model B (Table 4-7) shows a significant R2 of 80%, and F-statistic was 
significant (p < 0.01). The independent variable of alliance strategy and the mediating 
variable of individual-alliance capabilities were both significant at (p < 0.05) and (p < 
0.01) respectively. Four of the control variables were significant: alliance number (p 
< 0.1), past performance (p < 0.01), major in business (p < 0.01) and output functional 
background (p < 0.05). 
Model C (Table 4-8) shows a significant R2 of 82%, and F-statistic was 
significant (p < 0.01). The mediating variable of portfolio-alliance capabilities was 
significant at (p < 0.01) and the independent variable of alliance strategy was at (p < 
0.05). The significant control variables were R&D orientation (p < 0.05), alliance 
number (p < 0.1), past performance (p < 0.01), industry effect 2 (p < 0.01) and output 
functional background (p < 0.05). 
4.4.3.1. Total Effect: Alliance Strategy on Firm Performance 
The total effect is the effect of independent variable on dependent variable when 
mediator is not presented in the model, i.e. the c path. For example, the total effect of 
alliance strategy on firm performance is derived by summing the direct and indirect 
effects: c = c' + ab. For the three different mediators, the total effect of alliance strategy 
on firm performance are the same, as can be seen from the calculation below: 
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For alliance capabilities as mediator = -0.115 + 0.143 = 0.028. 
For individual-alliance capabilities as mediator = -0.0924+0.1205 = 0.028 
For portfolio-alliance capabilities as mediator = -0.086+ 0.114 =0.028 
The total effect explains that the scores of managers who differ by one unit in 
alliance strategy are estimated to differ by 0.028 units in their firm performance. The 
coefficient is positive; this means managers toward portfolio strategy are likely to 
achieve a better firm performance. For Hypothesis 1 (H1), I hypothesised that a 
portfolio strategy is likely to lead to better firm performance. However, this effect is 
the same for all models, and it is not significant as it is not statistically different from 
zero; t = 0.4487, p =0.6542, with a confidence interval between -0.0963 to 0.1530. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 1 (H1) is not supported. 
4.4.3.2. Indirect Effect: Alliance Capabilities as Mediator 
The indirect effect is the effect of alliance strategy on firm performance through 
relationship alliance capabilities. Multiplying a and b yields the indirect effect, ab = 
0.519*0.277 = 0.143. It is the effect of alliance capability on alliance strategy which, 
in turn, affects firm performance. This means two managers who differ by one unit in 
their alliance strategy are estimated to differ by 0.143 units in firm performance as a 
result of a higher tendency toward portfolio strategy with higher alliance capabilities 
because both a and b are positive, which in turn achieves better firm performance. This 
indirect effect is statistically different from zero, as revealed by a 95% bootstrap 
confidence interval that is entirely above zero (0.0366 to 0.2493). In addition, the 
normal theory based Sobel test (Z=2.80, p< 0.01) agrees with bootstrap confidence 
interval. The indirect effect showed that alliance capabilities mediates between 
alliance strategy and firm performance. 
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4.4.3.3. Indirect Effect: Individual-alliance Capabilities as Mediator 
When multiplying a and b yields the indirect effect, a*b = 0.333*0.362 = 0.121. 
It is the effect of individual-alliance capabilities on alliance strategy which, in turn, 
affect firm performance. This means two managers who differ by one unit in their 
alliance strategy are estimated to differ by 0.121 units in firm performance as a result 
of a higher tendency toward portfolio strategy with higher alliance capabilities, 
because both a and b are positive, which in turn achieves better firm performance. This 
indirect effect is statistically different from zero, as revealed by a 95% bootstrap 
confidence interval that is entirely above zero (0.0238 to 0.2192). In addition, the 
normal theory based Sobel test (Z=2.62, p < 0.01) agrees with bootstrap confidence 
interval. The indirect effect showed that individual-alliance capabilities mediates 
between alliance strategy and firm performance. For Hypothesis (H2), I hypothesised 
individual-alliance capabilities mediate between alliance strategy and firm 
performance. The results of indirect effect support the hypothesis.  
4.4.3.4. Indirect Effect: Portfolio-alliance as Mediator 
When a and b are multiplied together, the indirect effect is 0.114 (a*b = 
0.186*0.615 = 0.114). This is the indirect effect of portfolio-alliance capabilities on 
alliance strategy, which, in turn, affect firm performance. The indirect effect is 
statistically different from zero with a 95% bootstrap confidence interval that is 
entirely above zero (0.0244 to 0.2091). Also, the normal theory based Sobel test 
(Z=2.37, p < 0.05) agrees with bootstrapping confidence interval. The indirect effect 
shows a mediating effect of portfolio-alliance capabilities between portfolio strategy 
and firm performance. As a and b are positive, this means managers who have a higher 
tendency toward portfolio strategy with higher portfolio-alliance capabilities tend to 
achieve better firm performance. For Hypothesis (H3), I hypothesised that portfolio-
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alliance capabilities mediate between portfolio strategy and firm performance. The 
result supports the hypothesis. 
4.4.3.5. Direct Effect 
The direct effect of alliance strategy on firm performance is the relationship 
between them controlling for mediator. I used three separate mediators – alliance 
capabilities, individual-alliance capabilities and portfolio-alliance capabilities – and 
each direct effect is estimated as c' = -0.115, -0.092 and -0.086 respectively (see Figure 
4-1, 4-2 and 4-3). Take the example of alliance capabilities as mediator; the direct 
effect means that two managers differ by one unit on alliance strategy score but are 
equal on alliance capability scores, and are estimated to differ by 0.115 in firm 
performance score. The coefficients of the direct effect for the three separate mediating 
models are all negative, meaning that the managers have a tendency toward portfolio 
strategy with the same alliance capabilities score or zero alliance capabilities scores is 
estimated to be 0.115 units lower in the firm performance. This direct effect is 
significant as it is statistically different from zero, (t = -2.9813, p< 0.01) with a 
confidence interval from -0.1917 to -0.0390. The direct effect for other two mediating 
models are also significant as both are significantly different from zero (t =-2.0438, p 
< 0.05) and (t = -2.163, p < 0.05) and confidence interval are (-0.0032 to -0.1816) and 
(-0.0018 to -0.1699). 
To sum up, the three separated mediating models all indirectly influenced firm 
performance through its effect on alliance strategy, as can be seen in Figure 4-1, 4-2 
and 4-3. To conclude the mediating analysis for my hypotheses, Hypothesis 1 (H1) is 
not supported as alliance strategy was not significant for all three mediating models, 
as shown in the result of total effect when the mediator is not presented in each model. 
For Hypothesis (H2), I hypothesised that individual-alliance capabilities mediate 
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between alliance strategy and firm performance. This is supported by the indirect 
effect when individual-alliance capability is the mediator; the indirect effect is 
significant and the direct effect is significant. For Hypothesis 3 (H3), I hypothesised 
that portfolio-alliance capabilities mediate between portfolio strategy and firm 
performance. Both direct and indirect effect are significant. The indirect effect of 
portfolio-alliance capabilities as mediator show evidence that portfolio-alliance 
capabilities mediate between portfolio strategy and firm performance because the 
result shows that managers with a high tendency toward portfolio strategy and high 
scores on portfolio-alliance capabilities achieve better firm performance. Hence, 
Hypothesis 3 (H3) is supported.  
Figure 4 - 1: Alliance capabilities as mediator 
 
Figure 4 - 2: Individual-alliance capabilities as mediator 
 
Figure 4 - 3: Portfolio-alliance capabilities as mediator 
 
AC
a=0.519*** b=0.277*** Coeff. SE p Coeff. SE p Coeff. SE p
Alliance Strategy (AS) c 0.028 0.063 0.654 a 0.519 0.183 0.005 c' -0.115 0.039 0.003
Alliance Capabilities (AC) b 0.277 0.016 0.000
AS FP Constant i1 4.017 1.648 0.016 i
2 37.302 4.774 0.000 i
3 -6.315 1.148 0.000
c'= -0.115***
Indirect effect (a*b)














F(17,172) = 14.426, p < 0.01
0.519*0.277 = 0.143
IAC
a=0.333*** b=0.362*** Coeff. SE p Coeff. SE p Coeff. SE p
Alliance Strategy (AS) c 0.028 0.063 0.654 a 0.333 0.125 0.008 c' -0.092 0.045 0.040
Individual Alliance Capabilities (IAC) b 0.362 0.027 0.000
AS FP Constant i1 4.017 1.648 0.016 i
2 20.870 3.250 0.000 i




F(18,171) = 37.605, p < 0.01F(17,172) = 14.426, p < 0.01











F(17,172) =10.671, p <0.01
PAC
a=0.186*** b=0.615*** Coeff. SE p Coeff. SE p Coeff. SE p
Alliance Strategy (AS) c 0.028 0.063 0.654 a 0.186 0.077 0.017 c' -0.086 0.043 0.045
Portfolio Alliance Capabilities (PAC) b 0.615 0.042 0.000
AS FP Constant i1 4.017 1.648 0.016 i
2 16.433 2.009 0.000 i
3 -6.097 1.288 0.000
c'= -0.086***
Indirect effect (a*b) 0.186*0.615 = 0.114
F(17,172) = 10.376, p <0.01 F(18,171) = 43.241, p <0.01
Model Coefficients










F(17,172) = 14.426, p < 0.01
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Table 4 - 6: Model A summary 
  
Model A
Dependent Variable: Firm Performance Sample Size: 190
Independent Variable: Alliance Strategy
Mediating variable: Alliance Capability
  R R
2 MSE F df1 df2 p
0.9237 0.8531 2.028 55.1836 18 171 0.0000
Coefficient se t p LLCI ULCI Significant
constant   -6.3148 1.1483 -5.4991 0.0000 -8.5815 -4.0481
Alliance capabilities 0.2770 0.0158 17.5774 0.0000 0.2459 0.3081 Y
Alliance strategy -0.1153 0.0387 -2.9813 0.0033 -0.1917 -0.0390 Y
Firm age 0.0049 0.0076 0.6452 0.5197 -0.0101 0.0199
Firm size 0.0000 0.0001 0.3969 0.6919 -0.0001 0.0002
International activities -0.0032 0.0047 -0.6885 0.4920 -0.0124 0.0060
RD orientation 0.0899 0.1468 0.6122 0.5412 -0.1999 0.3797
Alliance Function 0.0132 0.2573 0.0513 0.9591 -0.4948 0.5212
Alliance number -0.0132 0.0065 -2.0283 0.0441 -0.0261 -0.0004 Y
Past Performance 0.2341 0.0407 5.7475 0.0000 0.1537 0.3144 Y
Industry effect 1      -0.2485 0.3107 -0.7998 0.4249 -0.8618 0.3648
Industry effect 2    -0.5195 0.3055 -1.7003 0.0909 -1.1226 0.0836 Y
Country effect -0.6465 0.4832 -1.3381 0.1826 -1.6002 0.3072
Respondent's age 0.1737 0.1388 1.2512 0.2126 -0.1003 0.4476
Educational level 0.0788 0.1341 0.5879 0.5573 -0.1858 0.3435
Major in business   -0.7037 0.2296 -3.0644 0.0025 -1.157 -0.2504 Y
Elite Education -0.0959 0.2672 -0.359 0.7201 -0.6233 0.4315
Tenure -0.0551 0.1334 -0.4135 0.6797 -0.3184 0.2081
Output functional bacground 0.6167 0.2418 2.5501 0.0116 0.1393 1.0940 Y
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Table 4 - 7: Model B summary 
 
 
Table 4 - 8: Model C summary 
 
  
Model B Sample Size: 190
Dependent Variable: Firm Performance
Independent Variable: Alliance Strategy
Mediating variable: Individual Alliance Capability
  R R
2 MSE F df1 df2 p
0.8935 0.7983 2.7847 37.6054 18 171 0.0000
Coefficient se t p LLCI ULCI Significant
constant   -3.5467 1.2872 -2.7554 0.0065 -6.0875 -1.0059
Individual Alliance Capabilities 0.3624 0.0271 13.3616 0.0000 0.3089 0.4160 Y
Alliance strategy -0.0924 0.0452 -2.0438 0.0425 -0.1816 -0.0032 Y
Firm age 0.0060 0.0089 0.6801 0.4973 -0.0115 0.0236
Firm size 0.0000 0.0001 0.3118 0.7556 -0.0001 0.0002
International activities -0.0030 0.0055 -0.5480 0.5844 -0.0138 0.0078
RD orientation 0.0939 0.1730 0.5428 0.5880 -0.2476 0.4354
Alliance Function 0.0438 0.3020 0.1452 0.8847 -0.5523 0.6400
Alliance number -0.0136 0.0076 -1.7870 0.0757 -0.0287 0.0014 Y
Past Performance 0.3343 0.0455 7.3507 0.0000 0.2445 0.4241 Y
Industry effect 1      -0.3284 0.3642 -0.9017 0.3685 -1.0474 0.3906
Industry effect 2    -0.1467 0.3600 -0.4076 0.6841 -0.8573 0.5638
Country effect -0.7018 0.5661 -1.2396 0.2168 -1.8192 0.4157
Respondent's age 0.2582 0.1623 1.5908 0.1135 -0.0622 0.5785
Educational level 0.1245 0.1574 0.7909 0.4301 -0.1862 0.4352
Major in business   -0.9103 0.2692 -3.3813 0.0009 -1.4417 -0.3789 Y
Elite Education -0.2668 0.3150 -0.8471 0.3981 -0.8885 0.3549
Tenure -0.1089 0.1561 -0.6978 0.4862 -0.4170 0.1992
Output functional bacground 0.7095 0.2832 2.5053 0.0132 0.1505 1.2685 Y
Model C
Dependent Variable: Firm Performance Sample Size: 190
Independent Variable: Alliance Strategy
Mediating variable: Individual Alliance Capability
  R R
2 MSE F df1 df2 p
0.9055 0.8199 2.4871 43.2419 18 171 0.0000
Coefficient se t p LLCI ULCI Significant
constant   -6.0973 1.2875 -4.7356 0.0000 -8.6388 -3.5558
Portfolio Alliance Capabilities 0.6154 0.0415 14.8444 0.0000 0.5336 0.6973 Y
Alliance strategy -0.0858 0.0426 -2.0163 0.0453 -0.1699 -0.0018 Y
Firm age 0.0056 0.0084 0.6643 0.5074 -0.0110 0.0222
Firm size 0.0000 0.0001 0.4297 0.6680 -0.0001 0.0002
International activities -0.0049 0.0052 -0.9394 0.3489 -0.0151 0.0054
RD orientation 0.3446 0.1601 2.1519 0.0328 0.0285 0.6606 Y
Alliance Function 0.2771 0.2832 0.9786 0.3292 -0.2819 0.8361
Alliance number -0.0126 0.0072 -1.7509 0.0818 -0.0269 0.0016 Y
Past Performance 0.2562 0.0453 5.6627 0.0000 0.1669 0.3456 Y
Industry effect 1      -0.0773 0.3441 -0.2246 0.8226 -0.7566 0.6020
Industry effect 2    -1.2179 0.3404 -3.5781 0.0005 -1.8897 -0.5460 Y
Country effect -0.6829 0.5350 -1.2764 0.2035 -1.7390 0.3732
Respondent's age 0.1441 0.1540 0.9357 0.3508 -0.1599 0.4482
Educational level -0.0587 0.1483 -0.3961 0.6925 -0.3514 0.2339
Major in business   -0.3890 0.2556 -1.5220 0.1299 -0.8936 0.1155
Elite Education 0.3944 0.2948 1.3380 0.1827 -0.1874 0.9762
Tenure -0.0764 0.1476 -0.5177 0.6053 -0.3679 0.2150
Output functional bacground 0.5419 0.2681 2.0213 0.0448 0.0127 1.0711 Y
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4.4.4. Post Hoc Test 
At the initial correlation analysis, the inter-correlation between past 
performance and the moderating variables was high, although VIF test did not suggest 
there was a multicollinearity issue. I further conducted tests by excluding the past 
performance in my analysis to see if the mediating results of my analysis were the 
same. The results of the three mediating models are generally the same and as before, 






Successful implementation of firm strategy depends on a firm’s resources and 
capabilities (Miles and Snow, 1984). The resource-based view suggests that firm 
resources and capabilities affect firm performance (Barney, 1991, Hitt et al., 2000, 
Ray et al., 2004). As firms are increasingly engaged in strategic alliances, 
understanding alliance strategies and alliance capabilities are therefore important to 
explain firm performance (Ireland et al., 2002). Prior studies have studied different 
kinds of alliance strategies (Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009, Parise and Casher, 2003, 
Hoffmann, 2007), which can be grouped into standalone and portfolio strategies. 
These studies tend to investigate either one-off standalone alliances or the alliance 
portfolios in firms. For example, some studies looking at standalone strategy show that 
firms with specific alliance objectives, such as entering into a new market, may be 
beneficial to international performance (Brouthers et al., 2014, Ireland et al., 2002, 
Nakos and Brouthers, 2008, Nakos et al., 2014).  
In contrast, other studies focus on the alliance portfolio strategy and explore 
themes such as the synergistic effect of different alliances in the portfolio on 
performance (Cui and O'Connor, 2012, De Leeuw et al., 2014, Duysters et al., 2012, 
Hoffmann, 2005, Hoffmann, 2007, Jiang et al., 2010, Parise and Casher, 2003, Sarkar 
et al., 2009, Vassolo et al., 2004). Overall, studies have not asked which strategy leads 
to better performance – that is, they have not taken the two groups of alliance strategies 
together to explicitly compare their effect on firm performance. Consequently, it has 
been unclear whether the different alliance strategies firms adopt will influence firm 
performance differently.  
The same problematic situation occurs in studies on alliance capabilities. 
Alliance capability studies suggest that alliance capabilities influence alliance success 
 358 
 
and firm performance (Anand and Khanna, 2000, Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007, Kale 
et al., 2002, Kale and Singh, 2009, Lavie et al., 2012, Sampson, 2005, Sarkar et al., 
2009, Schilke and Goerzen, 2010, Schreiner et al., 2009, Swaminathan and Moorman, 
2009, Zollo et al., 2002). Scholars have implied that there are two levels of alliance 
capabilities, i.e. individual-alliance capabilities and portfolio-alliance capabilities 
(Kale and Singh, 2009, Wang and Rajagopalan, 2015), but none have not made 
distinctions between the two levels of alliance capabilities in their empirical studies. 
Analysing the literature on alliance capabilities, it becomes clear that, in earlier studies, 
scholars tended to study alliance capabilities for individual alliances (Doz, 1996, Dyer 
and Singh, 1998) while in more recent studies, scholars placed more emphasis on the 
capabilities required for managing an entire portfolio of alliances (Heimeriks and 
Duysters, 2007, Hoffmann, 2007, Sarkar et al., 2009). Other scholars make no 
distinction between capabilities for single alliances and capabilities for a portfolio of 
alliance, and focus on demonstrating that alliance capabilities, in general, positively 
influence firm or alliance performance (Anand and Khanna, 2000, Kale et al., 2002, 
Kale and Singh, 2009, Sampson, 2005, Schreiner et al., 2009, Swaminathan and 
Moorman, 2009, Zollo et al., 2002). The missing distinction between individual-
alliance capabilities and portfolio-alliance capabilities leads to the lack of 
understanding on why firms with alliance capabilities may have different performance 
outcomes.  
More importantly, despite the multiple studies on alliance strategies and alliance 
capabilities, we still do not know the linkage between alliance strategy and alliance 
capabilities. We do not know how these two complement each other in order to achieve 
better firm performance. In my study, I first showed that firms do have two different 
types of strategies when they forming their alliances – standalone and portfolio 
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strategies. However, these two kind of alliance strategies do not directly impact on 
firm performance.  
Second, I made a distinction in two levels of alliance capabilities – individual-
alliance capabilities and portfolio-alliance capabilities. Drawing on the resource-
based view, which suggests that firm strategy needs resources and capability to 
implement (Barney, 1991, Miles and Snow, 1984), I argued that alliance strategy 
should not be studied in isolation but should be studied together with alliance 
capabilities in order to explain better or worse firm performance. The results of my 
study showed that individual-alliance capabilities and portfolio-alliance capabilities 
are the mediating influences between alliance strategy and firm performance. This is 
important because it demonstrates that a firm with an alliance strategy will not be 
effective if the firm does not have the right alliance capabilities in place. A firm cannot 
extract benefits from its alliance strategy without the necessary resources and 
capabilities. 
In addition, when analysing alliance capabilities at different levels, I found that 
a firm that can match its alliance strategy with the suitable level of alliance capabilities 
will tend to achieve better firm performance. Firms forming alliances while ignoring 
the potential incompatibility between their alliance strategy and alliance capabilities 
may find that firm performance suffers as a result. Based on my study, firms that form 
alliances taking a standalone strategy require at least individual-alliance capabilities 
to achieve a better firm performance. A firm that forms alliances taking a portfolio 
strategy will require both individual-alliance capabilities and portfolio-alliance 
capabilities in order to achieve a better firm performance. 
I make an important contribution to the literature by comparing standalone 
alliance strategy and portfolio alliance strategy. Prior studies suggest that there are two 
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kinds of alliance strategies (Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009, Parise and Casher, 2003, 
Hoffmann, 2007), and that firms’ ability to capture value is likely to vary when they 
adopt different strategies (Lavie, 2007). As mentioned above, previous literature failed 
to take the two kind of alliance strategies together, which can lead to an incomplete 
picture of how alliance strategy affects firm performance.  
Scholars also suggest that alliance capabilities are important for alliance success 
and alliance performance (Kale et al., 2002, Kale and Singh, 2009, Schreiner et al., 
2009, Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007). However, strategic considerations are not taken 
into account when they analyse alliance capabilities and firm performance. There were 
no studies that brings the concept of alliance strategies and alliance capabilities 
together. Based on the resource-based view, I extend current understanding on alliance 
formation and firm performance by arguing that alliance capabilities should be taken 
into account when studying the relationship between strategy and performance. My 
result shows that the relationship between alliance strategy and firm performance is 
not significant; however, the same relationship mediated by alliance capabilities is 
significant. This implies that strategy alone is not sufficient in alliance operations. 
Adequate alliance capabilities are required to implement the strategy successfully. 
This is an important contribution to the alliance and strategy research, because 
theoretically we understand alliance capabilities are essential and complementary to 
firm strategy, but we did not know how it complements alliance strategy.  
Moreover, my study is different from previous studies on alliance capabilities 
which tend to address alliance capabilities as a whole and analyse their different 
dimensions (Sarkar et al., 2009, Schilke and Goerzen, 2010). By clearly distinguishing 
individual-alliance capabilities from portfolio-alliance capabilities and highlighting 
their mediating effects on specific alliance strategies and firm performance, I 
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complement previous research by providing a more ingrained analysis of different 
alliance capabilities. Although previous literature already signalled that alliance 
capabilities are important to performance, and suggest that there are two levels of 
alliance capabilities (Wang and Rajagopalan, 2015, Kale and Singh, 2009), I 
specifically show the performance benefits of matching the right alliance capabilities 
with the chosen alliance strategy by including two kinds of alliance strategies together 
with different level of alliance capabilities in my analysis.  
My results suggest that the two levels of alliance capabilities can potentially 
contribute to firm performance differently. Firms taking a standalone strategy will 
benefit from individual-alliance capabilities. Firms taking a portfolio strategy will 
benefit most with both individual-alliance capabilities and portfolio-alliance 
capabilities. In other words, a portfolio strategy involves both the capability to manage 
the individual alliances within the portfolio and the relationships between alliances 
inside the portfolio. Without the distinction between the two levels of capabilities, 
firms can only develop alliance capabilities in general and would be unaware that of 
how well their capabilities match with their alliance strategy and have blurred 
understanding on performance outcomes. My research is thus novel in showing that 
individual-alliance capabilities and portfolio-alliances capabilities contribute to 
performance differently.  
In sum, by incorporating two kinds of alliance strategies with two levels of 
alliance capabilities, I contribute to alliance literature by highlighting that the 
identification of the level of alliance capabilities is required to match a firm’s alliance 
strategy to achieve better performance. My study is the first to bring the concepts of 
alliance strategy and alliance capabilities together, and drives a better understanding 
on why firms need relevant resources and capability to implement its strategy when 
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forming alliances.  
Limitations 
Although this study provides valuable insights about alliance strategy, alliance 
capabilities and firm performance, it suffers from a number of limitations. First, I only 
used two industries from Taiwan and China to test my theories, thus the 
generalisability of findings to other industry may not be fully suitable. In addition, the 
level of alliance experiences in my sample firms are quite substantial, given that a high 
percentage of the sample firms have an alliance function in their companies and on 
average formed twenty-one alliances in the past five years. This suggests that my result 
may not be generalizable to industries or firms with less alliance experience. 
Second, firm size was included as control variable in my study, but it was not 
significant. However, large and small firms do have different resources and 
capabilities endowment. In my sampled industries, I was unable to see the differences 
in my result. It would be valuable to further explore whether or not SMEs or 
multinationals might have different results from their alliance operations.  
Third, although the common methods bias has been addressed, the data 
collection techniques could be improved. In my study, only perceptual measures of 
alliance strategy, past performance, firm performance and alliance capabilities were 
used. Scholars note that perceptual measures may be biased and reflect a desired state 
rather than an actual scenario (Brouthers et al., 2003). Future research efforts may 
consider to evaluate secondary data on the collections of firm alliances to validate firm 
alliance strategy. For past performance and firm performance measures, financial data 
from secondary sources can be used for triangulation. 
Fourth, we collected the data on the tendency of choosing alliance strategy and 
after the choice was made. The responses may be an adjusted perception (Brouthers et 
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al., 2003, Brouthers et al., 2000). Future research may consider a longitudinal study, 
and, using improved measures, could clarify how alliance strategic orientation was 
formed and also the process to formulate its alliance strategy. 
Fifth, response bias may be present. One of the cultural differences is that 
Chinese executives, or Chinese in general, tend to avoid extreme response options, or 
exaggerate in their answers. Krosnick (1999) suggests that avoiding extreme answers 
in survey may represent a response bias. Future research may consider designing the 
questionnaire differently to overcome this issue. 
Finally, future research may consider extending the range and measure of the 
managerial characteristics in the control variables. This may help to identify other 
personal factors that have an influence on the tendency of alliance strategy. Additional 
factors may include socioeconomic background, such as income, cultural/ethnicity 
and religion, because these factors may influence one’s attitudes, beliefs and behaviour. 
Future research may wish to focus on SMEs or multinationals to see if they have 
similar results to my study. In addition, future studies can use or develop other 
measures for alliance strategy to capture attributes that are not included in our study. 
Managerial implications 
My results have an important implication for senior executives who are in 
charge of alliance operations because executives’ choice of alliance strategy can lead 
to the development of alliance capabilities and strong alliance capabilities tend to lead 
to a better firm performance. If executives understand what type of alliance strategies 
are suitable for their firms, they can plan suitable levels of alliance capabilities to 
implement alliance strategy. For executives adopting portfolio strategies, both levels 
of alliance capabilities, i.e. individual alliance capabilities and portfolio alliance 
capabilities, are essential to better manage alliance operations and achieve better firm 
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performance. For executives adopting standalone strategies, individual alliance 
capabilities are needed to achieve better performance results. 
Executives must have a clear understanding of their existing alliance capabilities. 
If their alliance capabilities are not sufficient to implement their alliance strategies, 
they must plan how to acquire the necessary alliance capabilities. Managers need to 
ensure that their alliance capabilities are compatible with their alliance strategies. 
In addition, firms are no longer able to work in isolation, and they increasingly 
create a portfolio of alliances and must work with different partners. A portfolio 
strategy may be more suitable in the long-run, regardless of size. Therefore, firms must 
develop both levels of alliance capabilities rather than only individual-alliance 
capabilities. 
My results suggest that the choice of alliance strategy and firms’ alliance 
capabilities can impact on firm performance. They are indispensable parts of firms’ 
alliance operation. 
Conclusion  
By exploring the impact of alliance capabilities (individual-alliance capabilities 
and portfolio-alliance capabilities) between alliance strategy and firm performance, I 
add valuable insights about how the two different levels of alliance capabilities can 
benefit the implementation of firms’ chosen alliance strategies. I also highlight the 
importance of possessing suitable levels of alliance capabilities, hence resulting in 
better firm performance. I add to knowledge by investigating the mediating effect of 
alliance capabilities between alliance strategy and firm performance, noting that 
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Strategic alliances have become popular among firms throughout the global 
business communities, and there has been much research on this form of business 
collaboration. Prior research suggests that strategic alliances often fail (Greve et al., 
2010). Hence, scholars are interested to explain the formation of such corporate 
strategy and its impact on firm performance outcome (e.g. Hoffmann, 2007, Ozcan 
and Eisenhardt, 2009). My research complements previous studies that seek to explain 
why performance is different among firms (e.g. Anand and Khanna, 2000, Kale et al., 
2002, Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007). I argue that a critical step to understanding a 
firm’s alliance operation and firm performance is the executives’ orientation toward 
firms’ alliance strategies. 
Firm performance is contingent on firm strategy and resource reconfiguration 
(Miles and Snow, 1984). Looking at alliance strategy is important and interesting 
because alliance strategy can determine how firms operate their alliances and impact 
on its performance (Hoffmann, 2007). Scholars suggest that firms tend to have either 
a standalone strategy or a portfolio strategy (Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009, Parise and 
Casher, 2003). The question is which of the two strategies do firms tend to have? How 
do they differ in firm performance? What could be the impact of choosing one strategy 
over another? 
Managerial characteristics provide indications on firms’ strategic choice 
(Brouthers et al., 2000, Hitt and Tyler, 1991). Agency theory suggests that 
compensation package may alter managerial behaviour (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). 
Building on upper echelons theory (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) and agency theory 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976), I theorised in my first paper that managerial 
characteristics and compensation package are crucial to understanding why senior 
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executives adopt different alliance strategies. My first study shows that tenure predicts 
choice of alliance strategy. Longer-tenured managers have a stronger orientation 
toward a portfolio strategy while shorter-tenured managers prefer a standalone strategy. 
Furthermore, my study reveals that the level of compensation package, such as 
variable pay, potentially influences executives’ decisions and behaviour. Findings 
highlight that executives with a business major and output functional backgrounds (i.e. 
sales and marketing) are even more likely to choose a standalone strategy when they 
receive a higher level of variable pay. Overall, the first study explains why different 
alliance strategies are adopted in companies. The choice of alliance strategy depends 
on managerial characteristics such as tenure, educational background, functional 
background and the level of variable pay they received.  
In the second study, building on the resource-based view (Barney, 1991), I 
theorised that alliance diversity and alliance strategy are important for understanding 
performance differences among firms in their alliance operations. Many scholars 
suggest that alliance diversity influences firm performance (e.g. Goerzen and Beamish, 
2005, Goerzen, 2007, Jiang et al., 2010), but the effect of alliance diversity on 
performance is still equivocal. This study contributes to previous research by adding 
an additional factor – alliance strategy – to explain the diversity-performance 
relationship. I found that for companies with a highly diverse set of partners, a 
portfolio strategy will help to improve firm performance, while companies that have 
a less diverse set of partners may not benefit from a portfolio strategy to improve firm 
performance. This implies that alliance strategy is important to manage a firm’s 
alliance diversities and can improve firm performance because the potential benefits 
of diverse partners are the external resources and capabilities available to the 
companies. Top executives with an orientation towards a portfolio strategy are more 
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likely to focus on the combination of all resources and capabilities from different 
partners. 
In contrast, firms with a widely diverse set of partners – a standalone strategy –
will not help to improve firm performance, but a standalone strategy can help to 
improve firm performance when the firm has a less diverse set of partners. This 
suggests that firms with less of a degree of partner diversity can benefit from a 
standalone strategy rather than a portfolio strategy. Top executives with an orientation 
towards a standalone strategy tend to focus on the resources and capabilities from each 
individual alliance. Therefore, with a less diverse set of alliance partners, a standalone 
strategy is better than a portfolio strategy.  
In the third study, building on the resource-based view (Barney, 1986, Barney, 
1991, Ireland et al., 2002), I suggest alliance strategy and alliance capabilities are 
important to firm performance. I focus on the relationship between alliance strategy 
and firm performance as well as the impact of alliance capabilities on the relationship 
between alliance strategy and firm performance. Scholars have suggested that there 
are standalone and portfolio strategies (e.g. Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009), but there 
were no studies to understand the relationships between different alliance strategies 
and firm performance. I found that alliance strategies – standalone and portfolio 
strategies – do not directly impact on firm performance. However, alliance strategies 
become significant when companies have the suitable alliance capabilities in place. 
My study complements existing research (Kale and Singh, 2009) by demonstrating 
alliance capabilities are different for managing individual alliances and a portfolio of 
alliances. For firms with an orientation towards a standalone strategy, individual 
alliance capabilities are required in order to achieve better performance. For firms with 
an orientation towards a portfolio strategy, portfolio and individual alliance 
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capabilities are both required.  
In sum, my study shows that the correct alliance capabilities need to be matched 
to the chosen alliance strategy in order to achieve superior firm performance. On the 
one hand, individual alliance capabilities and portfolio alliance capabilities 
complement a portfolio strategy. On the other hand, individual alliance capabilities 
complement a standalone strategy. Previous studies do not make distinctions between 
individual and portfolio alliance capabilities and therefore fail to explain why alliance 
capabilities may not always lead to better performance. 
5.1. Contributions 
From my three studies, I make several important contributions to the strategy 
and alliance literature. First, I contribute to the strategic alliance literature by showing 
why companies choose different alliance strategies. This is an important line of 
enquiry because the literature highlights different alliance strategies, but is unclear on 
what leads to the choice of different alliance strategies. My study suggests that 
managerial characteristics such as tenure, major subject studied, functional 
backgrounds and variable pay influence the manager’s choice of alliance strategy. 
These aspects have not been investigated previously in the literature but are important 
for understanding why companies follow different alliance strategies. In addition, my 
study provides additional support to those scholars (Hoffmann, 2007, Parise and 
Casher, 2003, Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009) who suggest that firms have different 
alliance strategies and the choice of alliance strategy depends on managerial 
characteristics. My study also gives firms a better understanding of the differences 
between the two alliance strategies and provides insights on how managerial 
characteristics and compensation package influence alliance strategy. Thus, 
companies at board level can be more discerning when hiring top management and 
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when reviewing or designing executives’ compensation packages that encourage a 
suitable alliance strategy for alliance operations.  
Second, I contribute to the alliance diversity literature by providing an 
explanation for conflicting or inconclusive results between diversity and performance 
in current literature. By examining the effect of alliance strategy on the relationship 
between alliance diversity and firm performance, I tested three types of alliance 
diversities – partner diversity, functional diversity and governance diversity. Alliance 
strategy has an impact only on the partner diversity and firm performance relationship. 
I show that a portfolio strategy helps firms with a high partner diversity to achieve 
better firm performance, and a standalone strategy is more beneficial for firms with a 
low partner diversity. Therefore, the conflicting results in the partner diversity and 
performance relationship can be explained by including a strategic consideration, i.e. 
when firms choose an appropriate alliance strategy, as it can facilitate the management 
of partner diversity and result in better firm performance. 
In theory, the two different alliance strategies influence how resources and 
capabilities obtained from different types of alliance diversities are managed and 
configured. However, I did not find alliance strategies impact on functional diversity-
firm performance and governance diversity-firm performance relationships. For the 
functional diversity and firm performance relationship, my study confirms with 
previous studies that functional diversity is positively related to firm performance 
(Jiang et al., 2010, van Beers and Zand, 2014) but the impact of alliance strategies on 
functional diversity and performance relationship is not significant. The collaboration 
between different functions are often not the key consideration for alliance formation. 
Therefore, the benefit of having an alliance strategies is less important for managing 




For governance diversity and firm performance relationship, my study does not 
confirm with previous studies that greater governance diversity is negatively related 
to firm performance (Jiang et al., 2010). In contrast, my study shows that greater 
governance diversity is positively related to firm performance only when partner 
diversity is also considered (See Model 4, Table 3-4). Interestingly, high partner 
diversity is likely to require different governance structures to manage value 
appropriation (Lavie, 2007), inter-organisational learning (Kogut, 1988) and 
transaction cost (Reuer and Arino, 2007), and low partner diversity is less so. Although 
I did not find the effect of alliance strategy on governance diversity and performance 
relationship, my study shows some differences from previous studies and raises an 
interesting question about the relationship between governance diversity and partner 
diversity. 
Third, I contribute to the alliance capabilities literature by making a distinction 
between individual alliance capabilities and portfolio alliance capabilities, and linking 
them to alliance strategy. Previous studies do not link alliance strategy with alliance 
capabilities. My study is the first to bring the concepts of alliance strategy and alliance 
capabilities together, and this provides a better understanding on why firms need 
relevant resources and capability to implement strategy when forming alliances. My 
findings show that when the alliance strategy is linked with the right level of alliance 
capabilities, better firm performance will follow. In other words, a portfolio strategy 
requires individual alliance capabilities and portfolio alliance capabilities to work, 
while a standalone strategy requires individual capabilities. The matching of the right 
alliance capabilities with the chosen alliance strategy can benefit firm performance. 
Managers should be aware that if they favour standalone strategy they should develop 
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individual alliance capabilities within their firms in order to achieve a better 
performance. Likewise, managers who favour a portfolio strategy will have a better 
performance if both individual alliance and portfolio alliance capabilities are present 
in the organisation.  
5.2. Limitations 
Although this research provides valuable insights and contributions to different 
areas of alliance literature, it also suffers from a few limitations. First, I collected the 
data on the tendency of choosing alliance strategy after the choice was made. The 
responses may be an adjusted perception (Brouthers et al., 2003, Brouthers et al., 2000, 
Brouthers, 2013a) and potentially represent social desirability bias (Nederhof, 1985). 
Second, I tested my theories based on two industries from Taiwan and China. I 
do not know if my finding is generalisable to firms in other industries, or in other 
countries, especially western countries such as the US and UK, or other developed 
countries. In addition, the sample firms had quite strong experiences on strategic 
alliances, and my result may not be generalisable to firms with less strategic alliance 
experiences.  
Third, firm size was included as a control variable in my study, but it was not 
significant. However, large and small firms do have different resources and 
capabilities endowment. In my sample industries, I was unable to see the differences 
in my result. It would be valuable to further explore whether SMEs or multinationals 
might have different results from their alliance operations.  
Fourth, response bias may be present. My observation is that Chinese executives 
or Chinese in general tend to avoid extreme response options, or exaggerate in their 
answers. Krosnick (1999) suggests that avoiding extreme answers in surveys may 
represent a response bias. It would be interesting to see whether executives from other 
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countries might answer the survey differently and produce a different result. 
5.3. Future Research 
While the research that I presented shows various valuable results and 
theorisation related to firm alliance strategies, alliance diversity and alliance 
capabilities, there are still many areas that can be improved and further explored. First, 
future research can take a different data collection approach, such as a longitudinal 
study, and consider using improved measures for alliance strategies. This may clarify 
how alliance strategic orientation was formed in more depth and provide a better 
understanding on how executives manage their alliance strategies. Also, a longitudinal 
study may facilitate the investigation on how different types of alliance diversities are 
formulated. This approach may allow to further test the theories from each of the 
studies. 
Second, my study builds on upper echelons theory and agency theory to explain 
the choice of alliance strategy. Brouthers (2013b) suggest that executives make 
strategic decisions based on a number of firm-specific, industry-specific and country-
specific factors . Managers may make decisions based on all these factors, which can 
influence the choice of alliance strategy and firm performance. My study did not 
include all factors. Therefore, future research can consider other factors by drawing 
on other theoretical frameworks that are important to alliance strategy, such as, 
transaction cost model (Brouthers et al., 2003, Brouthers, 2013a), resources 
dependence theory (Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009) and social network theory (Gulati et 
al., 2000), or to combine these theories with upper echelons theory as well as agency 
theory, which I presented to examine the choice of alliance strategy. This may offer 
alternative or complementary views on the choice of alliance strategy and extend our 
understanding of alliance strategy and firm performance. 
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Third, I included a measure of alliance experience as a control variable in my 
study. A recent study suggests that explorative and exploitative alliance experiences 
influence innovation performance (Subramanian and Soh, 2016). Further 
distinguishing explorative and exploitative alliance experiences may reveal more 
information on alliance capabilities, and the potential impact on alliance strategy and 
firm performance. 
Fourth, my research shows that different alliances strategies have different 
impact on performance. Future research may explore different facets of alliance 
strategies. For example, firms are no longer able to simply work in isolation. Firms 
need to learn to co-create with various partners in order to achieve better performance 
on collaborative projects. There is still little understanding on the co-creation of 
products and services in the strategic alliance context. Future research may build on 
my research and explore co-creation in alliance strategy. 
5.4. Managerial Implications 
My study confirms that managers have different orientations toward their 
alliance strategies to manage their alliance operations. Some tends towards a portfolio 
strategy, while others tend towards a standalone strategy. My study, like the previous 
work of Parise and Casher (2003) and Ozcan and Eisenhardt (2009), suggests that 
companies can benefit from a portfolio strategy because managers adopt a holistic 
view on how to reconfigure and recombine firm resources to achieve companies’ 
objectives. In particular, my study indicates that firms can achieve greater performance 
if they adopt a portfolio strategy when the firms have a diverse set of partners, i.e. high 
level of partner diversity. However, firms may not benefit from a portfolio strategy if 
they only have limited types of partners, i.e. low level of partner diversity.  
Moreover, managers who were previously confused about why diversity may 
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lead to better performance in some cases but not others can now understand that 
alliance strategy is a determining factor. Different alliance strategies will lead to firms 
managing resources and capabilities differently, hence influencing the impact of 
diversity on firm performance. Therefore, in order to reap the benefits of diversity, 
managers need to decide not only on high versus low diversity in alliances but also the 
appropriate alliance strategy for the chosen level of diversity. 
In addition, my study suggests that companies can achieve better performance 
if they possess both individual and portfolio alliance capabilities to implement a 
portfolio strategy. If companies choose to operate a standalone alliance strategy, they 
should at least possess individual alliance capability. In contrast, if companies choose 
a portfolio alliance strategy, they should possess both individual and portfolio alliance 
capabilities. It is imperative for managers to understand what kind of alliance 
strategies their companies should adopt. Managers should also have a clear 
understanding of their existing alliance capabilities and ensure that their alliance 
capabilities match with their alliance strategy. This way, managers can plan for a 
suitable level of alliance capabilities to implement the alliance strategy they choose.  
In conclusion, my research provides a more in-depth analysis of alliance 
strategy and contributes to a better understanding of why alliances may fail or succeed. 
When studying alliance performance, it is important to understand that managerial 
characteristics of top executives can lead to a standalone alliance strategy or portfolio 
alliance strategy. Having a standalone alliance strategy or portfolio alliance strategy 
has a different impact on a firm’s performance. In particular, if there is a high level of 
diversity in the alliances, a portfolio alliance strategy can enhance the benefits of 
alliance diversity on performance while a standalone alliance strategy less so. Firm 
performance is also affected by how well the capabilities are matched with the chosen 
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alliance strategy. This research complements previous alliance strategy research by 
underlining the importance of distinguishing standalone versus portfolio alliance 
strategy and highlighting the ramifications such distinctions can bring to the 
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Appendix A. Elite Universities in China 
Source: Chinese Alumni Association 2016 
  
Peking University Tsinghua University
Fudan University Wuhan University
Zhejiang University Renmin University of China
Shanghai Jiao Tong University Nanjing University
National University of Defense Technology Sun Yat-Sen University
Jilin University University of science and technology of China
Huazhong University of Science and Technology Sichun University
Bejing Normal University Nankai University
Xian Jiao Tong University Central South University
Tongji University Tianjiang University
Shandong University Harbin Institute of Technology
Xiamen University Southeast University
Beihang University Northeastern University China
Chongqing University East China Normal University
Dalian University of Technology Beijing Institute of Technology
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Appendix B. Elite Universities in Taiwan 
Source：QS World University ranking 2015-16 
National Taiwan University National Tsing Hua University
National Chiao Tung University National Cheng Kung
National Taiwan  university of Science and
technology
National Yang Ming University
National Taiwan Normal University National Sun Yat-Sen University
National Central University Taipei Medical University
Chang Gung University National Chung Hsing University
National Taipeu University of Technology National Cheng Chi University
